In State v. Brown,
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The pertinent facts are not disputed. Trooper Davis stopped defendant for speeding
Based on Davis’s belief that what he had found was methamphetamine, and because in his experience “illegal drug users often carry small amounts to moderate amounts [of drugs] on their person or in their vehicles” and “often carry weapons,” he proceeded to search defendant’s car for further evidence of drugs or weapons. Davis found a backpack in the trunk that smelled strongly of marijuana; in that backpack there were two large individually packaged bags of marijuana. He also found additional white powder residue that he believed to be cocaine, methamphetamine, or heroin.
Davis’s discoveries led to three charges against defendant: delivery of marijuana, ORS 475.860(2) (Count 1); possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894 (Count 2); and possession of four or more ounces of marijuana, ORS 475.864(3) (Count 3). Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car, the methamphetamine-related evidence seized from his person as a result of the patdown, and his admission to Davis that the pipe in his pocket was a methamphetamine pipe. As to the evidence seized from defendant’s car, defendant did not dispute that Davis had probable cause to believe the car contained contraband or evidence of a crime at the time that he searched it. However, he contended that the automobile exception did not authorize Davis’s search because Davis had stopped defendant for speeding—not in connection with a crime— and that no other exception to the warrant requirement applied. The trial court rejected that argument, concluding that the automobile exception, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Brown, authorized the search of the car because Davis had lawfully stopped the car and had probable cause for the search. The court also denied defendant’s motion as to defendant’s statement and as to the methamphetamine pipe. Thereafter, the state dismissed Counts 2 and 3, and, following a stipulated facts trial, the trial court convicted defendant on Count 1 for delivery of marijuana.
Defendant appeals. He raises three assignments of error, contending that the trial court erred by not suppressing the evidence from his car, the evidence from his person, and his admission regarding the methamphetamine pipe.
In response, the state argues that the trial court correctly concluded that the automobile exception adopted in Brown authorized Davis’s search of defendant’s car, notwithstanding
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As framed by the parties, the legal issue before us is whether the Oregon automobile exception adopted in Brown authorizes a warrantless search where an officer lawfully stops a moving car for a traffic violation, rather than a crime, but then develops probable cause that the car contains contraband or evidence of a crime during the course of the stop. That issue is one of law, and we therefore review for legal error. State v. Finlay,
ANALYSIS
The question presented is one which, as noted, we have not answered directly and the Supreme Court has not addressed explicitly: Does the automobile exception adopted in Brown apply to authorize a warrantless search of a vehicle where, as here, an officer lawfully conducts a roadside traffic stop for a traffic violation and, during the course of the stop, develops probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime? Because the automobile exception derives from Supreme Court precedent, answering that question requires us to determine whether the Supreme Court, in adopting the exception, intended it to apply under the circumstances present here. See State v. Smalley,
The starting place for our analysis is Brown. That is because Brown is the case in which our Supreme Court first recognized the automobile exception, and the court has since explained that it continues to adhere to that articulation of the exception. See Kurokawa-Lasciak,
“We are convinced that adoption of a ‘per se exigency rule’ is a sound approach which provides the clearest guidelines for police in conducting automobile searches. Exigencies should not be determined on a case-by-case basis. Police need clear guidelines by which they can gauge and regulate their conduct rather than trying to follow a complex set of rules dependent upon the particular time, location and manner of highway stops.”
Brown,
Although Brown itself involved the lawful stop of a moving vehicle for suspected criminal activities, we identify three indications that lead us to conclude that the automobile exception applies when officers lawfully stop a moving vehicle, regardless of whether the stop was for a traffic violation or for a crime.
First, the plain words of the exception announced in Brown indicate as much. To reiterate, the rule states, “ [P]robable cause to believe that a lawfully stopped automobile which was mobile at the time of the stop contains contraband or other crime evidence justifies an immediate warrantless search of the entire automobile for the object of the search, despite the absence of any additional exigent circumstances.” Id. at 277. As we have recognized, that broad wording suggests that the exception applies whenever police lawfully stop a moving vehicle (assuming the requisite probable cause), regardless of whether the lawful stop is for a traffic violation or for a crime. Andersen,
Second, the court’s reasons for adopting the exception support the conclusion that it applies in the context of traffic stops as well as stops for suspected criminal activity. The stated purpose of the rule was to provide clear guidelines to police as to when they are permitted to search a car during a roadside stop, guidelines that did not depend “upon the [particular] time, location and manner of highway stops.” Brown,
Third, in recognizing the automobile exception, the court cited a number of decisions from other state courts, stating that it found them persuasive, at least three of which upheld warrantless searches of automobiles in the context of roadside stops for traffic violations. Brown,
Beyond those indicia of the scope of the Oregon automobile exception in Brown itself, the court’s decision in State v. Watson,
In arguing that the Oregon automobile exception does not apply in the context of a roadside stop for a traffic violation, defendant relies heavily on wording that appears in Kurokawa-Lasciak, Meharry, and Kock. Specifically, defendant notes that, in Kurokawa-Lasciak, the Supreme Court stated that Brown and Kock require “that, to qualify for the automobile exception, the vehicle that the police search must be mobile at the time that police encounter it in connection with a suspected crime.” Kurokawa-Lasciak,
Divorced from its context, the wording on which defendant relies could be read to suggest that those cases contracted the scope of the automobile exception as recognized in Brown, limiting its applicability to stops for criminal activity, thereby rendering it inapplicable in the context of traffic stops. However, the context of that wording persuades us that that was not the court’s intention. Kock, Meharry, and Kurokawa-Lasciak are all cases involving parked cars; that is, cars “that had not just been lawfully stopped by a police officer.” Kock,
In sum, we conclude that the Oregon automobile exception adopted in Brown applies where, as here, police lawfully stop a moving car for a traffic violation and develop probable cause to search the car for contraband or evidence of criminal activity. The trial court, therefore, correctly concluded that Davis’s
Affirmed.
Notes
State v. Belander,
As to the methamphetamine-related evidence (the methamphetamine residue and defendant’s admission about the pipe), the state argues that we need not reach defendant’s arguments regarding that evidence because the admission of that evidence, if erroneous, was harmless. The state points out that defendant was convicted solely of delivery of marijuana, and not for possession of methamphetamine, and argues that the admission of the methamphetamine did not “infect defendant’s only conviction—marijuana delivery.” We agree with the state that any error was necessarily harmless, in light of the fact that evidence likely had no effect on the trial court’s decision to convict defendant of possession of marijuana. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court as to that assignment of error.
The court opined:
“In this modem day of electronics and computers, we foresee a time in the near future when the warrant requirement of the state and federal constitutions can be fulfilled virtually without exception. All that would be needed in this state would be a central facility with magistrates on duty and available 24 hours a day. All police in the state could call in by telephone or other electronic device to the central facility where the facts, given under oath, constituting the purported probable cause for search and seizure would be recorded. The magistrates would evaluate those facts and, if deemed sufficient to justify a search and seizure, the magistrate would immediately issue an electronic warrant authorizing the officer on the scene to proceed. The warrant could either be retained in the central facility or electronically recorded in any city or county in the state. Thus, the desired goal of having a neutral magistrate could be achieved without the present invasion of the rights of a citizen created by the delay under our current cumbersome procedure and yet would fully protect the rights of the citizen from warrantless searches.”
Brown,