State v. BlanchardState v. Blanchard
We granted the state‘s application in the present case to determine whether the court of appeal erred in setting aside as an abuse of discretion a ruling by the trial judge that respondent сould not withdraw his “best interest” pleas, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), on three counts of indecent behavior with juveniles in violation of
The state initially charged respondent in a single grand jury indictment with two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor,
Trial of respondent on two counts of indecent behavior with a juvenile and one count of sexual battery began with jury selection on Monday, December 7, 1998. The court then recеssed trial until the following Wednesday. On the morning of December 9, 1998, F.K., whose whereabouts had been discovered by the state only hours before trial was set to resume, appeared in court to testify on the state‘s Prieur notice. After hearing F.K.‘s testimony, and entertaining argument on the motion, the court deferred ruling on the admissibility of the other crimes evidence until it cоnsidered the testimony of M.H. and M.B.B. during trial. The state therefore agreed not to mention the F.K. incident in its opening remarks to the jury. At the close of this hearing conducted out of the jurors’ presence, respondent conferred with counsel and subsequently entered his Alford pleas on three counts of indecent behavior with a juvenile, the third count reduced by the stаte from an original charge of sexual battery involving M.B.B. The record contains no disposition of the counts charging contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
Respondent subsequently moved to withdraw his pleas, alleging that a variety of factors had combined to undercut the voluntariness of his decision to forego trial. After conducting a hearing at which resрondent, defense counsel and the prosecutor testified, the court denied the motion and sentenced respondent to serve six years imprisonment at hard labor on one count. On the remaining counts, the court sentenced respondent to concurrent seven-year terms of imprisonment, suspended, with consecutive five-year probationary terms. Among the conditions imposed on respondent‘s probationary terms is the requirement that he register and provide notice of his sex offender status according to law.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed upon finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying respondent‘s motion to withdraw his pleas. State v. Blanchard, 99-1076 (La.App. 3rd Cir.3/22/00), ___ So.2d ___ (unpub‘d). The court of appeal focused on three factors. First, the trial court had failed to mention the sex offender registration and notice provisions of
In the present case, we find no arbitrariness in the trial judge‘s rejection of those factors deemed by the court of appeal critical to the defendant‘s motion to withdraw his pleas. With regard to the trial court‘s failure to address Louisiana’ sex offender registration and notice provisions at the time resрondent entered his pleas, we made our observation as to the importance of a similar failing in Calhoun in the context of testimony by the petitioner at the hearing on his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea that he had “learned of the registration requirements only after he had entered his guilty pleas and, then, only after someone had informed his wife of the sex offеnder registration laws.” Calhoun, 96-0786 at 4, 694 So.2d at 912. However, we cautioned in Calhoun that “[t]oday, we conclude only that the district court‘s failure to timely notify a defendant of the registration requirements is a factor that can undercut the voluntary nature of a guilty plea....” Id., 96-0786 at 9, n. 6, 694 So.2d at 914.
In the present case, and despite the allegations in the written motion to withdraw, the testimony of defense counsel and respondent at the evidentiary hearing made clear that respondеnt was well aware of the sex offender notice and registration laws before he entered his pleas and that he had sought a disposition of the case by which he could avoid the reporting requirements altogether. Respondent testified that he would not have entered his pleas if he had known with certainty that he would have to comply with the registration law. Nevertheless, on the basis of defense counsel‘s explanation that by entering “best interest” pleas he “wasn‘t really pleading guilty or wasn‘t really pleading innocent,” respondent had “assumed that I no longer would have to report.” However, respondent did not attribute that assumption to any representations made by the trial court, the prоsecutor, or by defense counsel. In fact, defense counsel testified that he informed respondent that he would have to register if he pleaded guilty and it appeared to counsel that respondent, who was a college graduate, had understood the consequences of a proceeding which would end in convictions for sexual offenses. It appears that the decision to enter “best interest” pleas was to accommodate respondent‘s steadfast claims of innocence and not to shelter
With regard to the state‘s notice of its intent to introduce the testimony of F.K. at trial, testimony at the hearing established that despite the state‘s notice in the week before jury selection began that it would seek to introduce her testimony under
Nevertheless, although pressed by defense counsel for an immediate ruling, the trial judge deferred his decision because “the only way this thing can be handled is I‘ve got to hear the other evidence before I can determine if this is relevant or not.” Although preferable, a pretrial resolution of the issue “is not always required.” State v. McDermitt, 406 So.2d 195, 201 (La.1981) (citations omitted); see United States v. Kelley, 120 F.R.D. 103, 109 (E.D.Wis.1988) (“Notwithstanding the defendant‘s professed desire to resolve these evidentiary matters [concerning other criminal acts] by motions in limine, this issue of admissibility of evidence can be more aрpropriately raised at trial where the findings of relevance and probative value versus prejudice are better addressed.“); State v. Schmidt, 97-0249, p. 7 (La.App. 3rd Cir.7/29/97), 699 So.2d 448, 452 (“The finding required for admissibility under
Respondent testified at the evidentiary hearing that he “plead guilty because I didn‘t think trial was in the best of my interest at the time because we were not prepared to rebut Ms. Frances King as part of the evidence in that trial.” His
In this context, the trial cоurt had a reasonable basis for concluding that the pressure brought to bear on the defense by the state‘s intent to introduce evidence of the F.K. incident stemmed not from its decision to defer ruling on the state‘s notice but from the state‘s unanticipated resourcefulness in finding the witness and producing her in open court. Although the prosecutor testified аt the evidentiary hearing that it was “absolutely not” his intent to place additional pressure on respondent to reconsider his decision to stand trial by offering him a preview of F.K.‘s testimony, any pressure brought to bear on respondent in that regard was “an inevitable—and permissible—attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the nеgotiation of pleas .... [and which] necessarily accept[s] as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor‘s interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Beatty, 391 So.2d 828, 830 (La.1980) (“[A] guilty plea often involves a choice between undesirable alternatives. The fact that neither road offеrs the prospect of a pleasant journey does not render the plea involuntary as a matter of law.“).
Finally, defense counsel conceded at the evidentiary hearing that the prosecutor had informed him in advance of jury selection that he knew members of both victims’ families. According to the prosecutor, at that time, defense counsel professed that any acquaintanceship would not present a problem. However, counsel testified that he did not “connect” with the information until after selection of the jury. His sudden realization caused him “some uneasiness.” In particular, defense counsel and the mother of one of the victims sang in the same church choir and hе “knew her very well.” According to defense counsel, he conveyed that information to respondent, who testified at the evidentiary hearing that on the night before trial he had sensed that counsel had lost confidence and “was not going to be comfortable with attacking the district attorney‘s prosecution like he had been, like he had acted earlier.”
Nevertheless, counsel‘s failure to “connect” immediately with the information provided by the prosecutor indicates that the relationships were too attenuated to have explained respondent‘s perception of counsel‘s eroding zeal for trial. See State v. Kirkpatrick, 443 So.2d 546, 552 (La.1983) (“In the present case, no member of the victim‘s family appeared as a witness so as to cause a conflict of interest [and] [d]efense counsel‘s familiarity with the victim‘s family was so attenuated that he had to question the individual that he
In summary, we find no abuse of the trial court‘s discretiоn in concluding that the sudden prospect of defending against evidence provided by F.K., coupled with the state‘s agreement to reduce the charge of sexual battery involving M.B.B., provided the impetus for respondent‘s pleas. The court conducted a thorough plea colloquy with respondent during which it fully advised him of the trial rights he was waiving and obtainеd respondent‘s assurances that he understood his trial rights, that he was waiving them voluntarily, and that he was satisfied with the representation he had received from defense counsel. Unlike the case in Calhoun, in which the admission by trial counsel that he simply “blew it” with regard to pre-trial preparation played an important part in our determination to set aside the guilty plea, Calhoun, 96-0786 at 10-11, 694 So.2d at 914-15, respondent‘s attorney testified at the evidentiary hearing that “we were prepared to refute the allegations of the two juveniles.” It also appears that counsel was not caught completely off guard by the unanticipated availability of F.K. to the state. Under these circumstances, the court of appeal erred in setting aside the trial judge‘s ruling on respondent‘s motion to withdraw his pleas as an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeal is reversed and this case is remanded for consideration of respondent‘s remaining assignments of error.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL REVERSED; CASE REMANDED.