121 S.E. 488 | W. Va. | 1924
At the October term, 1923, of the circuit court of Tucker county the defendants were indicted jointly for the larceny of one "black and tan male dog", valued at $75.00, the property of W. F. Lipscomb. The indictment contains two counts, the first in the usual form for grand larceny, and the second in like form with the further averment that taxes had been duly assessed and paid on said dog within one year next preceding the finding of the indictment.
By demurrer and motion to quash the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the indictment and each count thereof. The lower court having sustained the demurrer to, and motion to quash, the first count, and overruled them as to the second count, the case is hereby certified from these rulings.
At common law, although the owner had a qualified or base property in his dog sufficient to maintain an action for recovery of possession, or damages for the conversion or injury thereof, such animal was not the subject of larceny.Davis v. Commonwealth, 17 Gratt. 617; 2 Wharton Criminal Law *469 (11th Ed.) Sec. 1107; Macklin's Case, 3 Leigh 809. As to those animals, which do not serve for food, and which therefore the law holds to have no intrinsic value, as dogs of all sorts, and other creatures kept for whim and pleasure, though a man may have a base property therein, and maintain a civil action for the loss of them, yet they are not of such estimation, as that the crime of stealing them amounts to larceny". IV Blackstone, 235. It follows that the demurrer to, and motion to quash, the first count, founded upon the common law alone, were properly sustained.
The second count, however, is predicated upon Section 9-a-1, Chapter
"Any person who shall willfully, or maliciously steal, poison, wound or kill any such dog or dogs listed as personal property as aforesaid, shall upon conviction be punished as provided by law for stealing, poisoning, wounding or killing other property; and the owner of such dog or dogs, so stolen, wounded, poisoned or killed, after complying with the provisions of this act, may have a right of action in damages against any such person or persons guilty of a violation of the provisions of this act for the sum not exceeding the assessed value of such dog or dogs."
Defendants contend that this statute has been repealed by Chapter
Section 2324, Virginia Code, 1919, expressly provides that all dogs which have been assessed with license tax and upon which said license is not delinquent shall be deemed personal property and may be the subject of larceny and malicious or unlawful trespass.
The second count in the indictment charges that the defendants unlawfully and feloniously did steal, take and carry away" the dog. As this charge includes all the elements necessary to constitute the offense of unlawfully taking and carrying away personal property under Section 27, Chapter 145, Code, we do not think the unnecessary allegation, that the *471 act was done "feloniously", should render the count bad for that purpose. We therefore hold that defendants may be tried and punished under this count of the indictment, as provided in said Section 27. The comprehensive form of indictment prescribed by Section 28 is not exclusive.
The rulings of the circuit court will, therefore, be affirmed.
Affirmed.