69 Conn. 64 | Conn. | 1897
This is a complaint brought by the State of Connecticut against Henry T. Blake, the sole surviving trustee under the will of Philip Marett, late of New Haven, deceased, and certain others who are legatees under the will. In a general way the gravamen of the complaint is this: The plaintiff claims to be entitled to the one tenth part of the estate of the said Marett which is now in the hands of Mr. Blake as the said trustee, while the other legatees claim that they are entitled to the same one tenth of that estate. The complaint prays for an injunction restraining the said trustee, Blake, from paying over the same to the other legatees, and for an order and decree commanding him to pay the same to the plaintiff.
Philip Marett was an inhabitant of New Haven and died
The widow of Mr. Maretfc died September , 1878, and his only child on September 8th, 1889. The trustees thereafter settled their trust accounts with the Court of Probate, and on the 1st day of November, 1889, asked for an order of distribution of the estate. And thereupon, after due notice and hearing, an order was made on the 27-th day of November, 1889, by the said Court of Probate, commanding the trustees to distribute and pay over the funds in their hands to the persons and corporations entitled to receive the same under the will of the said deceased. Pursuant to that order the trustees distributed the several portions of said estate bequeathed by said will to the parties entitled thereto under the provisions of the same, and in accordance therewith and with the orders and decrees of said Court of Probate, except the portion bequeathed to the State of Connecticut in trust, the income to be applied, etc., etc., as appears in the will. In making the distribution as aforesaid, a practical difficulty had confronted the trustees in respect to that portion of the fund bequeathed to the city of New Haven in trust, the income to be used to supply fuel and other necessaries for indigent persons, not paupers, an account of which and the disposition thereof is set out at length in the case of Dailey v. New Haven, 60 Conn. 314.
Prior to the 27th day of June, 1893, such things had been done by the State of Connecticut and by its executive officers, and by the legislature, that Mr. Henry T. Blake, then the sole trustee, decided that the State had refused to accept the bequest to it under the will; and on said. day he made an application to the Court of Probate in the district of New Haven, setting forth that the State had refused to accept the bequest, and praying said court to appoint another trustee
That appeal came to the Superior Court in New Haven county and was heard in September, 1895. That court made a finding of facts, among other things finding in effect, as the pleadings in the case stated, that the State had refused to accept said bequest, and reserved all the questions of law arising on the ease for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors. The Supreme Court of Errors gave its advice to the Superior Court, as appears in the case of The President and Fellows of Yale College et al., Appeal from Prolate, 67 Conn. 237—that the said order and decree of the Court of Probate appointing Rufus E. Holmes trustee, was void, and should be set aside; because, by the terms of Mr. Marett’s will, upon the refusal of the State to accept the said bequest, Mr. Blake must distribute the fund remaining in his hands in augmentation, proportionately, of the other trusts. On the 14th day of February, 1896, the said Superior Court rendered its judgment in said cause in accordance with the advice and opinion of the Supreme Court of Errors; among other things adjudging and deciding “ that the said State of Connecticut did, prior to December 13th, 1893, decline and refuse, and ever since [said] last mentioned date has declined and refused to accept said trust.”
The complaint alleges that the State had accepted the bequest made in its favor in the will of Mr. Marett. This allegation shows the construction which the State puts on that will, viz: that an acceptance by the legatee is a condition precedent to the right of the legatee to receive the bequest. This is doubtless the necessary construction which the will must bear. Seeley v. Hincks, 65 Conn. 1; 2 Woerner’s Amer. Law of Admin., § 440; Marston v. Marston, 47 Me. 495. This allegation of the complaint was denied in the answer, and the court found it not to be true,—that the State had not accepted the' bequest, but had refused to accept it.
The plaintiff—now appellant—insists that the finding is vitiated by errors, and must be set aside. Very many errors are assigned, but they can all be easity divided into three or four classes, and considered in that way: First, those that depend upon the authority of the State treasurer; second, those that depend on the action of the legislature; third, those that depend on the construction of the case of Dailey v. New Haven; and fourth, those that depend upon the rulings upon evidence.
Before adverting to any of these errors, it will be instructive to consider what an acceptance by the State, of the legacy in Mr. Marett’s will, really meant. The acceptance of that bequest required more than a willingness to take the money. It included also a promise on the part of the legatee to expend the income of the money for the charitable purpose which the testator had indicated. The legacy included a trust. The fund which the legatee was to receive was a trust fund. The legatee was to become a trustee under obligations to expend the income of the fund in accordance with the provisions of the will. Such an acceptance on the part of the State could only be made by some one authorized to bind the State to the perfoi'mance of the trust. The question being not only who should take the fund, but who should execute and perform the trust. In this sense the State treasurer had no authority whatever to accept the bequest of the will. The State treasurer is the proper custodian of all moneys belonging to the State. The Constitution says of the treasurer, Art. IV., § 17 : “ He shall receive all monies belonging to the State, and disburse the same only as he may be directed by law.” This is the full measure of his authority. General Statutes, Chap..33. The treasurer may receive money, but he cannot control in any way as to its disbursement. He had no authority to bind the State to the performance of the trust. Notice to the treasurer, or want of notice to him, could be no more than a circumstance tending to show whetherthe State had, or had not, accepted the bequest.
It is urged' that the legislature could express its intention on this question only by some affirmative act; that is, by some vote or act saying in terms that it did accept, or that it did not accept. This argument cannot be sustained. The inquiry before the Superior Court was whether or not the legislature had expressed its intention on the question of accepting the bequest'in Mr. Marett’s will. The Governor had'in his message called the attention of the legislature to the fact of the bequest, and had requested them to take appropriate action thereon. A bill thereafter was introduced which by its terms provided that the State should accept the said bequest, and that the income should be expended as is expressed in the will. This bill was by both houses referred to the joint standing committee-on the judiciary. In committee it was considered and a report made recommending that the bill ought not to pass. That report was accepted by both houses and the bill was rejected. This action was affirmative action on the report of the committee. The report of the committee was accepted. If the report of the committee had been rejected and the bill passed, that would have been an unmistakable indication that the legislature intended to accept the bequest. But the legislative intention to refuse to accept the bequest is none the less distinct when the report is accepted and the bill rejected. Rejecting a bill to approve is as decisive as adopting a bill to reject. And so far as the present case is concerned the legal effect is the same in the
The plaintiff offered to prove that at the hearing before the judiciary committee on the said bill, the decision of this court in the case of Dailey v. New Haven was produced and read, and that the committee was misled thereby as to the effect on said bequest which a refusal by the State to accept would have, and offered other evidence of what occurred on said hearing before said committee, and claimed therefrom that said committee acted under a mistake in reporting that said bill ought not to pass; and that the legislature acted under a mistake when it voted to accept said report and reject the said bill, and therefore the vote was not binding on the State. This evidence on objection was ruled out. One ground for such ruling was that whatever took place before said committee was not made known to the legislature, and that the private reason which influenced the individual members of the legislature could not be shown for the purpose of affecting a legislative act. The intention of the legislature. can only be shown by its vote. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; Flint etc. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99; Sutherland on Stat. Construction, § 430; Endlich on Statutes, § 32.
Another reason was that the said evidence did not tend to prove any such mistake. That decision was not a fact relevant to show such a mistake. The will of Mr. Marett provided that if any bequest therein made was not accepted, the amount intended therefor should be distributed, proportionately, in augmentation of the other bequests which were accepted. One bequest was of a fifth part of the residue of
What we have now said shows that there is no material error in the rulings upon evidence. So far as these rulings relate to the State treasurer, they are immaterial; so far as they relate to the legislature, the evidence did tend to show that the legislature had knowledge of Mr. Mare’tt’s will when it voted on the bill reported by the judiciary committee.
But there is another ground which is, perhaps, quite as decisive of this ease as the one already considered: that the Superior Court, as a court of equity, has no jurisdiction to interfere with the settlement of Philip Marett’s estate. The settlement of estates is by law committed exclusively to the Court of Probate; and the Superior Court has no jurisdiction in such matters except by appeal from some order of the Court of Probate.
We have already mentioned that the testate estate of Philip Marett was in settlement in the Court of Probate. The trustee under the will having lawfully distributed all but one tenth of the estate, was about to distribute that one tenth, pursuant to the order of that court, to the persons and corporations who, under the will, were, as that court had decided, entitled to receive the same. In this condition the plaintiff, alleging that the persons and corporations to whom the said trustee was about to make the distribution, were not entitled thereto, sought to obtain a decree of the Superior
The decree of the Court of Probate establishing the will of Mr. Marett was in the nature of a judgment in rem, and conclusive on everybody who had any interest in the will, or the property conveyed thereby. All such persons are parties to the proceedings. Johnes v. Jackson, 67 Conn. 81, 90; Thompkins v. Thompkins, 1 Story, 547. The present plaintiff was a party to that proceeding sufficiently to be bound thereby. Our statutes give to all the decrees of a Court of Probate in the settlement of estates, in a very large degree the character of proceedings in rem; because they are necessarily conclusive on the matter in controversy, for the common safety and repose of mankind. No such decree can be attacked except by appeal taken within the time limited. General Statutes, §436; Gallup v. Smith, 59 Conn. 354; Lake's Appeal, 32 id. 331; Lancaster's Appeal, 47 id. 248. The Court of Probate in New Haven, having jurisdiction to establish the will of Mr. Marett, has exclusive jurisdiction to
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.