State v. BlackwellState v. Blackwell
Richard Ieyoub, Attorney General, Jerry L. Jones, District Attorney, George D. Ross, Asst. Dist. Atty., Counsel for Appellee.
Before NORRIS, C.J., and GASKINS and PEATROSS, JJ.
PEATROSS, J.
Defendant, James Blackwell, was convicted as charged of eight counts of carnal knowledge of a juvenile in violation of
FACTS
During the spring of 1996, the 35-year-old Defendant was a coach and teacher at West Monroe High School (“WMHS“). The victim, C.R., was a 16-year-old student and athlete who had recently moved to West Monroe from Alexandria.
C.R. played basketball, softball and eventually became involved in track. C.R. sustained a knee injury while playing basketball;
In March, Defendant was driving C.R. home from the wellness center and missed the turn to her house. He continued driving to another neighborhood and stopped at a stop sign. While they were stopped, Defendant told C.R. how much he was beginning to care about her and kissed her.
Thereafter, Defendant continued C.R.‘s physical therapy sessions. She also saw him every day after school at track practice. They were alone together on almost a daily basis. C.R. would even leave class to visit Defendant, and he would write excuses to her teachers for her.
One night around March 26, after Defendant and C.R. finished her therapy at the wellness center, he told her that he had forgotten something back at the high school track office. C.R. accompanied him to the school‘s stadium where the track office was located. C.R. testified in detail regarding this encounter:
[w]e went in, he told me to sit down while he worked on something and so I sat down and we got ready to leave and he turned off the light to leave and I just waited right outside the door while he turned the light on and he had forgotten something so he went back in but the light never came back on and he just told me to come in and he began to kiss me and ... put his hands on my waist and just ... and kissed me.... Then he kissed me and then he began to take my shorts off and I was really worried and I was kind of scared and nervous and I didn‘t—I pulled my shorts back up and he would tell me that everything was going to be okay and he pulled my shorts down again and then he laid me on the floor and he kept telling me everything was going to be okay and I was really scared and nervous. And we had—we had sex that night.
After the encounter on March 26, Defendant and C.R. continued seeing each other. On April 5, Good Friday, Defendant took C.R. and two other female students to Shreveport to attend a track meet. The meet was canceled due to rain. The group ate at a casino, and Defendant attempted to persuade the girls to try to get on the boat. When one of the girls refused, the group instead went to the mall for a couple of hours. When the group returned to West Monroe, Defendant dropped off the other two girls. Defendant then took C.R. to a hotel where, according to her testimony, they “had sex.” Defendant told C.R. that he loved her and that he was going to divorce his wife.
C.R. testified that, around April 8, she and Defendant “had sex” at Defendant‘s house. She further testified that Defendant picked her up to take her to a track meet in Lake Charles, and they stopped by his house to “have sex.” On or about April 24, the two stayed overnight in a motel in Natchitoches. C.R. also testified that on or about May 15, they “had sex” in or near some storage buildings.
On approximately May 17, Defendant and C.R. met at some apartments off Good Hope Road and left together in C.R.‘s car. According to C.R.‘s testimony, she and Defendant went to a nearby field and “had sex.” Defendant had parked his truck in such a way that it blocked the tenants’ vehicles. The apartment manager saw an invoice slip in the truck labeled James Blackwell Contractors and looked up his telephone number. The manager called the number and reached a woman. The woman—Defendant‘s wife—arrived at the
On May 21, 1996, Defendant‘s wife filed for divorce, citing his “improper relationship” with C.R. as the sole reason for their separation. Attached to the divorce petition were letters purportedly written by C.R. to Defendant which discussed their romantic involvement and her love for him.
C.R. testified that on May 24, she and Defendant “had sex” at the Red Roof Inn. She further testified that about May 31, the two “had sex” at the Best Western Motel.
After the spring semester, Defendant was asked to resign from his position as teacher and coach at WMHS; he complied. In July 1996, C.R.‘s parents, who had learned of the sexual relationship between Defendant and their daughter, notified law enforcement authorities. Defendant was initially charged with one count of carnal knowledge of a juvenile and one count of sexual battery. He was subsequently indicted on eight counts of carnal knowledge of a juvenile. He was convicted on all counts by a unanimous jury.1 Defendant appeals, urging 13 assignments of error, 9 of which concern his sentences. The remaining 4 assignments of error attack the sufficiency of evidence.
SUFFICIENCY OF APPEAL EVIDENCE
In four of Defendant‘s assignments of error, he contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he and C.R. engaged in sexual intercourse. He attacks the credibility of C.R. and her vocabulary in describing what acts transpired between them. He also contends that the testimony of Katy Davis that she saw Defendant kissing C.R. was inadmissible. Additionally, he asserts that several matters to which Christy Cook testified, including her testimony that Defendant tried to persuade her to take the possibly pregnant C.R. to see an out-of-town doctor he knew, should have been excluded on the basis of relevance.
In State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La. 1992), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that, when issues of both sufficiency of the evidence and trial errors are raised on appeal, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence.
Credibility
When the sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
The proper procedural vehicle to raise a sufficiency of the evidence error is a motion for post verdict judgment of acquittal.
Defendant attacks the credibility of the State‘s witnesses, especially C.R. In particular, he attempts to characterize her as an obsessed stalker who followed him and telephoned him constantly. Defendant testified at trial that he never had sex with C.R. or even kissed her.
In the present case, the evidence against Defendant consisted primarily of C.R.‘s testimony. However, there were a number of other witnesses who provided corroborating testimony to the sexual and/or intimate nature of the relationship that existed between Defendant and C.R. Additionally, there were several motel receipts in Defendant‘s name and signed by him that were admitted into evidence; they corresponded with the dates on which C.R. testified that she and Defendant “had sex.” Defendant stipulated that his date of birth is May 6, 1960. C.R. testified that her date of birth is June 27, 1979.
It was within the province of the jury to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. The jury chose to believe the State‘s witnesses instead of the self-serving testimony of Defendant and the testimony of his former wife, which was strongly challenged by the State on cross-examination. We will not second-guess the credibility determinations made by the jury.
Evidence of intercourse
A. Carnal knowledge of a juvenile is committed when:
(1) A person over the age of seventeen has sexual intercourse, with consent, with any person of the age of twelve years or more, but under the age of seventeen years, when there is an age difference of greater than two years between the two persons and the victim is not the spouse of the offender; or
(2) A person over the age of seventeen has anal or oral sexual intercourse, with consent, with a person of the age of twelve years or more, but under the age of seventeen years, when there is an age difference of greater than two years between the two persons.
B. Lack of knowledge of the juvenile‘s age shall not be a defense. Emission is not necessary; and penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime. [Emphasis added.]
Defendant contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence of sexual intercourse as required by the statute. We disagree. Throughout the trial, C.R.—then a 19-year-old married woman—used the expression “had sex” to describe what transpired between her and Defendant on the dates set forth in the indictment. She did not specifically state that Defendant penetrated her, nor did she use the expression “sexual intercourse.” While it would have been preferable for the State to have elicited more detailed information from C.R., we do not find that this is a fatal defect.
The testimony of the victim is sufficient to establish the element of sexual intercourse; however, whether through the testimony of the victim or from some other source, the record must contain evidence from which a rational jury could make the finding that penetration had occurred. See State v. Trackling, 609 So.2d 206 (La.1992) (finding that where the record was devoid of such evidence, the conviction could not be upheld). Our review of the record reveals sufficient corroborating evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that sexual intercourse, as defined in
In support of his argument, Defendant relies on State v. Marigny, 532 So.2d 420 (La.App. 1st Cir.1988). In Marigny, the first circuit found that the 15-year-old victim‘s testimony that she and the 19-year-old defendant “had sex” was not sufficient to support a conviction of carnal knowledge of a juvenile because there was no evidence that the victim understood the phrase “had sex” to mean sexual intercourse. Instead, the court entered a conviction for the lesser included offense of attempted carnal knowledge of a juvenile. We find that the Marigny case is distinguishable; the circumstances of that case and the conflict between the testimony of the defendant and the victim raised a serious question as to the young, never-married victim‘s understanding of sexual matters. Furthermore, in Marigny, there was a complete lack of corroborating evidence on the issue of sexual intercourse.
In the instant case, we are presented with a different factual scenario. While the age and marital status of the victim in Marigny, in connection with the facts of that case, led to an issue of whether she understood the meaning of the expression “had sex,” we find it difficult to sustain a similar argument in the instant case. In this case, by the time C.R. testified at Defendant‘s trial in September 1998, she was 19 years old and married. There was testimony that she feared pregnancy as the result of having “had sex” with Defendant. The only reasonable conclusion that may be drawn from this evidence is that she and Defendant engaged in sexual intercourse, the conduct prohibited by
Count Four
Nonetheless, we find it necessary to vacate Defendant‘s conviction on count four. This count, in the amended superseding bill of indictment, alleged carnal knowledge of a juvenile on or about April 24. In its brief, the State asserted that count four involved an overnight hotel stay in Natchitoches, Louisiana, which was proven by a Natchitoches hotel receipt. The instant prosecution is in Ouachita Parish; Natchitoches is located in Natchitoches Parish. The trial court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Defendant for this offense.
Christy Cook‘s testimony
Defendant argues that several portions of the testimony of Christy Cook, another WMHS student, were irrelevant.
La. C.E. art. 401 provides:“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
La. C.E. art 403 provides:Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time.
The trial court‘s determination regarding the relevancy of evidence is entitled to great weight and should not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Burrell, 561 So.2d 692 (La. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1074, 111 S.Ct. 799, 112 L.Ed.2d 861 (1991).
Christy testified that Defendant asked her to get a pregnancy test kit for C.R., who believed she might be pregnant. Christy refused. Defendant then tried to persuade Christy to take C.R. to see a Ruston doctor whom Defendant knew “very well.” Defendant stated that the doctor would “take care of everything.” Again, Christy refused. Christy also testified that Defendant spoke to her about his relationship with C.R. In particular, he told her that he planned to divorce his wife and that he and C.R. would then “officially be together.” Contrary to Defendant‘s argument on appeal, this evidence was clearly relevant as tending to prove the sexual relationship between Defendant and C.R. The trial court did not err in admitting this testimony.
Defendant also complains of Christy‘s testimony that she and another girl went to Shreveport with Defendant and C.R. to attend a track meet. After the track meet was rained out, Defendant took the girls to lunch at a casino restaurant and then urged them to try to gain entrance into the casino despite the fact that they were underage. Christy testified that she refused and they went to a mall instead, before returning to West Monroe. Although Defendant argues that this testimony was irrelevant, we find that this evidence was relevant in that it corroborated part of C.R.‘s account of that day. C.R. testified that after Defendant dropped off the other girls, he took her to a motel where they “had sex.”
Finally, Defendant contends that Christy‘s testimony about seeing Defendant and C.R. standing close together in the track office was irrelevant. Defendant made no relevancy objection to this portion of her testimony. A new basis for an objection cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Cressy, 440 So.2d 141 (La.1983); State v. O‘Neal, 501 So.2d 920, 924 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987), writ denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (1987);
Katy Davis’ testimony
Defendant argues that the testimony of student Katy Davis that she saw Defendant kissing C.R. in the school track office was irrelevant. He also asserts that its use required Prieur notice.
The Prieur notice rule requires the State to furnish, as a prerequisite to the admissibility of evidence of other
As to the relevancy of this testimony, the fact that Defendant was seen kissing C.R. at the school is highly relevant. The State had the burden to establish that there had been sexual intercourse between the two individuals. The fact that they were kissing in the high school track office tends to prove that the two had some type of intimate, sexual relationship. The trial court did not err in allowing this testimony.
EXCESSIVE SENTENCES
In nine of his assignments of error, Defendant complains that his sentences are excessive. We agree.
In reviewing claims of excessiveness, an appellate court uses a two-pronged analysis. First, the record must show that the trial court took cognizance of the factors set forth in
A sentence is unconstitutionally excessive in violation of
Defendant was sentenced to 10 years for counts one and two, to run consecutively, and 5 years for counts three—eight, to run concurrent with counts one and two. In sum, Defendant was sentenced to 20 years at hard labor without benefit of good time. See
The trial judge did consider the fact that C.R. consented to their relationship, but stated that there could never be any grounds which would justify a high school teacher to have a sexual relationship with a student, even if she was obsessed. The record shows that not only did C.R. consent to the relationship, but that she made deliberate efforts to foster and continue it; testimony and documentary evidence show that C.R. literally barraged Defendant with telephone calls.
The trial judge noted that Defendant is also accused of committing sexual battery upon two other WMHS students. He further stated that Defendant had committed perjury in both the criminal proceeding and his divorce proceeding. Also, in considering whether Defendant‘s conduct was likely to recur, the trial judge pointed out that, while waiting for trial, Defendant secured another teaching position in Texas where he was starting to gravitate toward and gain the trust of another female student, while at the time making her uncomfortable by initiating minor physical contact. The trial judge did note that the girl was 17; and, as such, if anything had occurred with her in Louisiana, no charges would result.
The trial judge also stated that the incarceration would not only be a hardship on Defendant, but also create a hardship on his children, whom he was financially supporting. He further noted that he got a large number of letters praising Defendant‘s ability as a teacher, an individual, a Christian man and someone concerned with the welfare and well being of young people.4 The trial judge then found an undue risk that, during any period of suspended sentence or probation, Defendant would commit another crime. He found that Defendant was in need of a correctional treatment or custodial environment that would be provided most effectively by commitment to an institution. The trial judge then sentenced Defendant to 10 years for counts one and two, to run consecutively, and 5 years for the remaining counts to run concurrent with counts one and two.
While we strongly agree with the trial judge that Defendant is in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment which is best provided by commitment, we find that 20 years at hard labor is excessive and shocks the sense of justice. This is largely because of the disparity between the present sentence and the sentences of similarly situated defendants who were convicted of carnal knowledge of a juvenile, some of whose conduct, sadly, is more egregious than Defendant‘s. See State v. Willis, 420 So.2d 962 (La.1982) (26 years for three counts of carnal knowledge
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant‘s conviction and sentence for count four are vacated. Defendant‘s remaining convictions for counts one through three and five through eight are affirmed; however, Defendant‘s sentences on those counts are reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE FOR COUNT FOUR VACATED; REMAINING CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCING REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION.
GASKINS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part..
NORRIS, C.J., dissents in part and concurs in part with written reasons.
NORRIS, C.J., dissents in part and concurs in part.
I respectfully dissent in part. It is axiomatic that in order to convict, the prosecution must prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Due process requires that the language of a criminal statute have a generally accepted meaning sufficient to give adequate warning of the proscribed conduct as well as to provide standards to enable courts to fairly administer the law. State v. Prestridge, 399 So.2d 564, 572 (La.1981); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 72 S.Ct. 329, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952). As such, it is well established that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. Any doubt as to the extent of the coverage of a criminal statute must be decided in favor of the accused and against the State. State ex rel. Mims v. Butler, 601 So.2d 649 (La.1992); State v. Badie, 626 So.2d 46 (La.App. 1st Cir.1993); State v. Smith, 97-0782, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/20/98); 708 So.2d 1166, 1168.
The elements of the offense of carnal knowledge of a juvenile who is not the spouse of the defendant are: (1) consensual sexual intercourse, (2) between a person over the age of 17, (3) and a person of age 12 years or more, but under the age of 17 years, (4) when there is an age difference of greater than two years between the two persons.
In this regard,
Blackwell was charged with eight counts of carnal knowledge of a juvenile, C.R. I agree with the majority‘s decision to vacate the conviction of Count 4, because it pertained to an incident in Natchitoches, which is outside the District Court‘s (as well as this Court‘s) jurisdiction.1 The other occasions in which Blackwell is accused of having consensual sex with C.R. are: Count 1 on March 26, Count 2 on April 4, Count 3 on April 8, Count 5 on May 15, Count 6 on May 17, Count 7 on May 24, and Count 8 on May 31. The record clearly shows that on these dates Blackwell was over the age of 17, C.R. was 16 years old, Blackwell and C.R. were not married, and there was greater than two years’ difference between their ages. The only real contention is whether or not there was consensual sexual intercourse between Blackwell and C.R. on these seven occasions, and if so, whether the state met its burden of proving that fact.
In order to prove that Blackwell had consensual sexual intercourse with C.R. on April 5, May 15, May 24, and May 31, the state asked C.R. if she and Blackwell “had sex,” to which she replied, “Yes, sir.” C.R. further testified that she and Blackwell “had sex” on April 8 and May 17, but did not describe the specific “sexual” conduct, only the location where they “had sex.” C.R., however, did not provide sufficient details from which one could infer, beyond a reasonable doubt, that “sexual intercourse” took place during each of these encounters. The only incident which C.R. explained in any type of detail was the first incident on March 26, when she testified that, while at the West Monroe Stadium track office:
[w]e went in, he told me to sit down while he worked on something and so I sat down and we got ready to leave and he turned off the light to leave and I just waited right outside the door while he turned the light on and he had forgotten something so he went back in but the light never came back on and he just told me to come in and he began to kiss me and ... put his hands on my waist and just ... and kissed me.... Then
he kissed me and then he began to take my shorts off and I was really worried and I was kind of scared and nervous and I didn‘t—I pulled my shorts back up and he would tell me that everything was going to be okay and he pulled my shorts down again and then he laid me on the floor and he kept telling me everything was going to be okay and I was really scared and nervous. And we had—we had sex that night.
Noticeably, at no time did the state attempt to elicit from C.R. what the phrase “had sex” meant to her or ask her to describe the “sex” which occurred. The closest the state even got to demonstrating that C.R. and Blackwell were engaged in the statutorily proscribed activity (“sexual intercourse“) was by C.R.‘s admission that during the incident charged in Count 1 Blackwell pulled her shorts down and they “had sex.”
To bolster the state‘s case, C.C. testified that at one point during the spring semester C.R. feared she was pregnant, which was corroborated by C.R. on direct examination. C.C. further testified that Blackwell likewise expressed concerns that C.R. was pregnant and told C.C. that she should take C.R. to a doctor in Ruston who would “take care of everything.” C.C. refused to do this, testifying that she also denied Blackwell‘s request to get C.R. a pregnancy test, telling him that it was his responsibility and not hers. Additionally, C.C. testified that C.R. was not dating anyone. This circumstantial testimony, coupled with C.R.‘s testimony that she was disrobed on March 26 and her fear of pregnancy, could lead a rational trier of fact to find that sexual intercourse took place on at least one occasion, the incident charged in Count 1. As such, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Bellamy, 599 So.2d 326 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 605 So.2d 1089 (1992), I conclude that the state did prove beyond a reasonable doubt that when C.R. testified that she “had sex,” that this must have included sexual intercourse on at least one occasion as required by
As for the remaining counts, the state failed to carry its burden of proving the requisite “sexual intercourse” element. The statutory language is clear, and leaves no doubt as to what is required to convict. Nevertheless, all the state could elicit from testimony was circumstantial evidence of an improper relationship and C.R.‘s vague admission that the two “had sex.” This does not establish what type of sexual conduct occurred, or if it included any penetration, as is statutorily required. I disagree with the majority‘s inference that because C.R. was a 19-year-old married woman when she testified, her use of “have sex” was interchangeable with “sexual intercourse” to the exclusion of any other activity which may be considered “sexual” in nature.2 Notwithstanding C.R.‘s age and experience, this reasoning still requires an impermissible inferential leap outside the evidence presented to the jury,3 particularly since no details of what
Although I disagree in part with the majority‘s reasoning as to sufficiency, I do agree that this 20 year sentence for seven counts of carnal knowledge of a juvenile is excessive and consequently concur with Judge Peatross and would remand for resentencing for the reasons expressed by him.
GASKINS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in that part of the opinion that upholds the conviction of counts one through three, and five through eight, and vacates the conviction and sentence of count four. I respectfully dissent from the reversal of the sentence imposed by the trial court.