23 Conn. App. 241 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1990
The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction of one count of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1), and one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21. He claims that the trial court (1) should have disclosed to him certain notes taken by the state’s attorney during an interview with the victim, and (2) should have allowed the defendant to present the testimony of the victim’s former attorney regarding an alleged prior inconsistent statement. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
In May, 1986, the defendant stopped exercising his visitation rights and the victim’s weekend visits to the defendant’s apartment stopped. Angry and hurt over the defendant’s refusal to see him, the victim told his mother about the sexual abuse. After an extended course of counseling and psychological therapy, the victim gave a statement to the Hartford police, who arrested the defendant and Mendes.
The defendant first claims that the trial court should have ordered the state to produce certain notes taken by the assistant state’s attorney during an interview with the victim. He argues that the notes came within the definition of “statements” contained in Practice Book § 749, and that he was entitled to disclosure of the notes pursuant to Practice Book § 752. We disagree.
Practice Book § 752 provides that “[ajfter a witness called by the state has testified on direct examination at trial, the judicial authority shall, on motion of the defendant, order the state to produce any statement
The trial court examined the notes in camera and questioned the victim as to the way in which the notes were taken. The judge handed the notes to the victim and the following colloquy ensued:
“The Court: Have you had a chance to see those pages?
“The Witness: Yes.
“The Court: Have you ever seen them before?
“The Witness: No.
“The Court: Did [the state’s attorney] ever hand them to you to read?
“The Witness: No.
“The Court: Did he ever read you those three pages, to your knowledge?
“The Witness: I don’t think so. No.
“The Court: And is your signature anywhere on them?
*245 “The Witness: No.”
Thereafter, defense counsel questioned the victim as follows:
“Q. After [the state’s attorney] took the notes did he go back and say, ‘Is this the way it is,’ those notes, and ask you if this is substantially correct?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And you said ‘yes?’
“A. Yes.
“Q. And you said — basically told him his notes were accurate and portrayed what happened?
“A. Yes.”
The trial court concluded that the notes did not constitute a statement within the meaning of § 749 because the witness did not sign or otherwise adopt or approve the notes. The voir dire supports this conclusion. The witness testified that he did not sign the notes, that the assistant state’s attorney never read them to him, and that he had never read or even seen them before. Although he also testified that the assistant state’s attorney asked whether the notes were substantially correct, the witness’ affirmative answer to this question is insufficient to show adoption or approval of the notes as a statement of the witness. A general affirmation by a witness that the interviewer’s notes capture the basic gist of their conversation, in the absence of a showing that the witness read or was read what the interviewer has written, does not constitute adoption or approval of the notes. See Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 110-11 n.19, 96 S. Ct. 1338, 47 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1976) (construing the nearly identical provisions of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500).
To be admissible, proof that the witness made a prior statement inconsistent with his trial testimony must show a substantial inconsistency and must relate to a material issue rather than a collateral matter. State v. Avis, 209 Conn. 290, 302, 551 A.2d 26 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1097,109 S. Ct. 1570, 103 L. Ed. 2d 937 (1989). With regard to the defendant’s prosecution, the timing of Mendes’ intervention into the abuse was irrelevant to the question of whether the defendant was guilty of sexual assault. The information in the defendant’s prosecution alleged a three year period during which the assaults occurred. Moreover, the defendant’s sole defense was to claim that the sexual assaults and abuse did not occur, not to challenge the time frame alleged in the complaint. See State v. Mancinone, 15 Conn. App. 251, 255-59, 545 A.2d 1131, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 818, 551 A.2d 757 (1988), cert. denied, 489
The judgment is affirmed.
Another definition in Practice Book § 749 concerns verbatim recordings made contemporaneously with the making of the statement. The notes in question were not a transcription of such a recording and therefore do not fall within this section.
The cited footnote reads in full: “Every witness interview will, of course, involve conversation between the lawyer and the witness, and the lawyer will necessarily inquire of the witness to be certain that he has correctly understood what the witness has said. Such discussions of the general substance of what the witness has said do not constitute adoption or approval of the lawyer’s notes within [18 U.S.C.] § 3500 (e) (1), which is satisfied only
Another proffered inconsistency concerned whether the victim had ever told anyone that Mendes began to participate six weeks after the abuse began. He testified at trial that he had not. The defendant proposed to use Keifer’s testimony to contradict that answer.