{¶ 2} On September 22, 2005, appellant was indicted for failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 4} "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO PERMIT A SUBSTITUTION OF HIS ASSIGNED COUNSEL FOR MR. BIZZELL WHERE THE RECORD INDICATES A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATION, MR. BIZZELL HAD NEVER PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED A SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL, AND THE TRIAL DATE IN THE MATTER HAD NEVER PREVIOUSLY BEEN CONTINUED."
{¶ 5} "An indigent defendant has no right to have a pаrticular attorney represent him and therefore must demonstrate `good cause' to warrant substitution of counsel." State v. Cowans,
{¶ 6} The decision whether to substitute an appointed attorney for an indigent defendant is within the trial court's discretion. State v.Jones,
{¶ 7} In supрort of appellant's request for a substitution of counsel, appellant explained to the trial court that his attorney, Inza Johnson Hebb, failed to file a motion to *3 dismiss the charge, as he had requested. Appellant also complained that Hebb failed to timely subpoena witnesses, failed to properly investigate the case, called him "crazy" and told him she did not like him.
{¶ 8} In response to appellant's allegations, Hebb explained that she considered filing a motion to dismiss, but found that she could not properly support such a motion. Hebb further explained that she attempted to contact both of the witnesses appellant suggested, but was only able to reach one of them. Hebb stated that she found this witness to be оf no assistance, and that appellant was not able to provide her with the means to contact the other witness. In addition, Hebb told the court that she had thoroughly reviewed the сase and was prepared for trial.
{¶ 9} After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for a substitution of an appointed attоrney. Disagreement between a defendant and his attorney over trial tactics and strategy does not necessarily warrant a substitution of counsel. See State v. Glasure (1999),
{¶ 10} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 11} "MR. BIZZELL'S WAIVER OF COUNSEL WAS NOT MADE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THEREFORE, HE WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE
{¶ 12} The
{¶ 13} "Nonetheless, `[t]o discharge this duty in light of the strong presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand. * * * To be valid such waiver must be made with an apрrehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.' Gibson,
{¶ 14} "Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order to competently and intеlligently choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will *5
establish that `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta,
{¶ 15} According to the record, the trial court suggested to appellant that he had the constitutional right to represent himself at trial, and asked appellant if he wanted to represent himself. When appellant responded in the affirmative, the trial court advised appellant against representing himself, beсause he was facing a third-degree felony charge, and could potentially receive a five-year prison sentence if convicted. The trial court then explained to appellant that he would be waiving his constitutional right to an attorney. The trial court asked appellant if he was familiar with the process of a criminal jury trial, and if he was comfortable going forward with the trial. Appellant responded in the affirmative to both questions. The trial court then prepared a jury waiver form, which appellant signed.
{¶ 16} Similar to our findings in Doyle, we find that the trial cоurt in this case failed to determine whether appellant knew or understood the nature of the charge against him, the statutory offenses included within the charge, and possible defensеs to the charge and circumstances in mitigation thereof. Doyle,
{¶ 17} However, unlike Doyle, we find that appellant has shown that but for the trial court's failure to properly advise him underFaretta and Gibson, he would not have waived his right to counsel and would not have proceeded pro se. In this case, appellant expressed a desire to "fire" his attorney, but appellant did not initially express a desire to proceed with the trial without an attorney. Rather, it was the trial court that suggested to appellant that hе had *6 the constitutional right to represent himself. After a brief and incomplete colloquy, the trial court presented appellant with the following form, which appellant signed:
{¶ 18} "Upоn examination of the Indictment filed against me on September 22, 2005 by the State of Ohio, I hereby voluntarily waive and relinquish my right to a Court appointed attorney and legal counsel in this casе. I realize that I have a right to an attorney free of charge but desire to represent myself. I do not desire to have a public defender attorney represent me in this jury trial schеduled for this date and understand this decision runs counter to the advice of my present attorney and the Court."
{¶ 19} Upon reviewing the colloquy between the trial court and appellant and the waiver of counsel form signed by appellant, we find that appellant's waiver was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made pursuant to Faretta and Gibson. To be valid, a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of counsel "must be made with an apprehension of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the matter." Von Moltke v.Gilles (1948),
{¶ 20} A court does not fulfill its responsibility to sufficiently inform a defendant as to that defendant's waiver of counsel merely because the defendant expresses a desire to represent himself, nor can the court fulfill this responsibility by ordering "standby counsel."State v. Richards (Sept. 20, 2001), Cuyahоga App. No. 78457. "However laudable, such appointments do not absolve the trial court from its responsibility to insure that the defendant is aware of the range of allowable punishmеnts, the possible defenses to the charges and circumstances that might serve in mitigation, as well as any other facts that would demonstrate that the defendant understood the entire matter." Id.
{¶ 21} Based upon the foregoing, we sustain appellant's second assignment of error. *7 Accordingly, appellant's conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
{¶ 22} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.
*1POWELL, P.J., and WALSH, J., concur.