The defendant, Samuel Biondolillo, appeals his conviction, following a bench trial in the 6th Circuit Court — Concord District Division (.Spath, J.), of disorderly conduct, see RSA 644:2, 11(e) (2007). He argues: (1) that his conviction violates his constitutional right to free speech; (2) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) that, for several reasons, the trial court committed plain error. We affirm.
I
The trial court could have found the following facts. On June 28, 2011, Concord Police Officer Garcia responded to a report that a man and a woman in a McDonald’s restaurant were not attending to the needs of their child. He approached the couple to determine whether they were capable of caring for their child, but was interrupted by the defendant, who was sitting nearby. The defendant advised the couple not to talk to Garcia, stating, among other things, that “the police ruin peoples’ lives.” After Garcia attempted to explain to the defendant the purpose of his visit, the woman took the child to the bathroom and Garcia asked the man to step outside to discuss the matter without interruption from the defendant. While outside, Garcia learned from a dispatcher that there was an outstanding bench warrant for the woman, meaning Garcia would need to take her into custody.
After speaking with the man for a short time to determine whether he could care for the child alone, Garcia saw the defendant leave the restaurant. Officer Kayla
II
The defendant first argues that his disorderly conduct conviction violates his right to free speech under Part I, Article 22 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the First Amendment of its federal counterpart. This argument presents a question of constitutional law, which we review de novo. State v. Marshall,
The State and Federal Constitutions contain robust guarantees of free speech, but they do not offer absolute protection to all speech under all circumstances and in all places. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
may be subject to reasonable time, place and manner regulations that are content-neutral, narrowly serve a significant governmental interest, and allow other opportunities for expression. Even where a law regulates conduct generally, without addressing speech in particular, it nonetheless may effect an incidental regulation of speech that, like direct regulation, is constitutionally permissible if it does not exceed the bounds of the limited, content-neutral time, place and manner standard.
Comley,
RSA 644:2, 11(e), the statute under which the defendant was convicted, provides that a person is guilty of disorderly conduct if he “[k]nowingly refuses to comply with a lawful order of a peace officer to move from or remain away from any public place.” A “[l]awful order” under this statute means “[a] command issued to any person for the purpose of preventing said person from committing any offense set forth in this section ... when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that said person is about to commit any such offense, or when said person is engaged in a course of conduct which makes his commission of such an offense imminent.” RSA 644:2, V(a)(l) (2007). Here, the State contends that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct which made his commission of another variant of disorderly conduct imminent — “[ejngaging in conduct in a public place which substantially interferes with a criminal investigation.” RSA
A
We are not persuaded that RSA 644:2, 11(e) is constitutionally deficient on its face. Our decision in Comley is instructive. The defendant in that case interrupted the inauguration ceremony of Governor John Sununu by shouting remarks about the Seabrook nuclear power plant. Comley,
As in Comley, RSA 644:2,11(e) does not specifically regulate speech, although “its application obviously may have such an effect where a prosecution under [it] concerns conduct encompassing expressive activity.” Id. Its plain terms, however, satisfy Comley’s three-part test. It does not target speech for its content, but rather aims only at persons who refuse to comply with an official command when that command is based upon an officer’s objectively reasonable belief that the person either (1) is “about to” commit an offense, or (2) is engaged in a course of conduct that makes an offense “imminent.” RSA 644:2, V(a)(l). The statute is also narrowly tailored to the State’s strong interest in safeguarding a police officer’s ability to pursue legitimate investigations “free from possible interference or interruption by bystanders.” Colten v. Kentucky,
The defendant relies upon Houston v. Hill for the proposition that “interrupting” the police may not be criminalized. See Houston v. Hill,
B
Neither is the statute unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. In Colten, the Supreme Court upheld the application of a similar statute in circumstances analogous to those of this case. Id. at 109. In that case, the defendant was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct after refusing to comply with an officer’s command to leave the scene of a traffic stop. Id. at 106-07. The defendant maintained that he had been attempting to arrange transportation for the driver of a vehicle that was to be towed away, and was asked by the police at least three times to move along. Id. at 107. The statute made it unlawful to “[c]ongregate[] with other persons in a public place and refuse[] to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse” if done “with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” Id. at 108 (quotation omitted). The Court rejected the defendant’s as-applied First Amendment challenge on the grounds that the defendant “had no constitutional right to observe the issuance of a traffic ticket or to engage the issuing officer in conversation at that time.” Id. at 109.
Here, too, the defendant was not engaged in constitutionally-protected conduct when he refused to leave the vicinity of Officer Garcia’s investigation. After having first interrupted the conversation between Garcia and the couple inside the restaurant, the defendant approached to within “arm’s distance” of Garcia outside the restaurant and attempted to engage in a discussion with the man. It was not the content of the defendant’s speech that caused Officer Garcia to arrest him. Rather, it was the fact that he was interfering with the performance of Garcia’s duties as a law enforcement officer and subsequently refused Garcia’s lawful command aimed at preventing further interference. Garcia was entitled, if not obligated, under the circumstances, to pursue the goal of ensuring that the man was capable of caring for the child “free from possible interference or interruption from bystanders” such as the defendant. Id. Thus, we perceive no basis for finding RSA 644:2, 11(e) unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.
Because the Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection than the State Constitution in these circumstances, see Comley,
Ill
The defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of disorderly conduct under the statute. To prevail, the defendant must prove that no rational trier of fact, viewing all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wilmot,
As noted, a person is guilty of disorderly conduct under RSA 644:2,11(e) if he “[k]nowingly refuses to comply with a lawful order of a peace officer to move from or remain away from any public place.” A “[ljawful order” under this statute means “[a] command issued to any person for the purpose of preventing said person from committing any offense set forth in this section... when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that said person is about to commit any such offense, or when said person is engaged in a course of conduct which makes his commission of such an offense imminent.” RSA 644:2, V(a)(l). The State argues that Officer Garcia had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was engaged in a course of conduct that made imminent his commission of another variant of disorderly conduct: “[e]ngag[ing] in conduct in a public place which substantially interferes with a criminal investigation.” RSA 644:2,11(d). The defendant, on the other hand, argues that the State offered no evidence Garcia was performing a criminal investigation, and accordingly no rational trier of fact could have convicted him on this basis.
The evidence presented is sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction. As is clear from the testimony of Officers Garcia and Buffis, the defendant’s conduct outside the restaurant demonstrated a design not simply to voice his concern to the man about speaking with police, but to inject himself into their investigation and interfere with Garcia’s efforts to complete his inquiry into the safety of the child. Not only had the defendant already expressed his opinion to the father inside the restaurant that “the police ruin people’s lives,” but he also came within “arm’s distance” of Garcia outside the restaurant and interrupted Garcia’s attempt to ascertain whether the father was capable of caring for the child. Even assuming that this evidence did not, on its own, establish that the defendant “substantially interfere^]” with the officers’ investigation, RSA 644:2, 11(d), a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the defendant’s “course of conduct” made a substantial interference imminent, RSA 644:2, V(a)(l). Accordingly, Officer Garcia’s command to the defendant to leave the area was a lawful order and the defendant’s refusal to comply constituted disorderly conduct under RSA 644:2,11(e).
Nor are we persuaded by the defendant’s argument that the State offered insufficient evidence that a “criminal investigation,” RSA 644:2] 11(d), was underway. While it is true that Officer Garcia initially went to the restaurant to follow up on a telephone call reporting a general concern about a child’s welfare, the nature of such an investigation will often' call upon the police to ascertain whether the child’s caretaker is endangering the child’s welfare, see RSA 639:3 (2007), or otherwise harming the child. Indeed, Officer Garcia testified that he had previously observed the same parents cross a heavily-traveled road pushing a baby carriage with apparent disregard for traffic, suggesting a caretaking issue. Moreover, by the time the defendant injected himself into the investigation outside, Officer Garcia had learned from a dispatcher that the mother of the child had an outstanding warrant for her arrest — a fact of obviously criminal import.
Because we sustain the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct based upon his refusal to comply with a lawful order, we need not address the parties’ arguments as to other statutory variants of the crime.
IV
Finally, the defendant invokes the plain error rule as a basis for reversal, see Sup. Ct. R. 16-A, an argument that appears to rest, at least in part, upon an assertion that the definition of “lawful order” is so vague as to constitute a due process violation as applied to him. For the purposes of the plain error rule, however, an error is plain only if it was or should have been obvious in the sense that the governing law was clearly settled to the contrary. State v. Ortiz,
To the extent that the defendant advances other bases for relief under the plain error doctrine, they are insufficiently developed for appellate review. See Sabinson v. Trustees of Dartmouth College,
Affirmed.