State v. BikleState v. Bikle
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Kidwell
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
The State appeals from an order entered pursuant to
Pursuant to
The question of the State’s right to appeal was raised by this court during oral argument. We cannot disregard a jurisdictional defect in an appeal and are required to dismiss an appeal on our own motion when we conclude that we lack jurisdiction. Wylly v. First Hawaiian Bank, 57 Haw. 61, 549 P.2d 477 (1976).
The State contends that
By State in criminal cases. An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the State from the district or circuit courts direct to the supreme court in all criminal cases, in the following instances:
(1) From an order or judgment quashing, setting aside, or sustaining a motion to dismiss any indictment or information or any count thereof;
(2) From an order or judgment, sustaining a special plea in bar, or dismissing the case where the defendant has not been put in jeopardy;
(3) From an order granting a new trial;
(4) From an order arresting judgment;
(5) From a ruling on a question of law adverse to the State where the defendant was convicted and appeals from the judgment;
(6) From the sentence, on the ground that it is illegal;
(7) From a pre-trial order granting a motion for the suppression of evidence, including a confession or admission, or the return of property in which case the supreme court shall give priority to such an appeal and the order shall be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal;
(8) From an order denying a request by the State for protective order for nondisclosure of witness for their personal safety under Rule 16(e)(4) of the Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure, in which case the supreme court shall give priority to such appeal and the order shall be stayed pending outcome of such appeal;
provided that no appeal shall be taken by or allowed the State in any case where there has been a verdict in favor of the defendant.
In State v. Johnson, 50 Haw. 525, 526, 445 P.2d 36, 37 (1968), we said:
The availability of appellate review sought by the State in a criminal case can be based only on clear statutory authority. This court has held that the statute must be strictly construed and that it cannot be extended beyond the plain meaning of the terms found therein. Territory v. Balarosa, 34 Haw. 662, 665-66 (1938). The statute clearly contemplates that an appeal may be taken by the State only after a final disposition of the case by the lower court.
Territory v. Balarosa,
34 Haw. 662 (1938) arose under § 3551, R.L. 1935, which similarly to
The statute clearly contemplates that a writ of error may be taken by and on behalf of the Territory only after final disposition of the cause in the court to which the writ lies. All the orders enumerated in the statute, including sentence, from which a writ of error may be prosecuted are final in their nature with the possible exception of rulings on questions of law adverse to the Territory and in the latter instance the writ will lie only where the defendant was convicted and appeals from the judgment. When the writ of error was taken by the Territory in the instant case there was no appeal pending in this court by the defendant in error from the judgment of conviction entered against him.
We have jurisdiction of the State’s appeal in this case only if the appeal is taken from an illegal sentence.
On the date of the entry of the order here appealed, H.R.Cr.P. 32(b), identical to H.R.P.P. 32(b), provided:
A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence.
From circuit courts. Any party deeming himself aggrieved by the judgment of a circuit court in a criminal matter, may appeal to the supreme court in the manner and within the time provided by the Hawaii Rules of Criminal Procedure. The sentence of the court in a criminal case shall be the judgment.
In
State v. Ferreira,
54 Haw. 485, 510 P.2d 88 (1973), a defendant sought to appeal from a judgment of conviction which did not include any sentence imposed upon the defendant. We held that we lacked appellate jurisdiction under
In order for us to entertain the State’s appeal, case law and
Sec. 712-1255 was derived from the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and has close counterparts in other jurisdic tions. In all cases in which the question has been considered, 2 it appears to have been held that a conditional discharge order lacks sufficient finality to be appealable.
In
Warren v. State,
377 A.2d 1169 (Md. 1977), the sole question was whether an order for probation without judgment, entered under a counterpart of
The statutory exception carved out from the final judgment rule for appeal following suspension of sentence is specific, and is limited solely to those situations where the sentence in the traditional sense of a fine or prison term is lacking. Missing here is an additional element, the entry of a judgment upon the finding of guilt. Nor is this merely a technical distinction, for though a suspended sentence avoids a fine or prison term, it is also the judgment upon the finding of guilt and the collateral effects of that judgment which the defendant seeks to avoid.
377 A.2d at 1174 (footnote omitted).
The same conclusion was reached in
State v. Ryback,
219 N.W.2d 263 (Wis. 1974),
and Rash v. State,
318 A.2d 603 (Del. 1974), under counterparts of
We do not have before us the question of the right of a defendant to appeal from a conditional discharge order,
which was the specific issue in these cases. We are satisfied, however, for the same reasons which are held controlling in these cases, that the conditional discharge order from which the State attempts to appeal in this case does not constitute a sentence which is appealable by the State under
The appeal is dismissed.
Notes
Conditional discharge. (1) Whenever any person who has not previously been convicted of any offense under this part of chapter 329 or under any statute of the United States or of any state relating to a dangerous drug, harmful drug, detrimental drug, or an intoxicating compound, pleads guilty to or is found guilty of promoting a dangerous drug, harmful drug, detrimental drug, or an intoxicating compound under sections 712-1243, 712-1245, 712-1246, 712-1248, 712-1249, or 712-1250, the court, without entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of the accused, may defer further proceedings and place him on probation upon terms and conditions. Upon violation of a term or condition, the court may enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed as otherwise provided.
(2) Upon fulfillment of the terms and conditions, the court shall discharge the person and dismiss the proceedings against him.
(3) Discharge and dismissal under this section shall be without adjudication of. guilt and is not a conviction for purposes of this section or for purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime.
(4) There may be only one discharge and dismissal under this section with respect to any person.
(5) After conviction, for any offense under this part or chapter 329, but prior to sentencing, the court shall be advised by the prosecutor whether the conviction is defendant’s first or a subsequent offense. If it is not a first offense, the prosecutor shall file an information setting forth the prior convictions. The defendant shall have the opportunity in open court to affirm or deny that he is identical with the person previously convicted. If he denies the identity, sentence shall be postponed for such time as to permit the trial, before a jury if the defendant has a right to trial by jury and demands a jury, on the sole issue of the defendant’s identity with the person previously convicted.
An appeal by a defendant in People v. DuMontelle, 374 N.E.2d 205 (Ill. 1978) and one apparently by the prosecution in State v. Battaglia, 343 A.2d 103 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) were decided without the issue of jurisdiction being considered.