27 Conn. 319 | Conn. | 1858
We are of the opinion that the information in this case is sufficient. It is founded on the statute which provides for the punishment of “every person who shall seduce and commit fornication with any female under the age of twenty-one years,” (Rev. Stat., tit. 6, § 83,) and it charges the offense in the words of (he statute. This mode of stating the offense is agreeable to the general rule in framing indictments for statutable misdemeanors. As said by Thompson, J., in delivering the opinion of the court in U. States v. Mills, 7 Pet., 138, “The general rule is that in indictments for misdemeanors created by statute, it is sufficient to charge the
The counsel for the accused also claims that it was requisite that the information should set out the particular acts done by him and by means of which he accomplished the seduction. We do not think that the general rule on which the defendant relies, requiring all the facts and circumstances constituting the offense to be speciflcally set forth in an indictment, renders the particularity which is here insisted on necessary. The acts of the defendant preceding the consummation of the offense, being only the means by which it
The defendant claimed on the trial, that the only persuasion or inducement used by him to prevail on the female named in the information to surrender to him her chastity, was a promise of marriage on his part, honestly and sincerely-made, and by him intended to be performed; and that, if this was the case, or if, after such promise, he refused to perform it because of her improper or indiscreet conduct claimed to have taken place at a ball, he could not be convicted of the crime of seduction. The proposition involved in the first branch of this claim, that a virtuous and innocent female, who has been persuaded by a man to surrender her chastity to him by a promise of marriage, which is the strongest temptation that could be offered to prevail upon her to part with her innocence, and in which she implicitly confided, is not, although such promise was made honestly and with an intention to perform it, within the protection intended by the statute on which this information is founded, is, on the
A new trial therefore should not be granted.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
New trial not advised.