State v.Bibler
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas allowing defendant-appellee, Brandon Lee Bibler (“Bibler”), to enter a plea of guilty to one element of the offense of domestic violence and granting Bibler’s motion in limine for the purpose of excluding evidence of that element. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
{¶2} On September 25, 2013, Bibler was indicted for domestic violence in violation of
Further, it will not be necessary for the State to prove at trial the existence of a prior conviction element, since [Bibler] has pleaded guilty to this element. Since the prior conviction is not material for any other purpose, and its admission into evidence would be unfairly prejudicial to [Bibler], the State will not be permitted to introduce into evidence or present information to the jury regarding the existence of the prior domestic violence conviction which is reflected in Court’s Exhibit 11 which was the result of [Bibler’s prior conviction].
(Id. at 9).
{¶3} On December 4, 2013, the State filed a motion for leave to appeal the November 27, 2013 judgment entry, incorporating and applying the November 26, 2013 judgment entry. On January 24, 2014, this court granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal the trial court’s judgment allowing Bibler to enter a plea of guilty, and the judgment granting Bibler’s motion in limine. The State raises one assignment of error.
Assignment of Error
The existence of a prior domestic violence conviction is an essential element of
R.C.§2919.25(A) ; consequently, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it allowed defendant-appellant to enter a plea of guilty to the single elementof the prior conviction for domestic violence and subsequently ordered that the state would be precluded from producing evidence of the same at trial.
{¶4} In its assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it permitted Bibler to plead guilty to a single element of the offense of domestic violence, and, subsequently, precluded the State from presenting evidence of Bibler’s prior domestic-violence conviction at trial.
{¶5} The acceptance of pleas and thе determination of whether or not to admit evidence are matters within the trial court’s discretion. See State v. Bowers, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-11-12, 2012-Ohio-1585, ¶ 17 (“
{¶6} However, the State argues that this matter raises a question of law and should be reviewed de novo. The de novo standard is appropriate “‘where a trial court’s order is based on an erroneous standard or misсonstruction of the law * *
{¶7} Because this appeal raises a question of law, we will review the trial court’s judgment de novo. Accordingly, we will address whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it permitted Bibler to plead guilty to the prior-conviction element of the offense of domestic violence. The State argues that the Revised Code, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and relevant case law do not permit Bibler to enter а guilty plea to only the prior-conviction element of the offense of domestic violence. The State further argues that the resulting effect of any such plea – essentially a bifurcated proceeding – is impermissible.
{¶8}
{¶9} The trial court permitted Bibler to plead guilty to the prior-conviction element alone. In other words, the trial court permitted Bibler to plead guilty to fewer than all of the elements of the offense for which the grand jury indicted him. It is an issue of first impression in this court whether a defendant may enter a partial plea of guilty by pleading guilty to a single element of a crime—that is, fewer than all of the elements of an оffense charged by a grand jury. Therefore, we must examine the authorities governing the entry of pleas and determine whether Ohio law permits a partial plea of guilty.
{¶10}
{¶11} To decide the scope of
{¶12} A “guilty plea” is “[a]n accused person’s formal admission in court of having committed the charged3 offense.” (Emphasis added.) Black’s Law Dictionary 1337 (10th Ed.2014). An “offense” is “[a] violation of the law; a crime, often a minor one.”4 Id. at 1250. Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has stated that a “guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge * * *.” McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). “The terms ‘crime,’ ‘offense,’ and ‘criminal offense’ are all said to be synonymous, and ordinarily used interchangeably.” 22 Corpus Juris Secundum, Criminal Law, Seсtion 3 (1989), citing Ex parte Brady, 116 Ohio St. 512, 517 (1927). An “indictment” is defined as, “The formal written accusation of a crime, made by a grand jury and presented to a court for prosecution against the accused person.” (Emphasis added.) Black’s at 891.
{¶13}
{¶14}
“With reference to the offense or offenses to which the plea is entered:
(1) The plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt.
* * *
(3) When a plea of guilty or no contest is accepted pursuant to this rule, the court, except as provided in divisions (C)(3)5 and (4)6 of this rule, shall proceed with sentencing under Crim.R.32.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶15} Bibler argues that because the Rules of Criminal Procedure do not specifically state that a defendant can оr cannot plead to an individual element, he should be permitted to do so. The trial court adopted Bibler’s argument. In reaching that conclusion, Bibler and the trial court merely cited
{¶16} Although not controlling in this case,
{¶17} In the context of abrogating common law offenses,
{¶18}
{¶19} In sum, the Revised Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure do not contemplate guilty pleas to fewer than all elements of a crime. The language еmployed by the sections of the Revised Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinent to guilty pleas employ the words “charge,” “offense,” “crime,” and “indictment” in describing guilty plea procedure. The plain meaning of the words “charge,” “offense,” “crime,” and “indictment” indicate that it was the General Assembly and the Supreme Court’s intent to allow for a guilty plea to an entire offense, not individual elements of an offense. Further, the General Assembly defined “offense” in
{¶20} This case is analogous to State v. Klein, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-945, 2004-Ohio-4557, in which the Tenth District determined that the
{¶21} Here, Bibler wrote “prior conviction element only” next to the caption “Entry of Guilty Plea” on the plea form.9 (Nov. 26, 2013 JE, Doc. No. 40). Bibler also amended the plea form by inserting “prior conviction element of the” bеtween the words “the” and “offense” and scratched out the “s” on the word “offenses” in the phrase “I now desire to plead GUILTY to the offenses set forth below.” (Id.). Further, he made the following italicized and strikethrough changes to the plea form:
I understand that my guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt to the prior conviction element and a waiver of any and all constitutional, statutory, or factual defenses in this case. I further
understand that by pleading GUILTY, I waive a number of important rights, including the right to have a trial by jury, the right to confront and cross-examine the State’s witnesses who testify against me, the right to subpoena witnesses in my behalf, and the right to require the State to prove my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which I cannot be compelled to testify against myself with respect to the prior conviction element. I understand that the Court upon acceptance of my plea of GUILTY may proceed with judgment and sentence.I am pleading guilty voluntarily. I am satisfied with the legal representation and advice I have received from my attorney. If I am found guilty of domestic violence, my conviction will be for a felony four offense.
(Id.). Lastly, the court added the phrase “to the prior conviction element” after the statement, “The court, being fully advised as to the facts; hereby accepts the Defendant’s plea of GUILTY * * *.” (Id.). The prosecuting attorney signed the plea form in acceptance “as to form only.” (Id.).
{¶22} Like the Tenth District in Klein, we also conclude that this type of customized plea is not permitted by
{¶23} Also informative to our holding is the law regarding bifurcated trials. The State argues that not only do the Revised Code and the Rules of Criminal
{¶24} As an essential element of a crime that must be found by a jury, “a defendant is not entitled to bifurcate proceedings, nor may he waive jury trial on a prior conviction element alone.” State v. Nadock, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2009-L-042, 2010-Ohio-1161, ¶ 38, citing State v. Sweeny, 131 Ohio App.3d 765, 773 (2d Dist.1999). See also State v. Runner, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 99-BA-36, 2001-Ohio-3263, *3 (May 16, 2001) (“Nearly every appellate district in Ohio has held that an accused has no right to a bifurcated proceeding absent an enactment by the General Assembly of a statute conferring such right.”). Similarly, this court
{¶25} The State argues that permitting a partial plea of guilty is essentially creating a de facto bifurcated proceeding. Bibler equally concedes that the trial court is creating a bifurcated proceeding in accepting his partial guilty plea, but argues, “it is time to change the ‘bifurcation rule’ in Ohio as it pertains to ‘prior convictions’ so fair trials are held in Ohio if a Defendant waives his right to jury trial on the prior conviction element and pleads guilty to its existence to a Judge.” (Appellee’s Brief at 8). In support of his argument, Bibler advances three claims: that the prior-conviction element is only a sentencing factor, not an essential element; that Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), prohibits the name and nature of a prior conviction from being presented to a jury where a defendant assents to it; and that this court should depart from the longstanding bifurcation rule where a defendant fully admits the prior-conviction element and properly waives his right to a jury trial on that element.
{¶27} The defendant in Apprendi was charged with violating a New Jersey statute prohibiting the possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose after he fired several shots into the home of an African-American family. Id. at syllabus. After pleading guilty to the charged offense, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance Apprendi’s sentence, alleging that Apprendi’s actions were racially motivated. Id. Apprendi was sentenced to 12 years, 2 years more than the 10-year maximum sentence for the offense to which he plead guilty. Id. Apprendi challenged his enhanced sentence, and the United States Supreme Court held that “[t]he Constitution requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
{¶28} This court acknowledged that the Apprendi rule “clearly states that for the purpose of increasing a penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum,
{¶29} Here, the prior-conviction element is not merely a fact that enhances the penalty, as Bibler would like us to infer from Apprendi. The prior-conviction element is an element of the offense that elevates the degree of the offense. Allen, 29 Ohio St.3d at 54. As such, we reject Bibler’s argument that this court should depart from Ohio law and treat the prior-conviction element only as a sentencing-enhancement factor.
{¶30} Next, Bibler urges that, even if we are unwilling to conclude that a prior conviction for domestic violence is merely a sentencing-enhancement factor, this court should, in the interest of fairness, depart from the longstanding bifurcation rule and allow him to plead guilty to the prior-conviction element and prevent the State from presenting it to the jury. Bibler bolsters his argument that he should be permitted to plead guilty to the prior-conviction element of domestic violence by reasoning that he will be unduly prejudiced should the State be allowed to present evidence of his prior conviction to the jury. Maintaining that he should be able to prevent evidence of his prior conviction from being presented
{¶31} The defendant in Old Chief, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, was charged with violating a federal statute prohibiting the possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction. Id. at syllabus. Old Chief offered to stipulate to the prior-conviсtion element to preclude the prosecutor from revealing the name and nature of his prior felony conviction to the jury because he believed evidence revealing the name and nature of his prior conviction would unfairly prejudice his case. Id. at 175. The trial court rejected Old Chief’s stipulation, and he was convicted. Id. at syllabus.
{¶32} The United States Supreme Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting Old Chief’s stipulation. Id. at 174. The United States Supreme Court based its conclusion on the specific federal statute under which Old Chief was charged. As such, the application of Old Chief is restricted to situations where “the fact of the qualifying conviction is alone what matters under the statute.” Id. at 190. “[T]he fact that Old Chief’s prior conviction was for assault resulting in serious bodily injury rather than, say, for theft was not itself an ultimate fact, as if the statute had specifically required proof of injurious assault.” Id. at 178. In situations where the underlying statute is unconcerned with the specifics of the prior conviction, the United States Supreme Court noted,
{¶33} Bibler is requesting that this court liberally construe Old Chief to exclude all mention of a prior conviction if a defendant assents to the prior conviction, whether through stipulation or pleading guilty to it. In making that request, Bibler raises the same argument raised by the Sixth District that “at least three justices of the Ohio Supreme Court have recently indicated that Ohio should adopt the holding in Old Chief.” State v. Robinson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1369, 2012-Ohio-6068, ¶ 41, citing State v. Baker, 126 Ohio St.3d 1215, 2010-Ohio-3235 (Lundberg Stratton, J., Brown, C.J., and Pfeifer, J. dissenting). Therefore, Bibler reasons that the holding in Old Chief should be adopted here to preclude the State from presenting evidence of his prior domestic-violence conviction to the jury.
{¶34} Again, Bibler’s argument is off point. A close reading of Old Chief does not permit this court to apply Old Chief in the manner Bibler urges and the manner the trial court did in arriving at its conclusion that Bibler may plead guilty to a single element of a multi-element offense and exclude all mention of the prior conviction from the jury. Similarly, the issue raised in Baker was whether the
{¶35} Other Ohio Appellate Districts have been asked to apply Old Chief in the same fashion urged by Bibler, and have rejected the request. See Robinson at ¶ 50 (The language of
{¶36} Most pertinently, the Eleventh District addressed applying Old Chief to the situation where a defendant sought to stipulate to prior domestic-violence conviсtions to prevent the jury from learning of the prior convictions. Nadock, 2010-Ohio-1161, at ¶ 25. In concluding Old Chief was not applicable, the Eleventh District stated, “Unlike the defendant in Old Chief, appellant was not simply offering to stipulate to his status as a two-time domestic violence convict to the jury; rather, appellant‘s offer to stipulate was expressly conditioned upon the state excluding all mention of those previous convictions from the state‘s case-in-chief.” Id. at ¶ 32.
{¶37} However, Bibler notes that the Eighth District acknowledged the need to adopt Old Chief in Ohio to prevent the State from admitting the name and nature of a prior conviction if a defendant offers to concede as much. State v. Woods, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 78752, 2001 WL 1002233, *2 (Aug. 30, 2001). The defendant in Woods was charged with, among other things, having a weapon under disability in violation of
* * * [N]o рerson shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if any of the following apply:
* * *
(2) The person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any felony offense of violence * * *.
{¶38} Even assuming Bibler correctly argues that the Eighth District would have broadly applied Old Chief, the offense with which the defendant in Woods was charged,
{¶40} Given the above, we reject, for two reasons, Bibler‘s argument that Old Chief should be adopted to preclude the State from presenting any evidence of a prior conviction of domestic violence where a defendant fully admits to the prior conviction. First, Old Chief did not involve a defendant‘s ability to plead guilty to fewer than all of the elements of an offense; rather, Old Chief involved a defendant‘s right to stipulate to the prior-conviction element. Bibler is not seeking to stipulate to the prior-conviction element. Second, еven if Bibler were seeking to stipulate to the prior-conviction element, the name and nature of Bibler‘s prior offense are relevant. As previously noted, the statute specifically requires proof Bibler was previously convicted of domestic violence to elevate the degree of the offense. See
{¶41} Furthermore, we reject Bibler‘s argument that this court should depart from the longstanding bifurcation rule where a defendant seeks to fully admit to the prior-conviction element by waiving his right to a trial by jury on that element. Bibler attempts to distinguish the effect of pleading guilty to an element of an offense from creating a bifurcated proceeding, in the traditional sense, by arguing that his guilty plea does not create two separate trials because he already fully admitted to the prior conviction. Bibler argues that a traditional bifurcated proceeding is not established because the trial court is permitted to convict and sentence him on the elevated offense if the jury convicts him on the underlying offense.
{¶42} The trial court concluded that it was not bifurcating the proceedings in accepting Bibler‘s partial guilty plea because Bibler “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiv[ed] his right to trial as to [the prior-conviction] element.” (Nov. 27, 2013 JE, Doc. No. 41). In reaching its conclusion, the trial court relied on State v. Riley, 98 Ohio App.3d 801 (2d Dist.1994), and accepted Bibler‘s argument that, because a defendant may waive his or her right to a jury trial, he should have the right to waive a trial by jury and plead guilty to a single element of a multi-element offense. The trial court and Bibler‘s reasoning is erroneous.
{¶44} Bibler has a right to a trial by jury under the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution; however, Bibler does not havе the right to insist on the opposite of that right.
{¶45} Similarly, as Bibler acknowledges, he does not have an absolute right to have his guilty plea accepted. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970). It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to accept his guilty plea where it is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made because, as we stated above, a defendant cannot plead guilty to fewer than all of the elements of an offense. Conversеly, it would be an abuse of discretion for a trial court to accept his guilty plea to fewer than all of the elements of the offense.
{¶46} Next, the trial court‘s reliance on Riley is improper. The defendant in Riley was indicted for aggravated trafficking, with a prior drug-offense conviction, in violation of
{¶48} The trial court‘s reliance on Riley was erroneous because the Second District‘s legal analysis is flawed and because Riley sought to remove the prior-conviction element from the jury‘s consideration through stipulation, not by pleading guilty to the prior-conviction element. The Second District‘s legal analysis in Riley is improper because the Second District failed to address the longstanding bifurcation rules. Equally, in determining that Riley was not controlling, the Eighth District concluded that a trial may not be bifurcated when the prior-conviction element enhances the degree of the offense, regardless of whether a defendant executes a valid, written waiver. State v. Mitchell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 67490 and 67491, 1996 WL 695665, *3-4 (Dec. 5, 1996), citing State v. Fittro, 66 Ohio St.3d 16, 16 (1993). Additionally, a close reading of Riley indicates that the Second District did not contemplate a defendant waiving a jury trial on the prior-conviction element by pleading guilty to the element; rather, the Second District contemplated waiving the requirement that a jury find the
{¶49} The State equates the resulting effect of allowing Bibler to plead guilty to the prior-conviction element of the offense to the two separate trials discussed in State v. Miller, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011-02-013, 2012-Ohio-997. In Miller, the Twelfth District concluded that the trial court erred in allowing Miller to conduct his trial in two consecutive stages—a trial by jury on a violation of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“OVI“), and, if the jury found him guilty, then a bench trial on his prior conviction. Id. at ¶ 3. The trial court allowed Miller to bifurсate his trial after concluding the prior OVI conviction was not an essential element of the subsequent offense, and granted Miller‘s motion in limine precluding the State from presenting evidence of the prior conviction at trial. Id. at ¶ 3-4. The Twelfth District concluded that the trial court erred in bifurcating the proceedings and allowing the jury trial on only the remaining elements of the offense. Id. at ¶ 12.10
{¶50} Consequently, the rationale in Riley is contrary to law and Riley is inapplicable to the facts in this case. It was improper for the trial court to rely on Riley to allow Bibler to plead guilty to the prior-conviction element, and
{¶51} Therefore, for all of the reasons stated above, the Stаte is correct in its argument that the resulting effect of permitting a guilty plea to fewer than all of the elements of an offense creates a de facto bifurcated proceeding, which is prohibited by Ohio law. Maynez, 2008-Ohio-3054, at ¶ 9.
{¶52} We hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it accepted Bibler‘s guilty plea to fewer than all of the elements of the offense for which he was indicted. As it was erroneous for the trial court to accept Bibler‘s guilty plea to fewer than all of the elements of the offense, the trial court‘s order in limine precluding the State from presenting evidence of Bibler‘s prior conviction to the jury was also erroneous. It is within the trial court‘s discretion to admit or exclude evidence. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, at paragraph two of the syllabus. The trial court specifiсally concluded, “[I]t will not be necessary for the State to prove at trial the existence of a prior conviction element, since [Bibler] has pleaded guilty to this element.” (Nov. 27, 2013 JE, Doc. No. 41). Because the trial court‘s order in limine is based on its erroneous acceptance of Bibler‘s partial guilty plea, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Bibler‘s motion in limine.
{¶53} The State‘s assignment of error is sustained.
Judgment Reversed and
Cause Remanded
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur.
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