OPINION
Appellants, the State of Texas (“the State”) and the City of Rosenberg, Texas (“the City”), bring this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s order denying their pleas to the jurisdiction in a suit for inverse condemnation brought by appellees, Badruddin and Samina Bhalesha (“the Bhaleshas”). We reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment granting appellants’ pleas to the jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
The Bhaleshas own and previously operated the Whitehouse Supermarket (“the supermarket”), a grocery store in Rosenberg, Texas. The supermarket was situated at the northeast intersection of Avenue G and former First Street (currently FM 723), with Avenue G abutting its north side, former First Street abutting its east side, and its parking lot fronting Avenue G. 1 To reach Avenue G, traffic turned from either First Street or what was then FM 723 (now Houston Street), immediately to the west of and parallel to First Street. Although the supermarket did not have its own parking area on First Street, customers could park in the street’s public parallel parking spaces on the east side of the supermarket.
On November 8, 2002, the Bhaleshas and Jaina Enterprises, Inc. 2 sued the State and the City following construction of an overpass that they alleged materially and substantially impaired access to the supermarket, and for which they sought damages for the diminution in the value of their property. The overpass, which was constructed to ease traffic flow over the train tracks running parallel to Avenue G, converted former First Street into current FM 723 (hereinafter “FM 723”). Because there was no longer an at-grade intersection for Avenue G and FM 723, Avenue G had to be barricaded, thereby cutting Avenue G in half and creating cul-de-sacs on either side of FM 723. As a result, traffic traveling west on Avenue G or on FM 723 had to use U.S. 90A (one block south of and parallel to Avenue G) and Houston Street (one block west of FM 723 and perpendicular to Avenue G) to reach the supermarket. Further, traffic traveling on FM 723 could no longer park on the east side of the supermarket. However, ingress and egress to the supermarket via Avenue G remained unaffected.
In their petition, the Bhaleshas and Jai-na Enterprises, Inc. alleged that the construction of the overpass materially and substantially impaired access to their property and, thus, constitutes a compensable taking under article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution. The State and the City each filed a plea to the jurisdiction challenging the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Bhaleshas’ claims. Following a hearing, the trial court granted appellants’ pleas as to the corporate plaintiff, Jaina Enterprises, Inc., but de *697 nied the pleas as to the Bhaleshas. Appellants now appeal that denial pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8). See Tex. Crv. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon 2008).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plea to the court’s jurisdiction challenges a trial court’s authority to determine the subject matter of a controversy.
See State v. Holland,
Governmental immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and, thus, is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction.
Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones,
A plea to the jurisdiction can challenge either the pleadings or the existence of jurisdictional facts.
See Miranda,
III. ANALYSIS
Appellants contend the trial court erred in denying their pleas to the jurisdiction because construction of the FM 723 overpass does not materially and substantially impair access to appellees’ property. Specifically, the State argues that there is no *698 such impairment because the Bhaleshas retain access to Avenue G, the only street that was accessible from their parking lot prior to the construction of the FM 723 overpass. In two sub-parts, the City contends that (1) requiring traffic to travel a more circuitous route to gain access to a property from a public road abutting the property does not constitute a material and substantial impairment as a matter of law and (2) the creation of a cul-de-sac is not a material and substantial impairment of access as a matter of law. Appellees argue that the substance of appellants’ arguments reaches the merits of the case and, therefore, should not be considered on appeal. However, they assert that if we determine review of appellants’ arguments is appropriate, the trial court properly denied appellants’ pleas to the jurisdiction because access to their property has been materially and substantially impaired.
A. Jurisdiction
As a preliminary matter, the Bha-leshas argue that appellants’ central argument — that the construction of FM 723 has not impaired access to their supermarket but merely requires traffic to travel a circuitous route to access the property — is a question on the merits of the case and, as such, goes beyond the narrow jurisdictional issue before us. Thus, they claim, appellants’ argument cannot be properly considered on interlocutory appeal. This argument is without merit.
In
Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
B. Inverse Condemnation
To recover on an inverse condemnation claim, a property owner must establish that (1) the State or other governmental entity intentionally performed certain acts, (2) resulting in the taking, damaging, or destruction of its property, (3) for public use.
Steele,
An abutting property owner possesses an easement of access that is a property right.
State v. Heal,
Here, the relevant jurisdictional facts are largely undisputed. A review of the record reveals that, prior to construction of the overpass, the supermarket abutted Avenue G and former First Street. Its parking lot, located in front of the store, fronted Avenue G. 4 After construction, Avenue G was barricaded and cul-de-sacs were created on either side of the current FM 723, thereafter requiring traffic traveling west on Avenue G or on FM 723 to travel a more circuitous route (one or two more blocks) to reach the supermarket by using U.S. 90A and Houston Street. 5 Also, although traffic traveling on FM 723 could no longer park in public parking spaces on the east side of the supermarket, the supermarket’s frontage on Avenue G, including its parking lot, remained unaffected.
Appellants contend that there has not been a material and substantial impairment of access to the Bhaleshas’ property. In support of their position, they assert that (1) the Bhaleshas retain access to a two-way public street, Avenue G, which is the only access their store had prior to the construction project at issue, (2) although some of the supermarket’s patrons may have to take a more circuitous route to reach the store, such circuity of travel is not a compensable loss, (3) though traffic no longer passes directly in front of the property, property owners have no vested interest in traffic flow under Texas law, and (4) the creation of a cul-de-sac does not entitle a property owner to compensa-ble damages as a matter of law. Appellees argue that access to their property has been materially and substantially impaired because one access point, former First Street, was closed entirely and the only remaining access point, Avenue G, has been materially and substantially affected by construction of the cul-de-sacs. While appellees recognize that they still have access to Avenue G, they argue that the remaining access is unreasonable.
In support of their contention that the construction materially and substantially impaired access to their property, appel-lees rely primarily on
DuPuy v. City of Waco,
Prior to the construction of the viaduct the property of DuPuy fronted on South 17th Street with full access thereto; now, South 17th Street is fourteen feet above the property and a concrete support forms a solid barrier to the immediate right of DuPuy’s building. As a result, the building is left fronting on a cul-de-sac under the viaduct. It is generally held under analogous circumstances that a property owner left in a cul-de-sac is entitled to damages.
Id.
In
Lethu,
the City of Houston barricaded Fair Oaks Road in front of the plaintiffs convenience store.
Lethu,
Appellees contend that, just as the plaintiff in
DuPuy,
they are now positioned at the end of a cul-de-sac and no longer enjoy a free flow of traffic, thereby resulting in a material and substantial impairment of access. We disagree with appellees that the facts here rise to the level of impairment present in
DuPuy.
While it is true that in both cases cul-de-sacs were created on the streets to which the properties previously enjoyed full access, in
DuPuy
South 17th Street was elevated fourteen feet above the property, denying access to any public road and leaving an alleyway as the only remaining access.
See DuPuy,
Appellees also argue that the circumstances in
Lethu
are similar to those here because in both cases the properties were left abutting a cul-de-sac and the barricades erected were intended to deny all access through the street. However, we find the facts in
Lethu
differ significantly from the facts of the instant case. Here, the record shows, and appellees do not dispute, that the construction of the FM 723 overpass was designed to improve the road and ease traffic flow over the train tracks running parallel to Avenue G. By contrast, the court in
Lethu
found that the barricade could “in no way be characterized as a public improvement, as it is nothing more than a permanent physical obstruction” that is “intended to deny all access through the street.”
Lethu,
We are mindful that the issue of whether reasonable access remains is not to be fragmented to focus only on the closed access point without considering the remaining access points.
See City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Props.,
Appellees, however, urge us to focus on the Texas Supreme Court’s statement in
City of San Antonio
that “[w]e have held that access to a business was not materially and substantially impaired when one access point was closed, but another access point on a public street remained unaffected.”
Id.
at 66 (emphasis added). Ap-pellees argue that because them only remaining access via Avenue G has been severely affected by barricades on either side of FM 723, there has been a material and substantial impairment. We are not persuaded. In
City of San Antonio,
the alleged taking involved the blocking of access from a private business driveway to a city street.
Id.
at 61. The court noted that “[i]f the access to [the street] is closed, at least six points of egress and ingress along the I — 10 access road will remain at the front of the business park.”
Id.
at 66. Here, the supermarket’s access point on Avenue G has not been affected by the barricades on FM 723; rather, it is the route which traffic must take to reach the supermarket that has been affected. As a result of the construction, traffic would be required to travel an additional one or two blocks to arrive at the supermarket. However, as noted above, property owners are not entitled to compensation arising from a diversion of traffic, reduced visibility from passing traffic, or circuity of travel.
See id.
at 66-67 (finding reduction in lease rates resulting from traffic being required to travel more circuitous route to access business park non-
*702
compensable);
Schmidt,
We also find the decisions in
Archenhold
and
City of Grapevine
to be instructive. In
Archenhold,
the companion ease to
Du-Puy,
the court found that construction of the South 17th Street viaduct did not deprive the property owner of reasonable access.
See
In
City of Grapevine,
the plaintiff owned a tract of property at the intersection of State Highway 26 and Pool Road.
Similarly, the Bhaleshas retain unobstructed frontage along Avenue G, thus furnishing a suitable means of access to the supermarket. Because they have never been without access to a public road, their access has not been materially and substantially impaired.
See also Burris v. Metro. Transit Auth.,
While we agree with the Bhaleshas that access to their property has been impaired, impairment alone is insufficient for a compensable taking. Instead, appellees must show that the impairment of access is material and substantial.
See City of Waco v. Texland Corp.,
IY. CONCLUSION
We conclude the trial court erred in denying appellants’ pleas to the jurisdiction. We reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment granting appellants’ pleas to the jurisdiction.
APPENDIX
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Notes
. A map of the location is attached as an appendix.
. The Bhaleshas own Jaina Enterprises, Inc. ("Jaina”), a Texas corporation, through which they operated the Whitehouse Supermarket.
. When a plea challenges a plaintiff's pleadings, the determination turns on whether the pleader has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.
Miranda,
. The parties differ in their characterization of what access, if any, the property had to former First Street. While the State acknowledges in its brief that the supermarket had access to former First Street via the public parallel parking spaces used by its customers, it argues that
direct
access to former First Street never existed because the property never had a driveway accessing the street. The City contends that the supermarket never had access at all or a driveway connection to former First Street. Appellees contend that these statements are factually inaccurate. A review of the record reveals that although the supermarket did not have its own parking lot adjacent to former First Street, customers could use the public parallel parking spaces on former First Street and then walk to the supermarket. Construing the pleadings in favor of the Bhaleshas, as we must do, we assume that former First Street provided access to the supermarket via its public parking spaces.
See Miranda,
. The Bhaleshas added the language “TAKE THREE RIGHT TURNS" to their existing signage to notify customers of the new route.