State v. BevlyState v. Bevly
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} This case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of
I. Case Background
{¶ 2} In March 2012, appellant, Damon L. Bevly, pled guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition in violation of
{¶ 3} Bevly argued that application of
{¶ 4} The trial court agreed with Bevly. The court could find no rational basis for the distinction between gross-sexual-imposition cases in which there is corroborating evidence and those cases in which there is none. The court also concluded that a jury was required to make a finding regarding corroboration because introduction of this evidence enhanced the sentence from a mere possible prison term to a mandatory prison term. Bevly was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and five years of postrelease control.
{¶ 5} The state appealed, arguing that its introduction of the confession as corroborating evidence triggered a mandatory prison sentence pursuant to
1.R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) treats cases where there is corroborating evidence differently from those where there is none. Because there is no rational basis for this distinction, the statute violates the due process protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
2.R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) violates the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
II. Legal Analysis
{¶ 7} Bevly was charged with, and pled guilty to, two counts of gross sexual imposition pursuant to
Gross sexual imposition committed in violation of division (A)(4) or (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree. Except as otherwise provided in this division, for gross sexual imposition committed in violation of division (A)(4) or (B) of this section there is a presumption that a prison term shall be imposed for the offense. The court shall impose on an offender convicted of gross sexual imposition in violation of division (A)(i) or (B) of this section a mandatory prison term equal to one of the prison terms prescribed in section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a felony of the third degree if either of the following applies:
(a) Evidence other than the testimony of the victim was admitted in the case convborating the violation.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 8}
{¶ 9} Bevly argues that we should adopt the reasoning of the trial court and conclude that
{¶ 10} Although
{¶ 11} In the context of
{¶ 12} Further, the presentation of corroborating evidence differs from factors such as the use of a deadly weapon, e.g.,
{¶ 13} Each of those factors allows a sentencing court to gauge the offender’s culpability and likelihood of recidivism based on the offender’s conduct or criminal history. Each also evaluates the severity of the offense based on the impact of the crime on the victim and society. In contrast,
{¶ 14} Thus, the legislature has unconstitutionally created two different sanctions to be imposed on offenders who commit the same crime — differentiated only by the quantity of the evidence presented to prove guilt. This situation is impermissible because it denies due pi-ocess and equal protection to those convicted of this criminal offense.
{¶ 15} In State v. Thompkins,
{¶ 16} The state maintains that
{¶ 17} In addition, this statute creates a disincentive for an accused to confess to a ci-ime. Although the accused’s confession is, as the state admits, often “the lone available corroborating evidence” when the victim of gross sexual imposition is a child, this statute enhances punishment for those who confess. And as the trial court recognized, any law that discourages the accused from taking responsibility for the offense could also potentially force a child victim to endure a trial in order for the state to obtain a conviction.
{¶ 18} We conclude that there is no rational basis for imposing greater punishment on offenders based only on the state’s ability to produce additional evidence to corroborate the crime. Corroborating evidence is irrelevant to determining the culpability of the offender, the severity of the offense, or the likelihood of recidivism. It bears no relation to ensuring that punishment is
{¶ 19} Thus, because
B. As applied,
{¶ 20} Even if we were to hold that
{¶ 21} Bevly argues that the statute improperly and unconstitutionally takes away the jury’s authority to determine whether there is corroborating evidence, which, if found, requires a mandatory sentence. The state counters that because no fact is decided in a court’s determination of whether corroborating evidence was admitted in the case, the statute does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
{¶ 22} The Supreme Court of the United States recently provided guidance on this issue in Alleyne v. United States, — U.S.-,
{¶ 23} In Alleyne, the Supreme Court revisited the same statute and issue presented in Harris and changed its position. This time it concluded, “Because the finding of brandishing increased the penalty to which the defendant was subjected, it was an element, which had to be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.) Alleyne at 2163. Because the judge, rather than the jury, made the brandishing finding, the court held that Alleyne’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated. Id. at 2163-2164. The court’s reasoning in Alleyne contradicted its earlier reasoning, stating:
When a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted to the jury. It is no answer to say that the defendant could have received the same sentence with or without that fact.
Id. at 2162.
{¶ 24} The court explained that the analysis pertaining to factors increasing a minimum sentence is similar to the analysis pertaining to factors increasing a maximum sentence by recognizing that “if a judge were to find a fact that increased the statutory maximum sentence, such a finding would violate the Sixth Amendment, even if the defendant ultimately received a sentence falling within the original sentencing range.” Id. “The essential point,” the court emphasized, “is that the aggravating fact produced a higher range, which, in turn, conclusively indicates that the fact is an element of a distinct and aggravated crime. It must, therefore, be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 2162-2163. The court accordingly overruled Harris. Id. at 2163.
{¶ 25} Application of the principles set forth in Alleyne illuminates the issue whether
{¶ 26} By its terms,
{¶ 27} We reject the state’s argument that under Alleyne, Bevly’s argument still fails because no fact is determined in the corroborating-evidence requirement. According to the state’s argument, once the court determines that additional evidence is legally sufficient to corroborate, the evidence satisfies the requirement regardless of what weight the jury would actually give the evidence. We read the statute differently.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 28} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals for two reasons.
{¶ 29} We hold that because there is no rational basis for the provision in
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Notes
. In this appeal, Bevly also raises challenges to
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 34} When its victims are younger than 13, the crime of gross sexual imposition (“GSI”) carries a mandatory prison term, as opposed to a presumption of prison, so long as “[ejvidence other than the testimony of the victim was admitted in the case corroborating the violation.”
Due Process, Equal Protection, and Rational Basis
{¶ 35} The corroboration distinction in
{¶ 36}
{¶ 37} Reasonable minds can debate the wisdom of this policy. See Antkowiak, Judicial Nullification, 38 Creighton L.Rev. 545, 548 (2005) (arguing that “judges
{¶ 38} The majority argues only that
{¶ 39} Accordingly, I believe that
The Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial
{¶ 40} Under the Sixth Amendment, “facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury.” Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. -,
{¶ 41} The question, then, is whether the corroboration requirement in
{¶ 42} Economo is binding precedent and should be followed. Determining the existence of corroboration is a legal question regarding the quantum of evidence, one that is satisfied by even “[sjlight circumstances or evidence which tends to support the victim’s testimony.” Id. The inquiry is akin to other evidentiary rulings within the province of the court. See
{¶ 43} The legal question of corroboration is fundamentally different from the elemental fact-finding at issue in Apprendi and its progeny. The statutes in those cases allowed sentencing courts to resolve disputed allegations about what the accused did; they did not address legal questions. See, e.g., Apprendi,
{¶44} For these reasons, I would affirm the court of appeals’ judgment. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring separately.
{¶ 30} I agree with the majority that there is no rational basis for imposing greater punishment on offenders based on the state’s ability to produce additional evidence to corroborate proof of the crime. In my view, corroborating evidence is different from other statutory sentencing factors that focus on the circumstances of the offense and the conduct and criminal history of the offender but that do not focus on the quantity of evidence presented to prove guilt.
{¶ 31} This resolution renders moot the question whether the trial court’s factual findings also violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, and in my view, the majority’s discussion of that claim is superfluous to our holding. “It is well settled that this court will not reach constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary.” State v. Talty,
{¶ 32} And as Judge Roberts, now Chief Justice Roberts, explained in PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Adm.,
{¶ 33} Here, it is unnecessary to decide whether