56 Conn. App. 742 | Conn. App. Ct. | 2000
Opinion
The defendant, Kenya L. Best, appeals from the judgment of conviction of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3).
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court acted improperly in denying her motions for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of manslaughter in the first degree. In doing so, she asserts that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she acted either “under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life” or “recklessly engage[d] in conduct which create[d] a
The trial court reasonably could have found the following facts. The victim, Mahkeva Best, was born on February 23, 1995, and was approximately twenty months old at the time of her death on October 31, 1996. At that time, she weighed twenty-two pounds and measured two feet, eight inches in height. On October 30, 1996, the defendant, who was Mahkeva’s mother, was twenty-four years of age and resided with her boyfriend, Daryl Walker,
From October 31 to November 2,1996, the defendant gave four separate written statements to the Waterbury
Later that evening, Walker called a cab because he thought that Mahkeva did not look well and thought that she needed to go to the hospital. WTiile waiting for the cab, the defendant changed Mahkeva’s diaper and clothing, at which point Walker pointed out some bruising on Mahkeva’s stomach area and asked the defendant what had happened. The defendant responded that she did not know what had happened, but that maybe the bruising was due to the child’s diaper being too tight.
When Mahkeva was brought to the emergency room of Waterbury Hospital at about 3:15 a.m. the next morning, October 31,1996, by the defendant and Walker, she was examined by Genevieve O’Connell, an attending physician. Mahkeva’s heart had a very slow agonal beat.
Later that day, Malka Shah, the associate medical examiner at the office of the chief medical examiner, performed the autopsy
The injuries to Mahkeva’s forehead were older than the injuries to her abdominal area. The one on the right side of her head was older than the one on the left. Both, however, were older than the abdominal injuries. According to Shah, the blunt force trauma to the abdomen and the bite mark were “of the same duration” or were inflicted on Mahkeva at about the same time.
Ira Titunik, a forensic odontologist,
At the time of her fourth statement, in telling Neil O’Leary, a detective lieutenant with the Waterbury police,
The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court improperly denied her motions for judgment of acquittal because tirere was insufficient, evidence to sustain the conviction of manslaughter in the first degree. We disagree.
In State v. Cansler, 54 Conn. App. 819, 836, 738 A.2d 1095 (1999), we stated that “[t]he standard of review for a sufficiency of evidence claim is well settled. Our Supreme Court has stated: In reviewing [a] sufficiency [of evidence] claim, we apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 126, 646 A.2d 169 (1994), quoting State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62, 76, 634 A.2d 879 (1993); State v. Famiglietti, 219 Conn. 605, 609, 595 A.2d 306 (1991); State v. Jarrett, 218 Conn. 766, 770-71, 591 A.2d 1225 (1991); State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231,
In Ingram, this court stated: “We note that the probative force of the evidence is not diminished because it consists, in whole or in part, of circumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence. State v. Robinson, 213 Conn. 243, 254, 567 A.2d 1173 (1989). State v. Lago, 28 Conn. App. 9, 30, 611 A.2d 866, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 919, 614 A.2d 828 (1992). It has been repeatedly stated that there is no legal distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence so far as probative force is concerned. State v. Haddad, 189 Conn. 383, 390, 456 A.2d 316 (1983); State v. Perez, 183 Conn. 225, 227, 439 A.2d 305 (1981). It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence. State v. Perez, supra, 227 .... State v. Braxton, [196 Conn. 685, 691, 495 A.2d 273 (1985)]. . . . State v. King, 216 Conn. 585, 602, 583 A.2d 896 (1990); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211, 478 A.2d 1005 (1984). [T]he inquiry into whether the record evidence would support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence . . . established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . State v. Boykin, 27 Conn. App. 558, 563-64, 609 A.2d 242, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 905, 610 A.2d 179 (1992).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ingram, supra, 43 Conn. App. 810.
“It bears emphasis that [i]n evaluating evidence that could yield contrary inferences, the [trier of fact] is not
Furthermore, as an appellate court, we must determine whether the totality of the evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s verdict, supports the trial court’s verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, where a three judge court is the judge of the facts as well as the law, as is the case here, the court, as the triers of fact, is not to be expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own obseivations and experiences of the affairs of life. Rather, they may apply them to the evidence or facts in hand, to the end that their action may be intelligent and their conclusions correct in the ultimate verdict that they may render. See id., 838.
As already noted, the statute on manslaughter in the first degree, insofar as pertinent to this case, General
It is also true that there is no specific definition of the term “grave risk of death.” The defendant has given us no analysis or argument that that term is used in
David Best, the estranged husband of the defendant, returned Mahkeva to the defendant’s home on Monday, October 28, 1996, at which time she was “fine.” From that time until the early morning hours of Thursday, October 31,1996, when Mahkeva was taken to the hospital, no one except the defendant and Walker had any contact with Mahkeva. Although the defendant, in her first statement to the police, opined that Walker beat Mahkeva, it was not until several days later that she admitted that it was she, not Walker, who had beaten her child. That leaves her as the sole cause
On October 30, 1996, the defendant maintained that Mahkeva was “fine,” although she acknowledges that on the previous day Mahkeva had fallen off the couch and hit her head on the coffee table. O’Connell, the attending physician who examined Mahkeva on October 31, 1996, said that the bruise on her left forehead was suffered within two days of October 31, 1996. On the morning of October 30, 1996, the defendant “realized” that the child was not well because she was “moaning, groaning and cranky” and she had a very bad diaper rash, which the child was scratching. There is no indication of what the defendant did to alleviate Mahkeva’s diaper rash. When the defendant gave Mahkeva Tylenol and later, Nyquil, the child was “tussling” with her. The defendant had “to be strong” with her to administer the medication and to do so she held the child down “so she couldn’t fight [her].”
On October 30, 1996, the defendant was stressed and frustrated because she could not find a job and the child was getting on her nerves as she would not keep still. That afternoon the child, who was lying on the couch, lifted up her leg and kicked the defendant in the nose. Thereupon, the defendant actually bit the child on her left thigh. Such shocking retaliatory action by a mother against her totally vulnerable child is inexplicable and adduces an especially culpable mental state. Her stress or frustration cannot legitimate this biting of her own twenty month old daughter.
It is, however, the defendant’s beating of her daughter on the afternoon of October 30,1996, shortly after biting her, together with its consequences, that starkly demon
Beyond all that we have pointed out, there is the consciousness of guilt reflected in the defendant’s misstatements and changes in her statements to the police. State v. Carter, 196 Conn. 36, 48, 490 A.2d 1000 (1985); State v. DeMatteo, 186 Conn. 696, 702, 443 A.2d 915 (1982); see United States v. Durrani, 835 F.2d 410, 425 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[fjalse exculpatory statements made to law enforcement officers are circumstantial evidence and have independent probative force”). “False exculpatory statements have independent probative value [as consciousness of guilt] regardless of whether a defendant testifies on his behalf.”
From the cumulative effect of the evidence, together with reasonable inferences, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that the defendant was guilty of manslaughter in the first degree under § 53a-55 (a) (3). The evidence of the defendant’s behavior in this case was sufficient for the court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that, under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, the defendant recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of the victim’s death.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when ... (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person.”
General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) provides: “A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or causes a suicide by force, duress or deception; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime.”
General Statutes § 53a-54b provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of a capital felony who is convicted of . . . (9) the murder of a person under sixteen years of age.” At the time of her death on October 31, 1996, the victim, Mahkeva Best, was approximately twenty months old, having been bom on February 23, 1995.
General Statutes § 53a-56 provides: “(a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: (1) He recklessly causes the death of another person; or (2) he intentionally causes or aids another person, other than by force, duress or deception, to commit suicide.
“(b) Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony.”
General Statutes § 53a-3 (13) provides: “A person acts ‘recklessly’ with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation . . . .”
The defendant had been estranged from her husband, David Best, since January, 1996. David Best was Mahkeva’s father.
The defendant did not testify at her trial. She did, however, voluntarily give the Waterbury police four written statements from October 31 to November 2, 1996. All four statements were made at the Waterbury police department. She made the first statement on October 31, starting it at 6 am. and finishing it at 7 a.m. She made her second statement on October 31, starting it at 2:20 p.m. and finishing it at 3:55 p.m. She made her third statement on October 31, starting it at 7:50 p.m. and finishing it at 8:45 p.m. She made her fourth statement on November 2 starting at 6 p.m. and finishing it at 7:35 p.m.
The statements of the defendant varied, with the significant points as follows. In her first statement, the defendant stated: “On Tuesday the 29th, my daughter fell off the couch while she was playing and she hit her head on the coffee table.” She continued and inculpated her boyfriend, Daryl Walker, stating, “when I undressed her and removed her diaper I saw bruises below her belly button near her stomach area and [Walker] pointed out the bruises and said to me ‘what happened, how did those marks get there.’ I told him that I did not know and I pressed her stomach and thought maybe it came from her diaper being too tight . . . The only thing that I can figure out that happened is that [Walker] beat my daughter up. [Walker] is a violent person. . . .” In addition, the defendant stated that her daughter was “fine” when her estranged husband had returned her on Monday, October 28,1996, and she had changed her “several times since then.” Moreover, since her husband had returned Mahkeva, no one, except the defendant and Walker, had been with Mahkeva.
In her second statement, the defendant made no reference to Walker’s beating the child, but stated rather, “I am now giving the police this second statement of my own free will at 2:20 p.m. I would just like to add some things that I do now remember. On Wednesday, 10-30-96 at about 1:00 p.m. I did give my daughter Mahkeva some Tylenol medicine because I thought she had a slight fever. I laid Mahkeva on the couch to give her this medicine .... While attempting to give Mahkeva this medicine I held her hands across her body both together and was also holding her face. While holding Mahkeva down she would be tussling with me and I would have to put pressure on her to make her stop. I would lean on her with my body putting pressure on her stomach to stop her from moving around. While doing this Mahkeva was tussling with me moving her head about and I had to hold her down with pressure from my arm. After doing this Mahkeva threw up the Tylenol .... I waited until about 2:30 p.m. on Wednesday, 10-30-96 to give her . . . Nyquil. In giving Mahkeva the Nyquil I went through the same routine as I did the first time. Mahkeva was again tussling with me and moving all around and once again I would put pressure on her stomach until she would stop and take the medicine.”
At about 7:50 p.m. on the same evening, the defendant gave her third statement of that day, again making no reference to Walker beating the child and stating: “Because I have no job, I have no money, and I have been
These three statements, as well as the fourth statement, were admitted into evidence as full exhibits without objection.
An agonal heartbeat is usually the last few beatings of the heart before it stops.
One centered right around the “belly button,” another on the left lower ribs, a third over the right hip pelvic area and a fourth over the left pelvic area. In addition, X rays taken of Mahkeva’s body indicated a rib fracture.
The Waterburypolice department was contacted by the hospital because of Mahkeva’s condition. Officer David Sheehan arrived there about 3:50 a.m. While there, Sheehan spoke to the defendant. She asked him wha,t was going to happen to her and whether he would be contacting the department of children and families. She never asked him about Mahkeva’s condition, and he stated that she “seemed more concerned for her own [well-]being not for that of the child.”
During her medical career, Shah has performed “close to four thousand autopsies.”
A “macerating injury” is like a crushing injury, where the organ becomes “like a pulp.”
All of Mahkeva’s bleeding was internal.
Forensic odontology encompasses bite mark recognition. Essentially, it is the observing of a wound on tissue or food stuffs, the determination of whether it is a human or nonhuman bite mark and then using that in the determination for its importance in the particular case.
O’Leary was in charge of this investigation and was also the supervisor in the Waterbury detective bureau assigned to major crimes.
A specific intent to ldll or injure is not required. State v. Shine, supra, 193 Conn. 640.
In referring to the nature of our review, the defendant cites the following proposition from State v. Carpenter, 214 Conn. 77, 84, 570 A.2d 203 (1990): “A conclusion of guilt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and proof to that extent is proof which precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it tends to support, and is consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) To suggest that Carpenter dictates our review on the sufficiency issue indicates a fundamental misconception of the relationship between the principles set out in Caipmter and the well established and traditional scope of review of trial court verdicts. See State v. Sivri, supra, 231 Conn. 132. To accept this argument of the defendant would mean, as Siwi points out, that in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a guilty verdict, an appellate court would be required to give deference, not to the view of the evidence taken by the trial court that arrived at a guilty verdict, but to any reasonable hypothesis supplied by the defendant that, had it been accepted by the trial court, would have resulted in an acquittal. See id., 133; see also State v. Greenfield, supra, 228 Conn. 77.
In Sivri, our Supreme Court put it appropriately when it stated: “On
“When there is evidence that . . . the injuries occurred while the child was in the sole [care] of the [defendant], the [trier of fact] is permitted to infer not only that the child’s injuries were not accidental but that, in addition, they occurred at the culpable hands of [the defendant]. . . . State v. Chapman, [46 Conn. App. 24, 34, 698 A.2d 347 (1997)], quoting State v. Dumlao,
The degree of force the defendant used to inflict the injuries may be inferred when from the fact that the blows to the abdomen were administered when the child was lying on a couch, a surface softer than a hard surface.
The defendant in this case did not testify at trial.