Dеfendant Scott D. Bento challenges an order of the Superior Court (Hancock County, Beaulieu, J.) denying his motion to suppress a blood-alcohol breath test. After the denial of his motion, Bento entered conditional guilty pleas (Smith, J) pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), to aggravated OUI, 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312-B (1978 & Supp. 1989), and reckless conduct with the use of a dangerous weapon, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 211 (1983). 1 Because the court, when determining whether probable cause existed to justify the breath test, made inconsistent and irreconcilable findings, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
In August 1989, Bento was involved in a two-vehicle accident in Bar Harbor. Heathеr Billman, a passenger in Bento’s car, was killed in the accident. After the accident, Chief Daniel C. Herrick of the Bar Harbor Police Department met both drivers in the waiting area of Mt. Desert Hospital’s emergency room, read them the Implied Consent Warning pursuant to 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312 (1978 & Supp.1989), and administered a breath tеst to Bento and the other driver.
Bento filed a motion to suppress the results of the breath test on the ground that this evidence was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. Following an evi-dentiary hearing, the court ruled that under section 1312(11)(D), 2 in order for the *1096 test result to be admissible, probable cause to believe that Bеnto was under the influence must have existed at the time the breath test was conducted. The court then found that no such probable cause existed. Nоnetheless, the court denied the motion to suppress, holding the test results admissible because, under the fourth amendment’s “exigent circumstances” excеption, probable cause did exist to believe that the search would reveal evidence of a crime, namely evidence to suppоrt the charge of manslaughter.
I.
The court interpreted section 1312(11)(D) as requiring that, in order for the blood-alcohol test results to be admitted into evidenсe, probable cause must have existed before the test was taken. We reject the court’s interpretation. We conclude that the statute does not require that probable cause exist prior to a driver’s submitting to the test.
Statutory application must be consistent with the legislative intent as divined from the language of the statute.
See State v. Edward C.,
First, we observe that the Legislature did not intend to treat an operator involved in a motor vehicle fatality in the same fashion as an operator involved in a routine OUI stop. Compare 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312(l)-{3) & (12) (probable cause of OUI must exist to conduct a blood-alcohol test; admission of the test results dependent on informing driver of consequences of failing to comрly) with 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312(8) & (11) (motor vehicle accident involving death, by itself, sufficient to conduct a blood-alcohol test; moreover, admission of the test does not depend upon giving the warnings of the consequences of refusing the test). Second, section 1312(11)(D) provides that:
[t]he result of a test taken pursuant to this paragraph is not admissible at trial unless the court is satisfied that probable cause exists, independent of such test result, to believe that the operator was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or had excessive blood-alcohol level.
29 M.R.S.A. § 1312(11)(D) (emphasis added). This provision describes the court’s responsibility when admission of the test results is sought at trial. The court must ascertain that probable cause then exists. The statute does not require, by its terms, that the court determine whether probable cause existed at some prior time (i.e., at the time of arrest or the time the test was conducted). Given these two factors, we hold that the court’s interpretation of section 1312(11)(D) was error.
II.
Thе misinterpretation of the statute does not end the matter, however, because of an inconsistency in the court’s findings i) that no probable causе existed to believe that the defendant was operating while under the influence, and ii) that probable cause did exist to believe that the searсh would produce evidence tending to establish the commission of the crimes charged. Because these findings are irreconcilable, we remand for reconsideration consistent with our interpretation of section 1312(11)(D).
As we previously have observed, a defendant is guilty of operating under the influеnce if “his mental or physical faculties are impaired ‘however slightly,' i.e., ‘to any extent.’ ”
State v. Longley,
Although we will not reverse the court’s findings concerning whether probable cause exists unless it is clearly erroneous,
see State v. Cyr,
III.
We are asked by the State to go further than to determine the meaning of the statutory requirement of probable cause. The State argues that
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,
The entry is:
Judgment vacated.
Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.
All concurring.
Notes
. In addition to the counts includеd in the conditional guilty plea, the defendant was indicted for manslaughter, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203 (1983 & Supp.1989), aggravated assault, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 208 (1983), and additional counts of reckless conduct with the use of a dangerous weapon, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 211 (1983).
. At the time of the accident, section 1312(11)(D) stated, in pertinent part:
D. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, each operator of a motor vehicle involved in a motor vehicle accident which results in the death of any person shall submit to and complete a test to determine that person’s blood-alcohol level by analysis of such blood or breath.... The result of a test taken pursuant to this paragraph is not admissible at tried unless the court is satisfied that probable cause exists, independent of such test result, to believe that the operator was trader the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or had excessive blood-alcohol level.
*1096 (Section 1312(11)(D) has since been amended by P.L.1989, ch. 740.)