23 N.J.L. 532 | N.J. | 1852
On the part of the defendant in this certiorari, it is insisted that the writ ought to be dismissed, on the grounds that great injury will result to the township if it be sustained, and the taxes assessed declared to be illegal: and that an appeal ought to have been first taken to the commissioners of appeal in cases of taxation. Undoubtedly the court may dismiss a certiorari at any stage of the proceedings, 3 Zab. 85. But the case before us involves very important principles of law, arising out of the construction of a tax law altogether different from those before in force, and it is therefore proper that they should receive a judicial construction. As a general rule, I think a certiorari ought not to be allowed, even for the decision of legal questions arising upon the tax laws, until there has been an appeal ; but it always rests,in the sound discretion of the court at what stage of the proceedings the certiorari shall be granted, or whether it shall be granted at all; and as in this case the writ was allowed upon special application, I see no reason to interfere with it.
The first objection made to the assessment returned 'is, that the record of the proceedings of the town meeting, entered in the clerk’s book, does not state the time when the meeting was held. But I do not think a correct record is indispensable to render the proceedings of the town meeting valid. It clearly appears by the proof, that in point of fact the meeting was
It appears that the money actually ordered to be raised for the aforesaid purposes, added to that ordered to be raised in the township for county purposes, amounted in the aggregate to the sum of six thousand seven hundred and twenty-four dollars forty-throe cents. The sum actually assessed was eight thousand five hundred and eighty-four dollars seventy-one cents, being an excess of eighteen hundred and sixty dollars twenty-eight cents above the amount ordered, or more than twenty-five per cent, upon the whole sum ordered. This excess, which is far beyond the fees of the officers, is not authorized by the laws empowering the assessors to levy and assess taxes. Those laws do not authorize them to g‘o beyond the sums ordered by the boards of chosen freeholders and the town meetings, except for fees of assessing, collecting, and paying, and, in certain cases, of default and deficiency. Rev. Stat. 185, 1002, 1005, 1009, 1023.
It has no doubt been the general practice throughout the state for the assessors to add to the sums ordered to be raised, and to the fees for assessing and collecting, a sufficient amount
Another objection to the assessment is, that the prosecutor was assessed for the value of certain shares of stock of “ the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey” and of “the Morris and Essex Railroad Company.” These shares it is insisted are exempt from taxation, by express provisions contained in their respective charters, which the tax law of 1851 did not intend to repeal. The provisions of the charters are, in this respect, substantially the same. The fourteenth section of the charter of the first named company, originally chartered by the name of the Somerville and Easton Railroad Company, declares, “that as soon as the net proceeds of said railroad.
The fifteenth section of the charter of the Morris and Essex road is the same, except that the state tax is not to be paid until the net proceeds shall amount to seven per centum on its cost. Acts of 1835, p. 30.
Both acts require statements of the cost and annual statements of the net proceeds to be made to the legislature. These statements have been made, but the net proceeds have not yet, in either case, reached such a per centum as to require any tax to be paid, and none has been paid.
The first and important question to be decided in reference to these limitations of the power of taxation is, whether they do, in terms or by fair and necessary construction, apply to the levy and assessment of taxes on the value of the stock in the hands of the individual stockholders, as well as to a levy and assess- ' merit directly on the corporations, as such. The language of the provision is, that the corporation shall pay a certain tax to the state treasurer, and that no other tax shall be levied or assessed upon the said company. Does this expression “said company,” as here used, include the several stockholders who compose the company, or is it an expression, intended to be exactly synonymous with the prior expression “ said corporation?” This must be ascertained, as well from the context as by looking at the general scope and object of the provision itself.
It has been finally settled, by repeated decisions of this court, affirmed by the Court of Errors, that similar provisions in the charters of the Paterson and Hudson River Railroad Company and of the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company exempt not merely the franchises, but all the property of those companies held for the necessary purposes of their business, from all taxes for state, county, city, or township purposes. 2 Harr. 80; 3 Harr. 12, 71; 1 Zab. 557.
The power of taxation is unquestionably of paramount importance to the state, and must not be restrained or defeated by mere doubtful inferences. I concur entirely in what was said by Chief Justice Taney, in the case of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (11 Peters 544), that in grants by the public nothing passes by implication, and that any ambiguity in the terms of the contract must operate against the adventurers, and in favor of the public. But language must be interpreted according to its fair and natural import, and so as to effect the object intended, not merely in form, but in substance. Great and important works of a public character, by which all the citizens of the state were to be directly or indirectly benefited, requiring a heavy expenditure, and admitting of doubt as to their ultimate profit, were to be constructed by private capital. Individuals having the means were encouraged to subscribe and. pay the money necessary to complete the undertakings, by provisions, that until the net earnings of the company should amount to a reasonable and fixed per centum, that is until these individual subscribers should receive certain dividends, the corporation should pay no bonus or tax; and when the prescribed dividends should be realized, then the corporations should pay a fixed .tax, and that no other tax or impost should be levied or assessed upon the said companies. The contract was with the stockholders individually, as well
I am therefore of opinion that, upon principle, this stock was not taxable. But even if I was disposed to take a different view of this subject, I should hold myself bound to yield my own opinion to what seems to be the clear weight of authority. Numerous cases have occurred in other courts involving the same question, and all of them have been decided in conformity with the views above expressed. In the case of Johnson v. The Commonwealth (7 Dana 342), the Court of Appeals of Kentucky ruled that where the act incorporating one of the banks exempted the bank from any other than a certain tax, the stockholders were not taxable for the value of their respective shares under a general law taxing stocks in the hands of stockholders.
The courts of Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, and Maryland have held that a tax on a corporation for the value of its property, and on the stockholders for the value of their shares, would be double taxation, which involves the same principle. 10 Mass. R. 514; 4 Metc. 184 ; 9 Metc. 199 ; 3 Greenl. 133 ; 9 N. Hamp. R. 423 ; 5 Gill 231; 12 G. & John. 117.
In the case of Gordon v. The Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133, the Supreme Court of the United States decided, that where an act of the legislature of Maryland provided that upon certain banks complying with the terms and conditions of the act, the faith of the state was pledged not to impose any further or, other tax or burthens upon the said banks during the existence of their charters: this was a contract with the stockholders, whereby they were exempt from a tax levied upon the value of their respective shares of the stock. The judge who delivered the opinion of the court argued that this was the meaning of the pledge from various expressions contained in the acts, none which more strongly indicated such a meaning than those contained in the acts now under consideration. This case seems to me to be in point, and being a decision upon the constitutionality of the tax, by the court whose decisions upon such questions are binding upon us, it is our duty to conform to it.
Besides the tax on the railroad stocks, the prosecutor was assessed for the value of certain stocks he owned in corporations within the state of New York, and it is objected that such stocks arc not taxable by the laws of this state. That the law does, iu terms, require all citizens of this state to be taxed for the actual value of such stocks, cannot be questioned, its language being, “that the term personal estate, shall be construed to include stocks in corporations, whether within or without this state.” The act adopts the principle, that all property which consists of dioses in action, that is evidences of a right or debt, having an actual value, shall be assessed to the owner,
Potts, J. The object of the certiorari in this case was to bring up the assessment made by the assessor of the township of Morris, in the county of Morris, upon property of the prosecutor, in 1851. Several questions were raised and discussed in the course of the argument at the bar, which will be noticed in order.
The defendant in certiorari moved to quash the writ, on the ground that the allowance of writs of certiorari was matter of discretion, which ought not to be exercised in cases where great public inconvenience would ensue, and where the errors complained of weré of a merely technical character; and that the collection of a large amount of the taxes assessed in this township had been suspended by this and other writs to the detriment of the public; and in the second place, on the ground that in this case the prosecutor had not applied to the commissioners of appeal of the township to have the errors complained of rectified before resorting to this remedy.
1. If the errors complained of in this case were purely technical, matters of form rather than substance, the first ground for quashing this writ might prevail; but this is not the case here. Some, at least, of the errors assigned are matters of substance, involving the construction of statutes and the powers of the assessor : and if the people of a township, through their agents, attempt to extract money upon doubtful authority from one of their citizens, they must abide by the consequent inconvenience which must result from a judicial review of the proceeding. The cases on this point are to be found collected in The People v. The Supervisors of Allegany, 15 Wend. 198.
2. It is eminently proper that, in all cases of complaint in matters of assessment, the party considering himself aggrieved should first apply to the commissioners of appeal for relief. The legislature have constituted this body a court of appeal in cases of unjust assessments, and have clothed it with ample powers to hear and determine such appeals in a speedy and effectual manner. Rev. Stat. 1024, 1014, 1015. And in ordi
We proceed, then, to consider the errors assigned by the prosecutor, and upon which he asks that the assessment in this case be set aside or corrected : and
1. It is alleged that the sum of $1300 for the use of schools, $2000 for roads, and $100 for the support of the poor, was assessed without any legal authority, inasmuch as there is no record of any town meeting held in the year 1851, at which these or any other sums for these purposes were voted by the people. A duly certified record of “minutes of the annual town meeting held in Morristown, Morris township, at Cooper and Be-land’s hotel, opening at eight o’clock in the morning, and closing at seven o’clock in the evening,” however, is produced, taken from the minute book of the township, by which it appears the above sums were duly voted to be raised. It does not state either the year, or the time of the year, when the meeting was held; but it appears in evidence that these proceedings are entered in the book between the record of those of 1850 and 1852, and that they are a true record of the proceedings of the annual town meeting of the inhabitants of that township, which was held on .the second Monday of April, 1851, the time fixed by law for holding the same. This is sufficient. The mere omission of the clerk to enter in the record the time when the meeting was held, cannot be állowed to have the effect of rendering the proceedings ©f that meeting a nullity. Evidence cannot be received to contradict the record, but it may be received to supply a palpable omission in it.
2. It appears that the assessor, in addition to the sum of $3324.43 for county purposes, was authorized, by the vote of the town meeting, to assess $1300 for schools, $2000 for roads,
3. The next error assigned is the assessment upon stocks held by the prosecutor in the Central Railroad Company and the Morris and Essex Railroad Company. In the case of The State v. The Collector of Chatham, township, decided at the present term, it is held that the property of the Morris and Essex Railroad Company is exempted by its charter from all taxation, except that specially imposed by the 15th section. In the case of The State v. Branin, collector, also decided at the present term, it is held that an exemption of this character includes the stoch of a compauy in the hands of the stockholders. The charter of the Central Railroad Company contains the same clause of exemption as that of the Morris and Essex Railroad Company, and the stock of both these companies comes within the principle of the cases decided. This assessment must consequently be set aside, so far as these stocks are concerned.
4. The last error assigned is, that the assessor assessed certain stocks of the Merchants and Traders Bank of New York and the Floating Dry Dock Company of the city of New York
The Chief Justice concurred.
Cited in State v. Sickles, 4 Zab. 126; State v. Flavell, Id. 383; State v. Powers, Id. 401; State v. Betts. Id. 557 ; Newark City Bk. v. Assessor, 1 Vr. 20; State v. Miller, Id. 370 ; State v. Ferguson, 2 Vr. 119-126 ; State v. Collector of Delaware, 2 Vr. 197 ; State v. Hart, Id. 436; State v. Jersey City, Id. 577; State v. Cook, 3 Vr. 353; State v. Blauvelt, 5 Vr. 263; State v. Haight, 6 Vr. 284; State v. Saalman, 8 Vr. 159; State v. Jones, 9 Vr. 85; Mor. Can. & Bkg. Co. v. Central R. R. Co., 1 C. E. Gr. 436.