State v. BenjaminState v. Benjamin
{¶1} Akie H. Benjamin appeals the trial court‘s denial of his Motion to Vacate Void Sentence Pursuant to
{¶2} On November 26, 2007, a Scioto County Grand Jury indicted Benjamin for possession of and trafficking in both crack cocaine and methylenedioxymethamphetamine (commonly referred to as “ecstasy“). The trafficking charges were dismissed, and the state tried Benjamin on the possession charges. Benjamin was convicted of two counts of possession in violation of
{¶3} Following our decision, Benjamin filed several motions with the trial court. On May 14, 2010, Benjamin filed a Motion to Vacate Void Sentence Pursuant to
{¶4} Benjamin appeals and asserts the following assignment of error: I. “The sentence in the case is void due to the trial courts [sic] failure to impose a statutorily mandated drivers [sic] license suspension. Therefore Defendant is entitled to re-sentencing hearing [sic].”
II.
{¶5} In his sole assignment of error, Benjamin contends that his sentence is void and that he should be granted a de novo sentencing hearing. Benjamin argues that, because the trial court‘s sentence did not impose a mandatory driver‘s license suspension, his entire sentence is void.
{¶7} Here, we focus on the first prong. Specifically, Benjamin contends that the trial court failed to comply with all applicable rules and statutes, and thus, his sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. We review de novo whether the trial court clearly and convincingly complied with all applicable rules and statutes. State v. Walker, Mahoning App. No. 08MA103, 2009-Ohio-1503, at ¶10.
{¶8} Benjamin was convicted of two counts of possession of drugs, in violation of
{¶9} Benjamin asserts that he is entitled to a resentencing hearing because his sentence is void. Benjamin relies on State v. Beasley (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 74. In
{¶10} Benjamin argues that, because the trial court did not impose a statutorily mandated driver‘s license suspension, his sentence is a nullity or void under Beasley. Therefore, according to Benjamin, “where a sentence is void because it does not contain a statutorily mandated term, the proper remedy is * * * to resentence the defendant.” State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, at ¶23 (citing Beasley), superseded by statute.
{¶11} Courts have found that the failure to impose a statutorily mandated driver‘s license suspension renders a sentence void and that the proper remedy is resentencing of the defendant. See State v. Harris, 190 Ohio App.3d 417, 2010-Ohio-5374. In Harris, the defendant pled guilty to drug trafficking in violation of
{¶12} In a similar context, the court in State v. Fields, 183 Ohio App.3d 647, 2009-Ohio-4187, remanded a case for resentencing after the trial court failed to impose a statutorily mandated fine. The court stated: “[A] trial court retains jurisdiction to correct its void judgments. Because the court below did not include in Fields‘s sentence for cocaine possession the statutorily mandated fine, the sentence was void. And regardless of the jurisdictional bar to its consideration of Fields‘s postconviction claim on its merits, the court should have vacated the void sentence and conducted a new sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence imposed on Fields for cocaine possession and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.” Id. at ¶10-11 (citations omitted).
{¶14} The state relies on State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238. In Fischer, the Court held that when a trial court fails to properly impose statutorily mandated postrelease control, the defendant‘s resentencing hearing is limited to the imposition of postrelease control. Id. at ¶29. The Fischer Court stated: “[W]hen a judge fails to impose statutorily mandated postrelease control as part of a defendant‘s sentence, that part of the sentence is void and must be set aside.” Id. at ¶26 (emphasis sic). And “[t]he new sentencing hearing to which an offender is entitled * * * is limited to proper imposition of postrelease control.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus
{¶15} We agree with the state that Benjamin‘s resentencing hearing should be limited to the proper imposition of the statutorily mandated driver‘s license suspension. We acknowledge that the Fischer Court stated that its decision was “limited to a discrete vein of cases: those in which a court does not properly impose a statutorily mandated period of postrelease control.” Id. at ¶31. However, as the Fischer Court noted, “when an appellate court concludes that a sentence imposed by a trial court is in part void, only the portion that is void may be vacated or otherwise amended.” Fischer at ¶28. Benjamin‘s sentence is void only to the extent that the trial court failed to properly impose the statutorily mandated driver‘s license suspension. And limiting Benjamin‘s
{¶16} Benjamin‘s sentence is void because the trial court failed to impose the statutorily mandated driver‘s license suspension. Thus, we sustain Benjamin‘s assignment of error, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court. We vacate Benjamin‘s sentence to the extent the trial court failed to impose the statutorily mandated driver‘s license suspension under
III.
{¶17} In conclusion, the trial court‘s judgment is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED AND THIS CAUSE BE REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appellee shall pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Harsha, P.J. and McFarland, J. : Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY:_____________________________
Roger L. Kline, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.