STATE OF OHIO v. RAUL BENITEZ-MARANON
C.A. Nos. 26461, 26659
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
August 20, 2014
2014-Ohio-3575
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CR 11 08 2249
Dated: August 20, 2014
BELFANCE, Presiding Judge.
{1} Raul Benitez-Maranon appeals from his conviction in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
{2} Mr. Benitez-Maranon was indicted for aggravated murder and murder for killing Jerry Laury. Both counts had underlying firearm specifications. Mr. Benitez-Maranon pleaded guilty to aggravated murder along with the underlying firearm specification, and the remaining count was dismissed. The trial court sentenced Mr. Benitez-Maranon to an aggregate term of 33 years to life in prison.
{3} Mr. Benitez-Maranon filed а motion for delayed appeal, which was granted, and has raised four assignments of error for our review. For ease of discussion, we have rearranged his assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENSURE THAT MR. BENITEZ-MARANON WAS PROVIDED WITH A QUALIFIED INTERPRETER[.]
{4} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Benitez-Maranon argues that the trial court committed plain error because it failed to ensure that he was provided with a qualified interpreter.
{5} To establish plain error,1
“[f]irst, there must be an error, i.e., a deviation from the legal rule. * * * Second, the error must be plain. To be ‘plain’ within the meaning of
Crim.R. 52(B) , an error must be an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial prоceedings. * * * Third, the error must have affected ‘substantial rights * * *’ [to the extent that it] * * * affected the outcome of the trial.”
State v. Hardges, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24175, 2008-Ohio-5567, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002). “Notice of plain error under
{6} According to Mr. Benitez-Maranon, the plain error in this case is that “there is absolutely no indication that the interpreter was qualified or that the Court made any inquiry regarding the qualifications of the interpreter.”
Whenever because of a hearing, speech, or other impаirment a party to or witness in a legal proceeding cannot readily understand or communicate, the court shall appoint a qualified interpreter to assist such person. Before appointing any interpreter under this division for a party or witness who is a mеntally retarded person or developmentally disabled person, the court shall evaluate the qualifications of the interpreter and shall make a determination as to the ability of the interpreter to effectively interpret on behalf of the pаrty or witness that the interpreter will assist, and the court may appoint the interpreter only if the court is
satisfied that the interpreter is able to effectively interpret on behalf of that party or witness.
Pursuant to
{7} In this case, the trial court administered the oath required by
{8} Accordingly, based upon Mr. Benitez-Maranon‘s limited argument, his second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT HAVING THE APPELLANT PLEAD SEPARATELY TO THE AGGRAVATED MURDER CHARGE AND TO THE GUN SPECIFICATION AS REQUIRED BY CRIMINAL RULE 11(C)(3).
{9} Mr. Benitez-Maranon argues in his third assignment of error that the trial court committed reversible error by having him plead guilty to aggravated murder and the underlying firearm specification together rather than separately. We disagree.
{10} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, ¶ 9. ”
{11} Mr. Benitez-Maranon does not dispute that the trial court‘s plea colloquy complied with the requirements of
{12} Accordingly, in light of the limited argument before us and the apparent inapplicability of
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
{13} In Mr. Benitez-Maranon‘s fourth assignment of error, he argues that his sentence must be vacated because the trial court failed to give the notification required by
“MANDATORY” SENTENCE
{14} Mr. Benitеz-Maranon argues that the trial court failed to inform him that his sentence was mandatory as required by
{15}
{16}
[s]ubject to division (B)(3) of this section, if the sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a prison term is necessary or required, the сourt shall * * * [r]equire that the offender not ingest or be injected with a drug of abuse and submit to random drug testing as provided in section 341.26, 753.33, or 5120.63 of the Revised Code, whichever is applicable to the offender who is serving a prison term, and require that the results of the drug test administered undеr any of
those sections indicate that the offender did not ingest or was not injected with a drug of abuse.
Thus,
{17} However, to the extent that Mr. Benitez-Maranon argues that the trial court erred when it failed to order him to not usе drugs and to submit to random drug testing, his assignment of error is sustained. On remand, the trial court shall comply with the requirements of
{18} Mr. Benitez-Maranon‘s fourth assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANT WITHOUT INFORMING DEFENDANT AT HIS SENTENCING OR MAKING AN “ABILITY-TO-PAY” FINDING AS REQUIRED UNDER
{19} Mr. Benitez-Maranon argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court committed reversiblе error when it failed to determine whether he was able to pay prior to imposing court costs and attorney fees. He also argues that the trial court failed to give him the proper notice under
{20} Under
[t]he [attorney] fees and expenses approved by the court under this section shall not be taxed as part of the costs and shall be paid by the county. However, if the
person represented has, or reasonably may be expected to have, the means to meet some part of the cost of the services rendered to the person, the person shall pay the county an amount that thе person reasonably can be expected to pay.
Thus, “[t]he court must make a determination that the defendant is financially capable of paying for his appointed counsel before assessing court-appointed attorney fees.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Malone, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009732, 2010-Ohio-5658, ¶ 11. The trial court did not make any finding regarding Mr. Benitez-Maranon‘s ability to pay; in fact, the trial court did not mention attorney fees or court costs at all at the sentencing hearing. Therefore, the trial court‘s imposition of court cоsts and attorney fees must be reversed. See State v. Walters, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25391, 2011-Ohio-6247, ¶ 35.
{21} Turning to Mr. Benitez-Maranon‘s argument that the trial court failed to comply with former
{22} Mr. Benitez-Maranon‘s first assignment of error is sustained.
III.
{23} Mr. Benitez-Maranon‘s first assignment of error is sustained, and his fourth assignment of error is sustained in part. His remaining assignments оf error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed equally to both parties.
EVE V. BELFANCE
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, J.
MOORE, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
ANDREA L. WHITAKER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.