State v. BelloState v. Bello
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Dwyer
DWYER, J.
¶ 1
FACTS
¶ 2 Whatcom County Sheriff‘s Deputy James Triplett initiated a traffic stop of Lopez‘s car after pacing it traveling at approximately 38 miles per hour in a 25-mile-per-hour zone. As the car pulled over, Deputy Triplett noticed the passenger in the back seat, Bello, duck out of sight for approximately four seconds.
¶ 3 Deputy Triplett exited his patrol vehicle and approached Lopez‘s car. When he reached the car, he requested the license, registration, and insurance information of the driver, Lopez. The front-seat passenger, Domingo Rabang, passed Deputy Triplett a laser pointer, commenting that it was what Deputy Triplett was looking for and stating that he thought that the traffic stop had been initiated because he had been activating the laser pointer out of the windows of the moving vehicle. Deputy Triplett also observed that Bello was not wearing a seat belt. Deputy Triplett then requested and was provided with identification from all three men in the car. The identification correctly showed that Lopez was the driver, Rabang was the front-seat passenger, and Bello was the back-seat passenger.
¶ 4 Deputy Triplett then radioed the identities of the three men to the sheriff‘s office dispatcher in order to check for outstanding warrants or “wants” (indications that an individual is wanted by law enforcement for some purpose short of an arrest warrant). Deputy Triplett immediately received a response to his inquiry in the form of a mobile telephone call from Sergeant Hester. Sergeant Hester informed Deputy Triplett that Bello had “a drug history” and had previously been arrested on federal drug charges. Around this time, Bellingham Police Officer Brandland also arrived at the scene of the traffic stop.
¶ 5 Based on the information provided by Sergeant Hester, Deputy Triplett radioed a request for assistance to Whatcom County Sheriffs Deputy Anthony Paz, a narcotics detection canine handler. Soon after Deputy Triplett requested Deputy Paz‘s assistance, and at the same time that Deputy Paz was pulling up to the scene of the traffic stop in his patrol vehicle, the sheriffs office dispatcher informed Deputy Triplett that a warrant existed for the arrest of Bello.
¶ 6 Bello was asked to step out of the car, was arrested, and was read his Miranda4
¶ 7 Deputy Triplett then asked Bello, already in custody, if he knew anything about the pills. Nodding in Lopez and Rabang‘s direction, Bello stated that he knew nothing about the pills and that Deputy Triplett should ask Lopez and Rabang about them. Lopez and Rabang also stated that they knew nothing about the pills. At this point, Deputy Triplett placed Lopez under arrest. Deputy Triplett, then read Lopez his Miranda rights and asked him if he had anything illegal on his person. Lopez reluctantly admitted that he had additional ecstasy pills in his coat pocket, which Deputy Triplett recovered upon searching Lopez.
¶ 8 In a subsequent suppress ion hearing, Lopez challenged the constitutionality of the search of his vehicle. Lopez testified that the CD container in the back of the car belonged to Bello and that Bello had brought it with him when he was picked up by Lopez earlier that evening. The superior court ruled that the search of Lopez‘s vehicle was properly conducted incident to the arrest of Bello. Accordingly, the superior court denied Lopez‘s motion to suppress the evidence of the ecstasy pills obtained by the search and the pills subsequently obtained during the search of Lopez‘s person incident to his own arrest. Following a trial on stipulated facts, the superior court found Lopez guilty of possession of a controlled substance, fined him, and sentenced him to three months in jail. He now appeals.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
¶ 9 A superior court‘s conclusion that a warrantless search of a vehicle did not violate
Legality of the Search
¶ 10 Lopez contends that the Supreme Court‘s decision in State v. Parker, 139 Wash.2d 486, 987 P.2d 73 (1999) requires the suppression of the evidence obtained against him and the reversal of his conviction. According to Lopez, the court‘s holding in that case that “the search incident to arrest exception . . . does not automatically extend to the `private affairs’ of persons who are not under arrest,” Parker, 139 Wash.2d at 489, 987 P.2d 73, mandates the conclusion that the search of his car was conducted in violation of
¶ 11 It is well established that
[W]e reiterate that “[a]ny analysis of
article I, section 7 in Washington begins with the proposition that warrantless searches are unreasonable per se.” State v. White, 135 Wash.2d 761, 769, 958 P.2d 982 (1998). . . . This is a strict rule. White, 135 Wash.2d at 769, 958 P.2d 982. Exceptions to the warrant requirement are limited and narrowly drawn. White, 135 Wash.2d at 769, 958 P.2d 982. . . . The State, therefore, bears a heavy burden to prove the warrantless searches at issue fall within the exception it argues for.
Parker, 139 Wash.2d at 496, 987 P.2d 73. The search of a vehicle incident to the lawful custodial arrest of one of the vehicle‘s occupants falls within the narrow and carefully drawn exceptions to
¶ 12 The simple fact that the lawful arrest of a vehicle‘s occupant has occurred, however, does not give the police “the authority to conduct a full blown evidentiary search” of that vehicle. Parker, 139 Wash.2d at 499, 987 P.2d 73. Rather, the scope of, a warrantless vehicle search incident to the arrest of one of the vehicle‘s occupants must conform to the constitutional limitations articulated by the Supreme Court:
During the arrest process, including the time immediately subsequent to the suspect‘s being arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car, officers should be allowed to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons or destructible evidence. However, if the officers encounter a locked container or locked glove compartment, they may not unlock and search either container without obtaining a warrant.
State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436 (1986).
¶ 13 Warrantless vehicle searches are further circumscribed by Parker. In that opinion, the Supreme Court examined three consolidated cases. In each of these cases the police had made a lawful arrest of the driver of a vehicle and, in the course of performing a warrantless search incident to that arrest, also searched within items that they knew or should have known were the personal belongings of one of the vehicle‘s passengers. Parker, 139 Wash.2d at 489-92, 987 P.2d 73. The court field that the searches at issue were conducted in violation of
¶ 14 However, no analytical approach constituted a majority decision of the court. The lead plurality opinion stated that Stroud did not allow police officers, pursuant to the arrest of a driver, to search items such as handbags or jackets that were contained in a vehicle and which the officer performing the search actually knew or should have known belonged not to the arrested driver but, rather, to a nonarrested passenger who posed no obvious threat to the safety of the officer. The plurality stated that such items were not simply “containers” within the meaning of Stroud but, rather, were the personal property of the nonarrested passenger and were subject to
¶ 15 A narrowly focused dissent generally agreed with the plurality‘s articulation of the applicable rule, but conclude d that the plurality had misapplied the rule in one of the
¶ 16 Subsequent cases have clarified that the rationale discussed in Justice Alexander‘s opinion is now the law. In Jones, a prosecution for illegal possession of a firearm, the defendant contended that the search by the police of a purse found in his car but clearly associated with another vehicle occupant violated
¶ 17 Thus, the relevant concerns in this case are (i) whether the searching officers either knew or clearly should have known that the item in which the contraband was discovered did not belong to the original arrestee, and (ii) whether immediately prior to the arrest the item searched was within that arrestee‘s span of control. “Whether the arrested person was the vehicle‘s driver or a passenger is not a dispositive consideration. See Parker, 139 Wash.2d at 501, 987 P.2d 73 (“There is simply no authority under our precedent to suggest that personal belongings clearly and closely associated with nonarrested vehicle occupants are subject to full blown police searches merely because some other occupant of the vehicle is arrested.” (Emphasis added.)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has never addressed whether the rule articulated in Stroud must be applied differently depending on whether the arrested person is the driver of a vehicle or simply one of its passengers.
¶ 18 This court, however, has specifically examined that issue in two cases—State v. Cass, 62 Wash.App. 793, 816 P.2d 57 (1991), and State v. Chelly, 94 Wash.App. 254, 970 P.2d 376 (1999). In Cass, we addressed the then “novel question of whether a police officer may search a vehicle incident to the lawful arrest of a passenger, but not the driver, of the vehicle.” Cass, 62 Wash.App. at 794, 816 P.2d 57. In that case, an officer stopped Cass‘s car after recognizing one of its passengers, who was the subject of three valid outstanding arrest warrants. The officer then performed a warrantless search of Cass‘s car during which methamphetamine was discovered. Applying the rule articulated in Stroud, we held lawful the search of the vehicle in which the arrestee had been a passenger. We also held that
¶ 19 Stroud carefully refers to “vehicle occupants,” rather than distinguishing between drivers and passenger. Neither Parker nor Jones applies the rule articulated in Stroud differently depending on whether the arrested person is the driver of or a passenger in a vehicle. Accordingly, we discern no support in the law for Lopez‘s contention that vehicles in which passengers are arrested are the “personal effects” of the vehicles’ drivers and are, therefore, not subject to the vehicle exigency exception to the warrant requirement.
¶ 20 Lopez‘s contention—that because a vehicle subject to a traffic stop may be presumed to be the property of the driver, the vehicle is immune from the automobile exigency exception if the arrested party is a
¶ 21 The rule articulated in Parker and Jones applies regardless of whether the arrested person is the driver or a passenger. Accordingly, we reiterate the rule announced by the Supreme Court and hold that personal possessions known by the police to belong to a specific vehicle occupant may not be searched incident to the arrest of another vehicle occupant unless the possessions were in the span of control of the arrested person immediately prior to the arrest. Applying this rule, we further hold that the search of the CD container located in Lopez‘s car was performed in accordance with the requirements of
¶ 22 In this case, no basis existed for the any of the officers involved in the traffic stop to conclude that the CD container in which the ecstasy pills were found belonged to Lopez. To the contrary, testimony during the suppression hearing made clear that none of the vehicle‘s occupants at any time claimed ownership of the CD container.
¶ 23 Further, the evidence is unequivocal that the unlocked container in which the ecstasy was discovered was located on the backseat of Lopez‘s car next to Bello immediately prior to Bello‘s arrest and thus was in his immediate control. The evidence is equally unequivocal that Bello ducked out of sight in that same back seat as soon as the traffic stop was initiated by Deputy Triplett, giving rise to a concern that he may have been hiding weapons or destructible evidence.
¶ 24 The CD container was in Bello‘s immediate control prior to his arrest and there was no reason for the police to believe that the container belonged to either Lopez or Rabang. The police thus acted with authority of law when they looked within the container incident to the lawful arrest of Bello.
¶ 25 Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: APPELWICK, C.J., and ELLINGTON, J.