186 A.2d 805 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1962
The defendant appeared in the trial court pro se. In his appeal he has assigned error in the failure of the trial court to advise him of his right to counsel and of his right to testify; in denying him a fair trial; in admitting evidence claimed to be hearsay and in concluding upon all the evidence that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The pertinent facts can be stated in summary as follows: On February 1, 1962, about 1 a.m., a police officer went to an apartment located in the city of Hartford and occupied by a single woman. From the street no lights were visible in the apartment, which was located on the second floor. The officer entered the building, went to the second floor and knocked on the door of the apartment. After waiting three or four minutes, a woman came to the door and asked who was there. The officer identified himself and, after another three or four minutes had elapsed, the door was unlocked by the woman and the officer was admitted. Upon entering the premises, he observed that the woman was attired in a nightgown. In the kitchen adjacent to the entrance, he observed the defendant, who was fully dressed except for his jacket. The defendant stated he was not married and was there for the purpose of watching television. The television set was located in the bedroom. He further stated he had become tired and had been sleeping on the floor when the officer arrived.
The defendant was arraigned February 1, 1962, bond was set and the case was continued to February 15 for trial. Neither at the arraignment nor at the trial was the defendant advised that he had the right to counsel. *96
Article first, § 9, of our state constitution has since its adoption in 1818 provided in part as follows: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself and by counsel . . . ." The right to counsel did not exist under the common law. 14 Am. Jur. 883. Our constitutional provision abrogated the common-law practice. 2 Swift, Digest, p. 421 (Rev. 1853). Even though a defendant cannot be deprived of the right to counsel, we have held that the court is under no duty to advise a defendant accused of a misdemeanor of his right to counsel. State v. Florence,
The right to counsel in the federal courts stems from the sixth amendment, implemented by Rule 44 of the federal rules of criminal procedure. However, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does apply to convictions of criminal offenders in the state courts. In Betts v. Brady,
A defendant in a criminal trial cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself. Conn. Const. Art.
The defendant assigns error in the admission of certain evidence claimed to be hearsay, such as a statement by the officer that the woman involved was five months pregnant as a result of her prior conduct with the defendant. Even though the defendant had objected to such evidence and had taken exception to its admission, the evidence was harmless, for the defendant on cross-examination admitted *98 he was the father of her unborn child. This admission was in response to a question by the prosecutor. The question was proper. This is not an instance where evidence of one crime is admitted to prove another; it is a case where evidence of other lewd or lascivious acts committed between the same parties tends to show that an improper relationship existed and is admitted as evidence of the continuation of such relationship. It is admitted as corroborative evidence tending to support the one specific offense for the commission of which the defendant is on trial. See note, 167 A.L.R. 565, 617, and cases cited; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) p. 272.
Since the defendant claims that the court was not justified in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we examine the evidence for the purpose of determining whether upon all the evidence the trial court could have reasonably reached the conclusion that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is for the trial court to pass upon the weight and credibility of the evidence and if its conclusion was reasonably reached it must be accepted.State v. Dodez,
Our statute (§ 53-219) does not in terms define lascivious carriage, because of the "different shades of criminality attending the offense." Fowler v.State, 5 Day 81, 84. Lascivious conduct, because of *99
the very nature of the crime, is usually committed under circumstances calculated to ensure privacy, and as a result proof thereof is usually circumstantial and indirect. In Zeiner v. Zeiner,
As there was sufficient basis in the evidence, and in the inferences which the court was warranted in drawing, to support its conclusion, it is not our function to substitute our judgment on the evidence for that of the trial judge.
After a finding of guilty had been made, the prosecutor informed the court that he had information from the state welfare department that the defendant was the father of another child receiving state aid. In State v. Harmon,
There is no error.
In this opinion PRUYN and KOSICKI, JS., concurred.