The single question presented for decision is whether the trial judge erred by failing to submit to the jury the lesser included offense of felonious breаking or entering.
Burglary in the first degree is the breaking and entering during, the • nighttime of an occupied dwelling or sleeping apart
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ment with intent to commit a felony therein. G.S. 14-51;
State v. Cox,
G.S. 14-54(a) provides: “Any рerson who breaks or enters any building with intent to commit any felony or larceny therein is guilty of a felony and is punishable under G.S. 14-2.”
The statutory offense of felonious breaking or entering defined by G.S. 14-54 (a) is a lesser included offense of burglary in the first degree.
State v. Fikes,
If defendant entered the Julia Higgins Cottage with intent to commit a felоny other than by a burglarious breaking, he would be guilty of felonious breaking or entering as defined by G.S. 14-54(a).
State v. Brown,
In the case of
State v. Chambers,
In instant case, there was evidence that the last person known to enter thе dwelling found the front door open and “she did not lock the front door.” The evidence does not show whether *420 she closed the door or left it ajar. There were several doors to the cottage which ordinarily were unlocked during the day and locked at night. There was no direct evidence as to whether these doors had bеen locked on the night of the 26th of May 1971. There was evidence thаt the screen on the left of the front door was slit and unlatched. The evidence does not establish whether the window was open or whether the “slit” was large enough for a person to enter. Nor is thеre any evidence establishing when the screen was unlatched or when the slit was made. Likewise there is no direct conclusive evidеnce to show when the screen on the right of the front door was рushed out or when or how defendant entered the dwelling.
The evidence in the case and the inferences to be reasonably drawn therefrom were not such as would have required the jury to find that defendant еntered the Julia Higgins Cottage by a burglarious breaking. Conversely the jury might reаsonably have inferred that defendant made his entry without a bur-glarious brеaking.
Under these circumstances, defendant was entitled “ ... to have different views arising on the evidence presented to the jury upon proper instructions. ...” State v. Childress, supra.
For failure to charge on the offense of non-burglarious breaking or entering, there must be a
New trial.
