State v. Belgarde

to file actions and have reasonableness hearings conducted where relationship of principal and agent is unclear or where the possibility of involvement in the cause of an injury by employees other present.

As noted the insurance company's brief it is indeed ironic that the claimant can proceed now against the insur- ance company under the same policy that it into brought the situation place. the first It is also ironic illogical that a release having been given company's adjuster payment for full claim, for the the company is not released. Obviously the claimant would not pursue the in the agent absence of the solvent company. insurance This means that in any such situation no settlement could (1) entered into safely be unless carefully the release named every possible each and master and servant who might have (2) been involved or an action was filed and a court had held a time-consuming hearing to rubber stamp that which plaintiff both and defendant desired and had agreed upon fair and being equitable. J., Durham, J. Callow, concurs with May En 53556-6. Banc.

[No. 1988.] Respondent, v. A. Washington, State of Kermit Belgarde, Petitioner. Belgarde,

Kermit pro se, and Mark Muenster W. of Washington Appellate Association, peti- for Defender tioner. Rickert,

Michael E. Prosecuting Attorney, respon- for dent. Belgarde C.J. Kermit his convic- challenges

Pearson, and first degree attempted tions for first murder degree prosecutorial murder. contends that conduct Belgarde dur- him deprived of a fair trial. We ing closing arguments agree and the convictions. reverse 22, 1984, evening Belgarde,

On the March Kermit Joe Williams, nephew, Williams' Sam young Bright, and visited James Joanne Sam Pape home of and Nunn. Bright argument house, and leave the but was asked to did shooting among culminated the adults which ensued Pape instantly; Pape survived. Nunn. Nunn died Belgarde shooting. Pape did the Williams testified couple. Belgarde shot the Williams this and testified denied evening of the shoot- that on Five witnesses testified couple people. Belgarde ings, he had shot a told them police day, the next talked with Three of witnesses police their tell stories did not but two others shootings. approximately The latter two after the 3 weeks coming saying delay explained forward their (American Belgarde AIM Indian threatened use had Movement) speaking Belgarde against admitted them. his confessions on claimed have heard witnesses who shootings, night but denied the confessions and protect they lying attempted show were Joe at trial five some manner Each of the witnesses Williams. sister The witnesses were Williams' related Williams. husband, husband, her her Williams' niece and nephew. Williams' with he had affiliation

The defendant testified that some as a which he described American Indian Movement closing rights. organized protect During group Indian following argument, prosecutor1 made remarks: to come because of AIM—he AIM—I didn't want They get people. strong in it. She said he even was might might do or his was of what he what friends scared . . wing political is AIM? Sean Finn do. . What of Army. English Republican AIM is to the what the Irish deadly group It is a is to Irish. the Sean Finn of way saying all them not of but that's the madmen. I'm throughout they the world. think it. of Kadafi —feared stability. Why? [Jane We don't' think trust his We don't her, [John Doe], who is a Doe], of all four foot three looking bigger, spend rest their of lives lot wanted go Nohody deserves to have to their shoulders. over They up through on homes. don't We our that. don't Bisagna proceedings [defense Mr. reservation. In the appeal. represented by on different counsel 1The State is

507 I'm of "Well, I'm an Indian. not afraid says, counsel] Well, Bisagna AIM." fine. Mr. doesn't have that's live occupation up Bisagna of cans. Mr. doesn't picking isn't about four foot Bisagna on the reservation. Mr. three inches tall. She frightened. was

. . . AIM —the AIM. ... people frightened are of Knee, remember any Wounded South Dakota. Do of It you? chilling is one the most events the last of You might get decade. talk that over once in there. you That was the American Indian Movement. That was a militant, the American Indians that were faction of butchers, indiscriminately were killed Whites own. That years their event didn't end for some six all the court Is AIM something before battles done. you when are an frightened you to be Indian and live on the reservation? Yes it is. (Italics ours.) State v. Appeals, citing Claflin,

The Court of 38 Wn. (1984), App. 690 P.2d 1186 review 103 Wn.2d (1985) recognized appeals jury passion that ”[m]ere prejudice, prejudicial as well as allusions to matters evidence, Belgarde, outside the inappropriate." 441, 448, (1986), granted, 46 Wn. review 730 P.2d 746 (1987). However, Appeals 108 Wn.2d 1002 held the Court object because defense counsel had failed to to the prosecutor's remarks, raised appropriately the issue was not appeal. on

Given the undisputed fact that no was objection made, the issue any becomes whether curative instructions would have effectively Appellate erased the prejudice. is not precluded review if so prosecutorial misconduct ill flagrant intentioned that no curative instructions could have obviated the the mis prejudice engendered 207, 221, conduct. State v. P.2d Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d (1987); Charlton, 657, 661, P.2d 90 Wn.2d Case, 66, 74-75, 298 P.2d 500 (1956); inflamma State v. at n.2. These Claflin, supra pas to the tory appeal jury's comments were a deliberate render a verdict prejudice encouraged sion and it to AIM rather than associations Belgarde's based on were flagrant, The remarks admitted evidence. properly in evidence. "facts" not and introduced highly prejudicial in murder jury a a allowed to tell prosecutor A cannot be in" which the "strong group is that the defendant case madmen", and deadly of group as "a prosecutor describes lik- indiscriminately". prosecutor The that kill "butchers to "Kadafi" movement members American Indian ened the not allow such IRA. This court will Finn" of the and "Sean or not defense of whether testimony, argument, in the guise An objec- instruction. a curative sought or objected counsel erased could not have disregard an instruction tion and if they have felt had would jurors revulsion fear and the Indians description prosecutor's believed jurors assume did not This court cannot in AIM. involved repeatedly We have description. prosecutor's believe there is whether question to be asked explained comments likelihood" the a "substantial was 140, 147-48, Reed, the verdict. affected There Charlton, at 664. supra P.2d 699 from egregious departure this a substantial likelihood is "If misconduct did affect the verdict. prosecutor role of a effect, it, is, in there can cure flagrant that no instruction so mandatory only and the trial is the a mistrial and a new Case, supra at 74. remedy." State v. return to jury invited the prosecutor's argument

The has prosecutor A Knee. Wounded room and discuss jury matters or con- the jury to call to the attention right no to consider. right no have jurors which siderations say the Case, only did at 71. Not supra and madmen butchers group to a belonged defendant he also testified doing in so indiscriminately, but killed who AIM jury He told the record. outside facts fright- madmen", people "the "deadly group was frightened to be "something AIM", that AIM ened of reservation". live on the you are an Indian you of when pro- organized group AIM as a described The defendant AIM statements prosecution's rights. tect Indian

5Q9 (which memory group his he based on own of terrorists is a Knee) argument, not at Wounded constituted of the events description. testimony refuting the defendant's but argues relevant information is The State that such against relatives, testified two of Mr. Williams' who because by delay coming explained defendant, in forward the their expressing defense was a fear of AIM. The defendant's person present, the Williams, had done the other Mr. against shooting. the The who testified five witnesses regarding Mr. were all relatives of defendant his confessions witnesses had waited weeks before Williams. Two of those explanation given coming forward, was fear of and the attempted impeach by Belgarde witnesses to these AIM. pointing prosecutor delay coming forward. The out their the witness stand and testified about reserva- in effect took perception of the American Indian Movement. tion Indians' explanation "testimony" supported the witnesses' This delay reporting alleged the defendant's confessions their thereby credibility by supported their introduction of and prosecution put If the wished to facts outside record. properly AIM, in evidence that Indians fear the vehicle was present "testify" to evidence to that effect. To himself as comprise "madmen" American the and "butchers" that the deny right Indian Movement is to the defendant his prosecutor confront and cross-examine "witnesses". The stepped proper quasi-judicial his role as a offi- far outside jury highly inflammatory give cer and an advocate to the "information". prior prosecu a cases wherein

It is instructive to look to prejudicial as to warrant a reversal. tor's misconduct was so every flagrant prosecutor's argument bit as and here is Reed, in State v. made ill intentioned as the comments supra; supra; Charlton, Claflin, supra. prosecutor liar, the defendant Reed, In called case, referred to the have a defense counsel didn't stated jury clearly if two", asked the "murder defendant city lawyers they going their decision. This make to let there existed in Reed because reversed the conviction court jury's affected the likelihood" the remarks a "substantial was mild Reed, Reed misconduct at 147-48. The decision. In in this case. arguments compared on the defend- Charlton, briefly remarked prosecutor such refer- testify. This court held spouse's failure to ant's ill intentioned and reversed flagrant ence to be request a curative failure spite conviction of a by a poem read a Claflin, instruction. because no was reversed rape victim and the conviction passion appeal could erase such curative instruction prejudice engen- We likewise find prejudice. Ameri- regarding prosecutor's arguments dered a retrial. can Indian Movement mandates prosecutor's the This case also raises the issue of whether due violated on silence post-arrest comments defendant's held that the Appeals The Court of process. proper.

references to defendant's silence were defend- remarked on closing argument the upon initial silence arrest: ant's Schmidt. say anything item. Schmidt —doesn't to

Next to Christiensen, say anything doesn't patrol, the border ask Barriball, except talk to him again him. doesn't framed, getting he is to. This who was jail going guy what wait, you I to tell got think —I would "But you go, don't anything. getting doesn't He's say He something." guys his chance area, in the in the Huntoon but wait —Stokes area, talking. you— no ask the area, Kurhenrewther Gary about to have some doubts beginning who is [Bel- garde]? officers.) police are The named individuals

(Italics ours. Belgarde's prosecutor highlighted in rebuttal Again police his trial defense: to tell failure talk about his client? Why doesn't counsel] [defense story here who heard Oh, yeah, they get a doctor . . . some innocent, you you got story ago. three weeks If doctor. don't tell some you cops. tell You ours.) penalized comments (Italics contends these Belgarde him denied silent and to remain right his exercise process. due We agree.

5;Q not, may consistent with It is settled that State Miranda following post-arrest silence process, due use Doyle trial. testimony a defendant's at impeach warnings (1976). 91, L. S. 2240 610, 49 2d 96 Ct. Ohio, 426 U.S. Ed. v. 1, (1981) P.2d 83 stated at Evans, Wn.2d 633 page 3: use, purposes, of defendant's impeachment [T]he receipt warnings of Miranda funda- following

silence mentally process

unfair and therefore violates the due giving of the Fourteenth Amendment since the clause warnings implicitly silence assures defendant carry no penalty. will in the warnings "insolubly ambigu-

Silence wake of such may merely reflect on the to remain right ous" reliance Doyle, rather than at 617. silent a fabricated trial defense. Further, Miranda that a defend- warnings impliedly assure Doyle, silence will him at ant's not be used at trial. against 618.

However, right once a waives remain defendant police, prosecution may silent makes a statement impeach such a inconsis use statement defendant's in Doyle trial This to the rule v. testimony. exception tent Ohio, Charles, supra, v. 447 U.S. was set forth Anderson 404, (1980). Accord, L. 222, Ed. S. 2d 100 Ct. 2180 711, denied, Seeley, 168, P.2d review App. Wn. 789, (1986); Hatley, 107 Wn.2d 1005 41 Wn. P.2d review 104 Wn.2d 1024 Cosden, (1977), Wn. P.2d denied, cert. U.S. 823 review (1978). particular, In a defendant's may question the State into the the related at trial incorporate failure events given may challenge or inconsistent police statement it in Cosden where the Such was the situation assertions. silent, but had uttered a had not remained defendant in on different excuse. one form and trial asserted denial at the of the initial statement silence" time "partial This insolubly "strongly fabri ambiguous, suggests but not the properly impeaches the silence later defense and cated Cosden, defense." at 221. Such does not violate questioning due process as the defendant has waived right the remain silent matter of his concerning subject state- Anderson, ment. at 408.

We do prosecutor's not find the comments proper Anderson and Cosden. In both under cases, the State was allowed to question partial the defendant's silence at the time he made a police, having statement after waived the silent, right to remain in impeach order to the defendant's case, testimony. inconsistent trial prose- the instant cutor focused any prior not on inconsistent statements defendant, made but on his to make a state- failure immediately ment arrest. upon Although on inconsistent in Belgarde's prior commented statement portions closing argument, challenged other remarks refer specifically present to the officers when Belgarde was apprehended. first The prosecution's remarks which on the defendant's exercise focused of his to remain right Doyle directly silent falls under rule which forbids such silence using imply guilt. disagree We therefore the Court of Appeals and find that such comments on post-arrest However, silence process. violate due light fact arguments regarding AIM reversal, require it is unnecessary to determine whether the comments on post-arrest silence constitute or harmless prejudicial error. repeated. We assume this error will not be

The convictions are therefore vacated and remanded. JJ., Utter, Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Goodloe, Tern., J. Pro concur. Petrie, J., concurs in the result.

Andersen, J. concurring part) (dissenting part, Callow, —Not until now has it over- prosecutors been so clear that when in argument, may reach remain mute and defense counsel need raise no the abuse. It against remonstrance should plain be prosecutors they expect now can no clue they sailing objectionable from the defense when into to trial apparent waters. It should also now be and troubled they superintend that must each moment of a judges court silently the Whatcom Panzero of the Deputy Chief Ron

exculpatory statement Belgarde At that time County Department. Sheriff's Skagit 22, he that County stating in on March being Skagit denied At that time for a County searching job. in Whatcom was had not seen Panzero he knew Williams but told Belgarde had weeks, not know and him and that he did for several Nunn. Pape not shot or his the trial contradicted testimony during

Belgarde's spending the Panzero. He admitted Deputy statement County and visit- Skagit Williams day question with that but he claimed night, and Nunn's house that ing Pape with speaking admitted couple. Belgarde shot the Williams confessions, he his but who heard allegedly the witnesses to show attempted making denied such confessions Williams. protect were lying that the State's witnesses comments that majority with the agree improper silence were post-arrest on the defendant's silence to a defendant's process. Referring violated due he has arrest, is before or after whether the silence upon his of part misconduct on the Miranda warnings, been given Doyle v. reversal. normally cause for 91, 2240 Ohio, 610, L. 2d 96 S. Ct. U.S. 49 Ed. 426 222, 404, L. Ed. 2d 100 S. Charles, 447 U.S. 65 Anderson v. Evans, (1980); State v. denied, 2180, reh'g 448 U.S. 912 Ct. Seeley, v. 43 Wn. (1981); State 1, 633 P.2d 83 96 Wn.2d denied, Wn.2d 1005 168, 107 P.2d review App. 719 213, 568 P.2d Cosden, 18 Wn. (1986); State v. denied, 1016, cert. denied, Wn.2d (1977), review pros (1978). However, I concur although U.S. 823 remands majority improper, ecutor's comments whole record examining the a retrial without the matter for result error, trial would this whether absent to ascertain

5^5 Guloy, verdict. See State the same (1986). It (1985), cert. 475 U.S. P.2d 1182 untainted evi overwhelming me that under the appears court, determine test this we should adopted dence necessarily it overwhelming evidence is so whether the Gulóy, at 426. finding guilt. leads to a The critical issue was whether the defendant or Williams Pape killed Nunn and wounded fired the shots which when being present the trial Belgarde during admitted place. Belgarde's guilt took Evidence shootings accounts, eyewitness Bright's and Williams' Pape included testimony Belgarde that he saw enter and exit the house weapon prior following the murder to and carrying just shots, testimony Belgarde and the of five witnesses same The State also shootings night. confessed to the expert testimony corroborating Pape and Wil- presented the location from which both shots regarding liams' stories version of Belgarde's were fired which conflicted all the witnesses was credible save testimony events. The testimony defendant. The of all of the other that of the in that general witnesses was consistent of each testimony the defendant. The other witnesses save that of I by every other witness. of the defendant was contradicted overwhelming guilt the evidence was to the submit the defendant. I with the the conduct of agree majority also included factual recita- improper, was that he prosecutor record, made personal opinion outside of tions appeal were a deliberate to inflammatory comments which it to render passion prejudice encouraging the jury's with AIM on the defendant's associations verdict based majority admitted evidence. The properly rather than on the pros- because while the conduct of part company, early by defense counsel and flagrant, objections ecutor was the prejudice instructions could have avoided curative guilt the misconduct and the evidence by engendered majority the result of the overwhelming. importantly, Most 516 any responsi- counsel to abandon encourage

is to defense by super- place to a sentence sentence bility object the hands of the trial conduct into vision of a pros- when the undeservedly favors the defense court. This duty. its ecution its role and forgets see that an accused attorney's duty A prosecuting Charlton, 657, State v. 664- 90 Wn.2d receives a fair trial. Rose, 309, 312, State v. (1978); 62 Wn.2d 65, 585 P.2d 892, Reeder, v. 888, State 46 Wn.2d 382 P.2d 513 (1955). jus in the interest of prosecutor, 285 P.2d 884 preju free of seeking a verdict tice, impartially, must act Charlton, State v. supra; on reason. dice and based (1968), cert. Huson, 660, 663, P.2d 192 73 Wn.2d Charlton, denied, (1969). it was stated: 393 U.S. 1096 prejudicial pro- frequent warnings In spite of our we find that some permitted, tactics will not be secutorial prosecutors dicial means preju- sometimes improper, continue to use In most of effort to obtain convictions. sustains a con- instances, competent fully evidence these what, if Thus, pressed imagine are hard viction. we introduc- by prosecutors hope gain such anything, tactics. improper of unfair and tion observed that thoughtfully It has been defend- guilty to convict permitted prosecutors [i]f means, we are but a unfair then by improper, ants will prosecutors from the time when away moment unfair means. by defendants convict innocent Torres, Wn. 254, 263, P.2d 1069 (1976).

Charlton, at 665. may argument during closing

In general, instructions, court set forth state the law as cert. 407, Mak, 718 P.2d (1986), and has wide latitude 107 S. Ct. inferences and reasonable the facts evidence argue Papa v. Mak, State 698, 726; supra v. State at therefrom. (1983). We 401, P.2d 59 397, 662 dopoulos, App. 34 Wn. however, which arguments improper, held consistently have

517 rhetoric, opin inflammatory personal extraneous introduce Reed, v. See State record. by ion, unsupported or facts Music, 79 (1984); State v. 140, 684 P.2d 699 Wn.2d Huson, supra; v. (1971); State 699, 489 P.2d 159 Wn.2d 66, 298 P.2d Case, Rose, State v. 49 Wn.2d supra; v. also State v. Reeder, See (1956); supra. Claf (1984), review P.2d 1186 lin, 38 Wn. 3.4(e)(f). jury pas Appeals RPC Claflin, clearly improper. prejudice sion and Case, supra: in State v. As supra. observed to counsel permitted be "Language might which be used propriety a action cannot with summing up civil officer, is a prosecutor, quasi-judicial who public state, to act presumed of the and People representing If lays he aside only justice. in the interest impartially characterize his official should impartiality partisan, by vituperation heated and action to become a procure seeks to prisoner appeals prejudice of the a conviction at hazards, repre- to properly all he ceases victim, interest, no which demands public sent asks no conviction or resentment." sympathy passion, the aid of through officer, repre- attorney high public is a "The district state, equal impartial justice, seeks which senting and it suffers see that no innocent man duty is as much his In the escapes. no man guilty as it is to see that duties he commands important most discharge of these usually exer- county people respect the evi- discussing upon jurors. influence great cises a the four . latitude within given he is . . the widest dence corners of the comment, denunciation by way evidence call to the attention of has no right but he appeal, or the have jurors which the or considerations matters jury to consider." right no Fielding, 158 N.Y.

Case, (quoting People at 70-71 (1899)). 547, N.E. 497 defense did

However, during closing argument time at no action from corrective or seek other object counsel appeal, as error on argument preserve improper To court. mistrial, request or timely move object, must counsel State v. Dunaway, curative or admonition. instruction 221, Charlton, v. 207, 743 P.2d 1237 State Wn.2d Kendrick, 620, 638, v. supra; State 47 Wn. 736 P.2d 1079, (1987). denied, only review 108 Wn.2d The exception to this rule exists when the misconduct so fla- timely objection ill intentioned that and curative grant and resulting have preju- instructions could not obviated the Charlton, v. Dunaway, supra; supra. dice. ample prose- when the opportunity Defense counsel had AIM in the context of the Irish cutor first mentioned Army any further Republican object preclude preju- and pros- vein. I do not dicial remarks the same condone the conduct, we should not allow defense counsel ecutor's but argument, silent purposefully during improper remain an error acquittal, reserving but the benefit of hoping for in the the con- appeal possible jury and a retrial event Huson, is in supra. See State The trial court the victs. such an position to correct errors and entitled to best do opportunity to so. now able to he received argue

Defendant should not be A timely objection by responsi- unfair trial. an alert and counsel, disregard an instruction to and an ble defense emphasized from bench could have the admonition the conduct, stopped impropriety of wasteful getting avoiding from out of prosecutor line — difficulty of a retrial. Defense counsel's expense and only unnec- argument not results during closing silence retrials, costly jeopardizes but also essary appeals solely to the rights leaving protection his defendant's appellate courts. by majority. for the reached precedent

There is result However, before has the contrast between perhaps never improper argument of a unsupported of a counsel been so clear and the absolute silence defense I find majority, The reached which and stark. result overwhelming evidence unnecessary guilt, view of the trial judges to both message prosecutors sends clear the evi- the bounds of stay must within that prosecutors as set argue trial and the law during dence admitted in the court's instructions. forth evi the substantial ignores the majority The result of high degree reaching rule its result because dence by the closing argument flagrant disregard of bounds does so without an examination prosecution. majority reached only which the conclusion supports of the evidence Martin, in by the We said jury. (1969): (1968), cert. 393 U.S. 1081

440 P.2d 429 definitely in this state that The rule is now established in a case will be set aside jury the verdict of the criminal defendant, trial to the because of an granted and a new case, only when during the trial of occurring error such error . . . may prejudicial. be as designated may A error be defined as one which affects prejudicial . . . affects the final results of the trial. presumptively or say court is unable to from the appellate When record before it whether not have been convicted but the defendant would or would the error committed court, may harm- the trial then error not be deemed less, requires and the defendant's to a fair trial that right and that he be a new granted the verdict be set aside trial. But, guilt conclusively where the defendant's is evidence, proven by competent and no other rational except can be reached the defendant conclusion should not be set guilty charged, then the conviction ... aside because of unsubstantial errors. To determine resulted, whether has it is prejudice necessary court examine the entire record. appellate rule courts past appellate it has been the if only the defense alleged would review misconduct requested a correc- objected to the misconduct at trial and rely who here- tive instruction. Prosecutors and trial courts any responsibility guide to have after on defense delude themselves. prosecutorial conduct now sends a clear majority message prosecutors — trial stray your peril; from the law and the evidence at control within those boundaries judges reversal of a expect guilty from the defense or face nothing proof matter conclusive the or how meticu- verdict no how lously the trial. conducted disagree opinion that this court does not have with the any

responsibility the entire record case of to review overwhelming evi- reversal to ascertain whether there guilt. I shifts the dence of cannot concur a rule which correcting prosecutor's responsibility for defense counsel's entirely judge. misconduct to the trial Durham, J., Callow, concurs with J. May En 54143-4. Banc. 1988.]

[No. Company, Plaintiff, v. Joanne Standard Insurance Petitioner, Schwalbe, Glenda Rae Respondent. Dent, while the defense notes prosecutor's argument appeal errors to case of a conviction. The is now an area where the court must act sua argument the errant whether defense coun- sponte stop sel wishes it or not. only prose- Under the it is when the majority approach, wrongdoing appar- cutor's and should be most egregious nothing, ent to a defense counsel that counsel need do secure in the that courts will save knowledge appellate the defendant in the end. When the demand for action height, should be at its the exercise of the lowest standards is to be rewarded. any by Lest there be confusion left recita- majority's facts, tion of the it appropriate point out that argument which ensued among place adults took boy, because Nunn asked the Sam Bright, to leave because experience she had with him taking things. Belgarde and Williams objected Bright away, to Sam sent being saying that they trying to reform him. Pape testified, trial, at during argument Belgarde threatened him and he Belgarde ordered to leave. Pape that Belgarde said returned moments later with a rifle and shot him. Belgarde Williams also testified that shot Pape both and Nunn. stated that while Bright waiting out- side he saw retrieve a rifle from the and reen- Belgarde car ter the house. He heard two shots and then Williams and house, Belgarde emerged from the still Belgarde holding Bright the rifle. testified on cross examination that Bel- had concocted garde story picking up about a Cuban hitchhiker carrying backpack a blue and a rifle and had that, told to tell Bright story. Bright also testified although he did not see the actual fur- shooting, Belgarde him if say anything ther had told not to and that he did not $5,000. say he him anything, give would night Five additional witnesses testified that on the to them he had shot shootings, Belgarde confessed to sev- Pape and Nunn specifically mentioning people, two witness, Belgarde recounted one eral witnesses. As head off." girl's killed blew this people. stated: "I two trial, at arriving that after during It also came out station, gave County police Belgarde

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Belgarde

Court Name: Washington Supreme Court

Date Published: May 26, 1988

Citation: 755 P.2d 174

Docket Number: 53556-6

Court Abbreviation: Wash.