{¶ 2} Upon review of the record, Belbachir's arguments lack merit. Since he failed to raise these arguments in the trial сourt he has waived all but plain error. The trial court did not commit plain error in this case, because the victim testified about the costs she incurred to repair her damaged property, and abоut the wages she lost in connection with Belbachir's crime. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
{¶ 4} At the restitution hearing, Karen Cooper testified she owned property that was the subject of the criminal damaging case against Belbachir. Specifically, she stated that Belbachir damaged the door to her mobile home. Cooper requested $682.87 in restitution, which included payment for lost wages; labor costs, parts and supplies to fix the door; and $35.00 for clean-up of garbage and other items left in her mobile home while Belbachir was staying there.
{¶ 5} With respect to the lost wages, Cooper claimed she missed three days of work as a result of Belbachir's offense. She testified that after the incident occurred she stayed up late to fix the door and consequеntly missed work the next day. She also missed work when she came to court for the July 30 restitution hearing when Belbachir did not appear as well as for the rescheduled hearing. Cooper stated she earns аpproximately $100.00 per day. Cooper provided the court with receipts for most of the *2 parts and supplies that she purchased to repair the door. She did not provide any corroborating evidence with regards to the lost wages, labor costs or the clean-up costs.
{¶ 6} Belbachir did not object to the proposed restitution amount at all during the hearing. He cross-examined Cooper, but did not put forth any evidence of his own.
{¶ 7} At the close of testimony, the trial court ordered Belbachir to pay $547.87 in restitution. The court reached this number by starting with the proposed restitution amount of $682.87, and subtracting the $35.00 in clean-up costs and $100.00 for one day of lost wages. The court reasoned that the clean-up costs were unrelated to the criminal damaging offense, and that Cooper's time sрent at court for the actual restitution hearing was not part of the restitution, but rather part of her obligation to pursue the case. Again, Belbachir did not object to the trial court's order at the hearing. The restitution order announced at the hearing was memorialized by an August 6, 2008 judgment entry.
{¶ 9} "The trial court erred in ordering restitution not related to the victim's economic loss and not supported by competent credible evidence and not in an amount determined to a reasonable degree of certainty."
{¶ 10} This court would normally review a trial court's restitution order under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Byrd, 7th Dist. No. 04 BE 40,
{¶ 11} "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Crim. R. 52(B). This rule places three limitations on this court's ability to recognize plain error: (1) there must be a deviation from a legal rule; (2) the error must be an obvious defect in the trial proceedings; and, (3) the error must have affected the outcome of the trial. State v. Barnes,
{¶ 12} Restitution orders in the context of misdemeanors such as criminal damaging are governed by R.C.
{¶ 13} "R.C.
{¶ 14} When ordering restitution pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 15} As the Twelfth District noted, R.C.
{¶ 16} Similarly, in State v. Anderson, 1st Dist. Nos. C-050785, C-050786,
{¶ 17} "We find no plain error in the circumstances before us. The trial court was permitted by statute to rely on an amount of restitution recommended by the victim. Anderson caused excessive damage to her sister's apartment, and the record does not indicate that the amount of restitution ordered was not based on the victim's economic loss. And, most telling, Anderson did not contest the amount when it was proffered." Id. at ¶ 9.
{¶ 18} In the case at hand, Belbachir takes issue with the trial court's restitution order for several reasons. First, he insists that Cooper purchased more supplies than could have been reasonably necessary to repair her door. However, given the broad standard provided by R.C.
{¶ 19} Second, Belbachir argues that the State did not prove Cоoper's lost wages within a reasonable degree of certainty, since Cooper did not produce any corroborating evidence to prove her employment or her exact rate of pay.
{¶ 20} At least one appellate court, albeit in the context of restitution for a felony case pursuant to 2929.18(A)(1), has reversed a restitution order for a claim of lost wages that was nоt supported by corroborating evidence. State v. Portentoso,
{¶ 21} By contrast, the court in State v. Johnson,
{¶ 22} Finally, Belbachir argues that the two days of lost wages were not related to the underlying criminal offense. Belbachir insists it was Cooper's "choice" not to work the day after her door was damaged. He further argues that the lost wages рayment ordered in connection with the July hearing where Belbachir did not appear, was likewise not related to the underlying criminal offense.
{¶ 23} However, R.C.
{¶ 24} In conclusion, Belbachir's sole assignment of error is meritless. The trial court's restitution order was not a plain error that affected a substantial right. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Donofrio, J., concurs.
Waite, J., concurs. *1