State of Ohio v. Steven Behrendt
Court of Appeals No. L-15-1135
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
Decided: March 11, 2016
[Cite as State v. Behrendt, 2016-Ohio-969.]
Trial Court No. CR0201402531
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles R. McDonald, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Neil S. McElroy, for appellant.
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SINGER, J.
{1} Appellant, Steven Behrendt, appeals from his conviction in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas for pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor, a violation of
{3} Appellant was originally indicted for two felonies. The first charge was illegal use of minor in a nudity-oriented material or performance, a felony of the fifth degree. The second charge resulted in his conviction. Pursuant to a plea deal, the first charge was dismissed and appellant entered a plea of guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). to one count of pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor, a fourth degree felony.
{4} He was sentenced to 16 months in prison and classified a Tier II sex offender. Appellant now appeals setting forth the following assignments of error:
I. The trial court failed to consider the seriousness and recidivism factors of
R.C. § 2929.12 and, therefore, the 16-month sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law.II. Mandatory sex offender classifications under Senate Bill 10 constitute cruel and unusual punishment where the classification is grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense and character of the offender.
{5} In his first assignment of error, appellant contends that his sentence is contrary to law because the court failed to consider the seriousness and recidivism factors of
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court‘s findings under division (B) or (D) of
section 2929.13 , division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) ofsection 2929.14 , or division (I) ofsection 2929.20 of the Revised Code , whichever, if any, is relevant;(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{7} We initially note that appellant‘s 16-month sentence is within the statutory range for a felony of the fourth degree.
{8} The
{9} The
{10} Obviously, not all of these factors will apply to the facts of every case. As for the seriousness factors, only one is applicable to this fact scenario. Specifically, “[w]hether the physical or mental injury was worsened because of the physical or mental condition or age of the victim; whether the offense caused serious physical, psychological, or economic harm to the victim.” While the victims were not personally known to the court or probably even to appellant, it is clear from the record that the court considered this factor. In response to appellant‘s comment that he viewed child pornography for “shock value,” the court stated: “[I] would suppose maybe the shock
There are two age groups that our law requires to recognize that they need protection, the elderly and little children, minors, they need special protection. Relative to children. Their innocence, their fragile physical stature as well as their inability to physically and mentally protect themselves makes children extremely vulnerable to victimization.
{11} As for the recidivism factors, the court specifically noted on the record appellant‘s age, 58, and the fact that he has a clean criminal record. The court pointed out that appellant placed some blame on his daughter for downloading a program on his computer he did not fully understand. The court did not find appellant to be remorseful stating “[appellant] did not take any responsibility for his actions * * *.”
{12} The record supports our conclusion that the court properly considered the
{13} In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that mandatory sex offender classifications amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Appellant asked us to hold this issue in abeyance pending the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s decision in State v. Blankenship, a case that had not been decided at the time appellant‘s brief was filed.
{14} However, Blankenship was decided on November 12, 2015, with the court holding:
[t]hat the registration and address-verification requirements for Tier II offenders under
R.C. Chapter 2950 do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of either the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution. The Tier II registration requirements do not meet the high burden of being so extreme as to be grossly disproportionate to the crime or shocking to a reasonable person. State v. Blankenship, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-4624, ¶ 38.
{15} Appellant‘s second assignment of error is found not well-taken.
{16} The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Arlene Singer, J.
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
James D. Jensen, P.J.
JUDGE
CONCUR.
JUDGE
State v. Behrendt
C.A. No. L-15-1135
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.
