State v. BedfordState v. Bedford
In August, 1998, a “buy-walk” narcotics operation conducted by members of the Covington, Louisiana, Police Department, led to the arrest of relator for selling two rocks of cocaine to an undercover officer. Detective James McIntosh participated in the back-up surveillance team and subsequently determined by means of a wheeled pedometer that the sale had taken place 921 feet from the Covington Community Center. Respondent was thereafter charged with distribution of cocaine in violation of
At stake here is the proper interpretation of
A.(1) Any person who violates a felony provision of
R.S. 40:966 through 970 of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law while on any property used for school purposes by any school, within one thousand feet of any such property,... shall, upon conviction, be punished in accordance with subsection E.. . .
C. For purposes of this section:
. . .
(2) “School property” means all property used for school purposes, including but not limited to school playgrounds, as well as any building or area owned by the state or political subdivision and used or operated as a playground or recreational facility....
(Emphasis added).
In his sole attempt to prove that the state or a political subdivision owned the land at issue, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Detective McIntosh that the community center on the land “is run by the City of Covington. It‘s a recreation area. There is [sic] a couple of ball fields out there. They use it for, like a playground out there; they use it for kids’ sports and things of that nature.” A majority on the court of appeal panel found the detective‘s testimony sufficient to satisfy the requisite ownership element of
We agree with Judge Downing. In relying on the intent of the legislature instead of the actual language of the statute, the majority on the court of appeal panel virtually read the ownership requirement out of the statute. However, “[i]t is well established that the task of statutory construction begins with an examination of the language of the statute itself.... When the law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written, and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” State v. Barbier, 98-2923, p. 3 (La.9/8/99), 743 So.2d 1236, 1238. A criminal statute requires a genuine construction according to the plain meaning of its language because “[c]ourts are not empowered to extend the terms of a criminal provision to cover conduct which is not included within the definition of the crime.” State v. Anders, 01-0556, p. 3 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 513, 514. Further, the legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge of well-settled principles of statutory construction. Monteville v. Terrebonne Par. Con. Gov‘t, 567 So.2d 1097, 1100 (La.1990); State v. Antoine, 98-0369, p. 6 (La.App. 3d Cir.10/28/98), 721 So.2d 562, 565 (same); see also In re RLV, 484 So.2d 206, 214-15 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986) (“When interpreting a law ... [i]t is presumed that every word, sentence or provision in the law was intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is to be given to each such provision, and that no unnecessary words or provisions were used.“) (quoting Bunch v. Town of St. Francisville, 446 So.2d 1357 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984)).
Holding the prosecutor to the plain language of
We therefore vacate the defendant‘s conviction and sentence for violation of
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL REVERSED; DEFENDANT‘S CONVICTION REDUCED TO DISTRIBUTION OF COCAINE IN VIOLATION OF LA.R.S. 40: 966(A)(1) AND HIS SENTENCE VACATED; THIS CASE IS REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR RESENTENCING.
VICTORY, J., dissenting,
I dissent for the reasons expressed in the majority opinion of the court of appeal.