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State v. Becker
958 P.2d 627
Kan.
1998
Check Treatment

*1 79,440 No. Kansas, Petitioner, v. Steven R. Honorable

State III, Court, 27th Div. Becker, the District Judge District, Respondent. Judicial 627) (958P.2d filed 1998.

Opinion April cause, D. assistant Alan attorney, Timothy county argued Hughes, J. Chambers, him on was with the brief attorney, petitioner. county Zinn, defender, cause, R. Steven R. deputy argued appellate Jessica Kunen, defender, chief with him the brief for on David respondent appellate Proctor. was delivered court opinion mandamus, this for writ of the State seeks Davis, petition J.: 22-3428(1)(a) a declaration from court has been on that a criminal defendant who mandates 22-3221 be com- basis of mental defect or disease under K.S.A. State to the Lamed mitted safekeeping Hospital Security *2 Honorable Steven this court to direct the The State asks treatment. defendant, Proctor, under the David to commit the R. Becker pro- 22-3428(l)(a). visions had in David Proctor been

The facts are not diagnosed dispute. had on medication and been as from depression suffering unipolar to the incident for this condition years prior approximately condition on for the same in this case. He had been hospitalized occasions. six prior wife that was the defendant told his something August himself to the Hutchinson He admitted Hospital psychiatric

wrong. conferred with Dr. Eve him unit. His dúring Hohly, psychiatrist, 9, 1996, testified that the she his On the stay. morning August He was with some delusions. defendant was religious preoccupied did not to be im- room at the time and not in appear security himself. to the staff or minently dangerous the de- received a Later that same Dr. day, Hohly report the into a window. She directed that fendant had ran or jumped Ahrens, an in a room. Donald defendant be orderly security placed unit, room. the defendant in the security helped psychiatric room, Ahrens in the the defendant became Once agitated. security him, his room to to calm but the defendant went into the put try stated, then in his ears and refused to listen. The defendant fingers the and halt the and word.” “Go nation ye preach announced and Ahrens testified that the jumped up the The nurse he to kill the nurse on duty. pushed going Ahrens backed out to summon additional button” help, “panic came of the room The defendant out room. began ran to the fire The defendant then at Ahrens. throwing punches door, welded to the off a stainless steel bar that been ripped door, Ahrens. beat severely He waived with

The defendant was battery. charged aggravated defense. The trial and notice of to a gave jury trial, to the com- with the defendant case stipulating proceeded of a letter from to the admission and the State plaint stipulating occurred, the defendant that when the incident Dr. Hohly stating and should that he was Satan a delusional belief was under fighting his actions. held not be responsible evidence, court found that district Based stipulated he the defendant had committed while battery, aggravated with The case then insanity. proceeded guilty by disposition. State, the from the

Without presented objection well as the of Karen Brown of Dr. as testimony testimony Hohly Soden, State Dr. a nurse at Lamed Hohly Hospital. practitioner incident, the defend- that after the testified police transported Brown Soden testified that the ant to the Lamed State Hospital. die defendant was into hospital protective custody brought the time the defendant had been was evaluated. During hospital- ized, that he was from a disorder it was discovered suffering bipolar *3 Brown Soden testified that the rather than unipolar depression. that for for disorder is different from treatment bipolar unipolar disorder. testified that the defendant had been

Dr. Hohly previously an disorder but not on an- on antidepressant unipolar placed medication. She stated that someone with bi- placing tipsychotic that disorder on an alone can increase person’s polar antidepressant manic behavior. She testified that with the new med- antipsychotic ication, the defendant is well stabilized and has been able to return defendant was to work. She testified asymptomatic Further, be of little it could that a return to Lamed would help. be in that it would take his which is counterproductive away job, influence in his life. stabilizing

Brown Soden testified that the defendant to his new responded and his condition stabilized. He was released medication quickly from the on an basis 17 after the incident. hospital outpatient days A court order was filed in Reno District Court County mandating that the receive treatment. Brown Soden also outpatient that a return to Lamed would be detrimental to the de- testified fendant’s because it would his In her stability impair employment. the defendant was not a to himself or others at the danger opinion, Soden, time to Brown if the defendant of his release. According Lamed, he would were sent back to evaluation similar undergo his would be sent one he had undergone, reports previously re- who earlier the same to and approved person approved lease from Lamed. that under Becker

At close testimony, recognized Judge 22-3428, the de- he was to commit K.S.A. 1997 Supp. required However, case determined the defendant’s fendant. the judge Lamed, committed in that he been already unique he to himself that was no Lamed had determined longer danger others, determination that the there had been or judicial Becker, there- did not need to be Judge hospitalized. fore, had been satisfied that the of 22-3428 determined purpose release under and that the defendant was for conditional eligible conditional re- 22-3428(4). defendant on Becker placed Judge lease. as a reserved. How- filed this State initially appeal

ever, writ it dismissed instead brought petition appeal of mandamus. “a mandamus as

K.S.A. 60-801 defines proceeding compel court, tribunal, board, or or some some inferior person corporation office, from the which results duty, duty perform specified directed, trust, to whom the order or official state of party 3 of the Kansas Constitution or from law.” Article operation § in this court for man proceedings jurisdiction provides original However, State rel. relief in mandamus is ex damus. discretionary. 567, 836 P.2d 1169 Man v. Finney, Stephan damus is an for the compelling appropriate proceeding purpose *4 to a one officer defined imposed by perform clearly duty, public discretion. 251 Kan. at 567. law and not the exercise of involving However, re is not a common means of obtaining “[mandamus[ resort, cases, dress, and as a last for is available in rare but only v. State ex rel. causes which are Stephan extraordinary.” really 1022, 1024, (1984). will 686 This court 235 Kan. P.2d 171 O’Keefe, if is a of action the issue matter entertain mandamus great public 779, Dick, 786, 887 Sedlak v. 256 Kan. interest and concern. See (1995). P.2d 1119 22-3428(1)(a) 1997 provides:

808 “When a in defendant is answers affirmative acquitted jury 22-3221, asked to K.S.A. the defendant shall he com- special question pursuant mitted to the state treatment. A security hospital safekeeping finding in the affirmative to the asked jury answering special question thereto, to K.S.A. 22-3221 and amendments shall he prima facie that the is to cause harm to or others.” acquitted presently likely self added.) (Emphasis The the issue in this case and crystalize above-emphasized phrases whether, call for an answer to under the facts of question case, we writ of mandamus ought grant ordering Judge Becker to commit the defendant to the Lamed State Hos- Security ' 22-3428(l)(a). under pital

The State that we must the writ because 22- argues grant 3428(1) (a) establishes clear to commit once a criminal duly defendant has been on the of a basis mental defect or acquitted circumstances, disease under K.S.A. 22-3221. Under these 22- 3428(l)(a) defendant shall be committed to the provides and treatment. The defend- safekeeping ant that the same statute in its second sentence argues provides that an under the conditions set forth is evi- acquittal prima facie dence that he is Thus, cause harm self or others. he likely 22-3428(l)(a) him an to rebut the argues provides opportunity facie evidence and if based such evidence the court prima others, determines that no he is to harm himself or longer likely the court him. release law, aof statute is a and this interpretation Robinson,

court’s unlimited. review is See State v. 261 Kan. (1997). 934 P.2d 38 Under the fundamental rule of statutory construction, the intent when that intent legislature governs Roderick, can be ascertained from the v. statute. State 107, 110, (1996). 911 P.2d 159 statutes and deter- construing intent, act, several of an in ma- mining legislative provisions pari teria, must be construed with a view of together reconciling them Le, into workable if State v. bringing harmony, possible. 845, 847-48, Kan. P.2d 22-3428(l)(a) used and its language mandatory, import

seems clear. A who under conditions set

809 treatment. How- committed for “shall” be forth safekeeping in 1980 raises the ever, added to the statute sentence second facie evidence” contem- of the term whether use “prima to if defendant to determine presently likely hearing plates case, was held to self or others. A cause harm hearing evidence, that the de- determined the trial court based such upon others. harm to himself or was no to cause fendant longer likely and Brown that the evidence of Dr. Hohly argues arose because of his facie evidence that Soden rebutted the prima him. He con- released and that the trial court properly acquittal circumstance would confinement under this that continued tends Louisiana, v. 504 U.S. under Foucha violate his due rights process Foucha, 437, In 2d S. Ct. 1780. L. Ed. 112 118 that an Court determined United States insanity acquit- Supreme ill and as as he or she is both tee be held only long at 77. but ho 504 U.S. dangerous, longer. to consider

We have had a argument prior opportunity commitment of whether the insanity acquittees, pur- mandatory 22-3428, a defendant denied to 1979 suant K.S.A. equal Supp. cruel and unusual or constituted of law or due process protection 90, 110, 612 P.2d In re Jones, punishment. did not violate (1980), we held that such mandatory re was decided of a defendant. In the constitutional rights amendment in to its of 22-3428 based prior provisions upon decision. before the Foucha and 12 years 22-3428, commitment the 1980 amendment Prior to Moreover, the at 109-10. com- Kan. mandatory. acquittal duration, the defendant was of indefinite mitment although at which time he or she hearing annually, right request of the evi- show had the by preponderance attempt and, thus, or others to self that he or she dence danger 22-3428a. The See K.S.A. 1979 awin discharge. Supp. officer if chief medical after a be

could also discharged could and the defendant was warranted that such a felt discharge or others. to self he or she was not to the court that danger prove 22-3428a(3). 22-3428(2); See K.S.A. 1979 *6 the time In re court, decided the At was this by Jones effect, 22-3428(1) amendment had taken although 22-3428(1). decided on the 1979 version of inter- uncertainty into the 22-3428 1980 amendment was noted jected by by Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion: note, however, “It is that the amendment in ‘A interesting provides part: finding of not because of shall be evidence that the guilty insanity prima acquitted facie is self or others or of others.’ presently person dangerous person’s property added.) As facie evidence’ creates a (Emphasis Query: ‘prima merely presumption (in statute,

which be overcome evidence from the other the by party does not the new amendment or insanity acquittee), imply contemplate prior to allow the evidence’ to be rebutted or contradicted? Black’s hearing ‘prima facie (4th 1968). Law 1353-1354 ed. rev. This is a determination which will Dictionary be before this court at some later date.” 228 Kan. at 114. probably The defendant in this case that the 1980 amendment was argues added to the statute order to for a due provide process hearing commitment, before at which time a defendant could rebut facie case established the conviction. The defendant prima correct in his contention that facie evidence” is defined as “prima which, uncontroverted, if is sufficient to sustain a judg- Haremza, ment. See State v 201, 206, 515 P.2d 1217 The defendant also that the of the 1980 argues legislative history amendment His has merit. A mem- supports position. argument orandum Art of the Revisor of Statutes office to the Griggs Committee on which recommended the Special Judiciary, changes (22-3428), to the bill noted the recent trend in federal and state courts of a due to commitment. requiring process hearing prior See Memorandum to 1979 Committee on re- Special Judiciary 28, No. 4. garding Proposal p. Following presentation Griggs’ memorandum, (now Senator Donald moved Justice) Allegrucci that a bill draft be created which would statutorily recognize and that such would create a plea insanity finding rebuttable that the See presumption person presently dangerous. 20, Minutes of Committee on 1979. Special Judiciary, September This draft in the statute that provided present language “[a] of not in the affirmative to finding jury answering and amend- to K.S.A. asked 22-3221 special question thereto, facie evidence that ments shall be prima or others.” This to cause harm to self defendant is likely presently at created a hearing precommitment language arguably to show that he or she which time the defendant could attempt harm self or others. to cause presently likely 22- under modified the entire legislature procedure what was as constitu- 3428. S.B. 10 to correct perceived sought after the for a to be held tional deficiency by allowing mental state. See verdict to determine the defendant’s present Senate Committee on 1993. Minutes of the January Judiciary, there was concern that to the legislative history, grave According *7 effect, the then in with its automatic commitment system pre- illness, in of mental was unconstitutional of light sumption Louisiana, Court’s decision in Foucha v. United States Supreme West 504 U.S. 71. See Brenda Testimony Hagerman, Legal Services, Lamed State before the Senate Com- Judiciary Hospital, mittee, 1993. January result,

As a in was changed present procedure one, defendant, which that while a being acquitted provides defect, must be com- reason of a mental disease or mandatorily by commitment is mitted to the state such only security hospital, a to allow the state to evaluate the such time as security hospital Such an evaluation must be made defendant’s current mental state. the defendant’s a to the court within 90 issued days report Thereafter, a must be held within admission. hearing days at which time the defendant may present receipt report, that he or she is not ill. If the court currently mentally ill, he or she must finds that the defendant is not currently mentally defendant is still be released. If the court finds ill, or released. See he or she be committed conditionally Thus, 22-3428(l)(b), (c), (d). 22-3428 K.S.A. 1997 provides a limited commitment for for a following precommitment hearing evaluation purposes. to 22-3428 was to

The of the 1993 amendment provide purpose ac- deal with a defendant who has been a uniform to procedure to due the defendant’s reason of insanity, including quitted by Yet, amendment the 1980 within such language procedure. process in the affir- of not answering jury “[a] finding 22-3221 asked mative to the special question be evidence that thereto, shall amendments prima facie to cause harm to or oth- likely presently self defendant ers” remains. amendment which remains of the 1980 the language

Arguably, in addition to the a remedy specific today provides to 22-3428. If the forth in the 1993 amendment set procedure amendment, intended, the 1993 provide pro- legislature eval- committed for cedure the defendant mandatorily whereby that it left the it is uation without hearing, puzzling purposes intact in the 1980 amendment. language However, that we resolve this issue in order it is not necessary case, that the trial court to decide the instant for it is clear recog- 22-3428(l)(a) to be committed. nized that required case, in that the trial that this was court then noted unique commitment, that of allow- to be served the mandatory purpose evaluate and the chief medical the state ing the defendant’s mental officer to render an on present opinion therefore, court, health, saw little been already completed. and the defendant benefit jump through forcing hospital instead, and, these converted sentencing proceed- hoops again 22- mental state under to a on the defendant’s ing (d). 3428(l)(b), the State to the There was no objection by hearing. *8 evidence, of the chief medical Substantial including opinion at demonstrated that the defendant officer Lamed State Hospital, evidence, was not a or others. Based on this to himself danger release as authorized court the defendant on conditional by placed 22-3428(1)(d) 22-3428(4). the trial court’s characteri-

Our of the record reading supports zation of the facts in this case as unique. following Immediately incident of rise battery, giving charge aggravated State He defendant was taken to Lamed Hospital by police. and for the committed for his safety safety involuntarily his to fit his condition. After others. His medication was changed Lamed, officer de- the chief medical evaluation treatment at termined that the defendant was no to himself or longer danger time, others him. Within a short he was tried and discharged based aggravated battery upon plea insanity. Based the uncontroverted evidence before the trial court that others, the defendant was no to himself or longer danger court him on conditional as authorized 21- placed probation by 3428(l)(d) 21-3428(4). facts,

Under these there is a serious whether unique question continued confinement in the Lamed State Security Hospital would have violated the defendant’s due as outlined rights process However, the United States Court in Foucha. we need Supreme not resolve this because we believe mandamus unwar- ranted. we discussion,

As stated at the of our relief man- beginning State ex rel. damus is v. discretionary. Stephan Finney, at redress, 567. is not a common means of “[Mandamus[ obtaining cases, resort, but is available in rare and as a last for causes only are State rel. which ex v. Stephan O’Keefe, really extraordinary.” 235 Kan. at 1024. The facts before us militate a writ unique against of mandamus.

Writ denied.

McFarland, C.J., dissenting. I dissent from the J., dissenting: LOCKETT, respectfully major- determination that David Proctor is not to the man- ity’s subject of K.S.A. 1997 22-3428. datory provision Supp. 8,1996, On Proctor checked himself into the Hutchinson August unit. The next he beat Hospital psychiatric day, severely orderly 10,1996, with a metal bar. On Proctor commit- August civilly ted the district court to Lamed State under K.S.A. Hospital 59-2945 et the Care and Treatment Act for Men- seq., 111Persons as a If Proctor had been tally “psychiatric emergency.” with a crime at this he would have been sent to charged point, Lamed State which is on the situated same Security Hospital, as Lamed State for evaluation. K.S.A. 22-3303. grounds Hospital, After Proctor was medicated and then evaluated at Lamed civilly

814 Lamed State district court. returned to the he was

State Hospital, with Proctor. no further contact Hospital State 26, 1996, Lamed on the evaluation based On by August that Proctor district court determined “[was] Hospital, and treatment make decisions ill regarding [lacked] capacity commence Proctor to ordered outpatient judge placement.” center, Health Horizons Mental health mental care at private order, Hutchinson, civil Proctor was Center, Under the Kansas. Eve treated Dr. Hohly, private psychiatrist, Janice in clinical a Master’s who has degree psychology. Beougher, 19, 1996, issued Proc- On charging complaint September waived was arrested. Proctor Proctor with tor battery. aggravated trial, to a and his examination to a jury right preliminary 22,1997, Proc- On defense. filed notice of January insanity at both evidence as Proctor’s to trial. The tor went only conditional release and at the time of his of the offense the time who saw of Dr. Eve Becker was the Hohly, testimony Judge month, and once a Proctor about Beougher. Janice its was found not Proctor insanity. petition guilty by mandamus, had no asserts that Becker the State for writ of Judge K.S.A. 1997 release Proctor because to conditionally authority who has 22-3428(l)(a) that a criminal defendant mandates or disease under the basis of a mental defect on been acquitted for safe- to the state 22-3221 be committed security hospital order State and treatment. The judge requested keeping for safe- committed the defendant 22-3428(1). and treatment as mandated by keeping 22-3428(1), rule is that the fundamental When interpreting ascertained, where it can be intent of the governs legislature, have ex- a statute. The construction of legislature presumed it scheme its intent statutory language through pressed another when a statute enacted. Stated unambig- plain way, intention of the uous, effect to the the court must legislature give or should what the law should rather than determine as expressed, that which the not read into a statute not be. The court will leg- U.S.D. No. excluded. Brown v. Kan. islature has plainly 134, 141-42, P.2d

815 22-3428(1) K.S.A. 1997 provides: “(a) When a defendant is and the answers the affirmative to acquitted jury thereto, asked to K.S.A. 22-3221 special and pursuant amendments the defendant shall be committed to the state safekeeping and treatment. A of not in the finding affirmative jury answering asked to K.S.A.22-3221 special question and amendments pursuant thereto shall be evidence that the is prima to acquitted presently likely facie cause harm to or others. self “(b) admission, Within 90 of the defendant’s days the chief medical officer of the state shall send to the security court a written hospital evaluation report. Upon of the the court shall set a to receipt report, determine whether or not hearing the defendant is ill shall currently mentally be held within person. heating after the the court days of the chief medical receipt by officer’s report. “(c) The court shall notice of the to give the chief medical officer of hearing the state the district or security hospital, the defendant and county attorney, defendant’s The court shall inform the attorney. defendant that such defendant is entitled to and counsel that counsel will be the defendant appointed represent if the defendant is not able to financially as in K.S.A. employ attorney provided 22-4503 et and amendments thereto. The seq. shall remain at the state security hospital pending hearing. “(d) At the the defendant shall have the hearing, evidence present and cross-examine witnesses. At the conclusion of the if the court finds hearing, clear and by evidence that the defendant convincing is not currently mentally ill the court shall dismiss the criminal person, the de- proceeding discharge fendant, otherwise the court commit the defendant may to the state hos- security for treatment or pital defendant on conditional release place (4).” added.) subsection (Emphasis

In an effort to David Proctor is not to man explain why subject circumstances, commitment under these even com datory though mitment cites Foucha v. Lou statutorily required, majority isiana, 71, 118 437, 112 504 U.S. (1992), L. Ed. 2d S. Ct. 1780 In re Kan. 612 P.2d 1211 A review of these Jones, two cases reveals that the reliance them on majority’s misplaced. Foucha, 504 U.S. the defendant was with charged aggra- vated of a firearm. Two burglary illegal discharge physicians testified Foucha had been from incapable distinguishing right at the time of the bad acts. The trial court found Foucha wrong reason of and committed him until such time guilty by insanity as doctors recommended he be released. An- Procedure of Criminal Code 654 of the Louisiana

Article shall that a notated person provided committed, re- court was After be committed. person at which that hold to then person promptly quired does not he of she the burden of society. danger pose showing was re- Code, mental illness no Under the Louisiana finding different This is whatsoever. State had no burden quite quired. State to show 22-3428, burden on the which from places ill. defendant is that a clear convincing later, where Foucha die *11 Four facility years superintendent that Foucha be held recommended Following discharged. release, formed Louisiana superintendent procedure condition. Foucha’s mental to determine three-member panel admission, the since his of mental illness no evidence panel Finding released. that Foucha be recommended conditionally satisfied, a second two-mem- court commissioned Not the trial three members of of two of the ber original comprised panel had suffered a doctors that Foucha probably opined panel. con- that when he was admitted. Although drug-induced psychosis doctors, had an anti- Foucha dition passed, according and is not a mental disease This condition is social personality. in remission that Foucha “is untreatable. They presently reported that he would not cannot mental illness from certify [but] [w]e 504 U.S. at or others if released.” a menace to himself constitute court, Court of 74-75. The Louisiana district Supreme Appeals, burden of had not carried his Court found Foucha showing nor neither his due he was not and that equal process dangerous were violated. rights protection certiorari and over- Court

The United States Supreme granted courts, turned the Louisiana holding: reasonable re- commitment bear some “Due that the nature of process requires individual is committed. [Citations omitted.] lation to the for which the purpose court, Here, in the trial Foucha to the at the testimony hearing according given held, not If he is to be he should from a mental disease or illness. suffering 504 U.S. at 79. ill omitted.]” held as a [Citations be mentally person. does not care- the Louisiana statute went on to The Court say at 81. Under the confinement. 504 U.S. limit the scheme of fully issue, statute at Foucha was not entitled to an adversarial at which the State must clear and prove by convincing fact, that he the State presented danger community. had to because the statute the detainee to prove nothing, required he or she was not statute, Unlike die Louisiana prove dangerous. 22-3428(l)(d) the State to clear and requires prove by convincing evidence that a committed defendant is ill. If the State fails to such the defendant must be released. provide proof,

The Foucha court noted that one civil commit- exception ment due is where a criminal defendant is process requirements reason of The Foucha Court held: acquitted by insanity. “When a with committed crime is found not person charged having guilty by however, a State commit that insanity, without person satisfying Texas, 418, 323, (1979),] 441 U.S. 60 L. Ed. 2d Addington [v. S. Ct. 1804

burden with to mental illness and Such respect dangerousness. [Citation omitted.] verdict, States, we observed in United [v. U.S. 77 L. Ed. 2d (1983)], (i) 103 S. Ct. 3043 ‘establishes two facts: the defendant committed an act offense, (ii) that constitutes a criminal he committed the act because of mental illness,’ omitted], an [citation illness that the defendant in this adequately proved facts, context evidence. From these two it preponderance could be verdict, at the inferred that time of the properly defendant was still mentally ill and and hence could be committed.” 504 U.S. at 76. dangerous The 22-3428 mandatory procedure approved by *12 Court, the Foucha claims to the despite majority’s contrary. In In re was with five counts Jones, charged Jones of embezzlement from a bank and theft. Trial of the criminal felony cases was had cases). on all five counts from two was (arising Jones found not on each count After this insanity. asserted to the district he because was no finding, judge Jones insane or the 22-3428 commitment longer dangerous, mandatory claim, did not to him. To this procedure apply support prof- Jones fered the of Dr. Leonard H. Dr. Steve Shel- testimony Kapelovitz, ton, Nikkei, and Vernon all of whom would that the de- testify fendant was not not in need of currently dangerous, safekeeping, and not in of additional mental treatment. The State need argued to the district that the of22-3428 were judge provisions mandatory and that of introduction evidence was irrelevant to the issue of

818 to the State

commitment following acquittal security hospital of on the insanity. grounds (1) as to the defendant’s court found:

The district present proffer when commitment it is irrelevant was not admissible because sanity (2) not establish a rebuttable 22-3428 did presump- mandatory; rather, it establishes tion as to procedure insanity, present (3) it commitment; in that does not and is constitutional 22-3428 due of without a defendant process liberty unreasonably deprive district denied motion or The of law judge equal protection. Jones’ of 22-3428. to determine applicability to the case was transferred and the ultimately appealed, Jones Court. Kansas Supreme his commitment contended that mandatory Jones due to statute violated rights pro- was of his contention of law and basis cess equal protection. unlike with no due commitment resulted prior process, per- sons committed. civilly if the defense success- court observed that Jones asserted, the are proceedings governed

fully subsequent 22-3428a. The 22-3428 and K.S.A. Supp. Jones (1) the found: statute’s commitment court mandatoiy provision and related to proper reasonably rationally accomplishment (2) the was not or arbitrary leg- purpose capricious; legislative a reasonable balance between islative scheme constituted pub- from a class of lic’s be protected potentially dangerous the class to be individuals members of pro- rights confinement; (3) of in- from the classification tected improvident as a from class subject separate apart persons sanity acquittees was not or commitment to civil involuntary arbitrary procedures ends to be related to legislative sought capricious proper attained; (4) the of insanity acquittees mandatoiy the law. 228 due or Kan. did not deny process equal protection at 109-10. conclusion, the noted the court After reaching in the to 22-3428 was to be effective

amendment publication *13 based the statute book. resolved existing Although Jones 22-3428(1) law, provided: Supp. “When a is on the that such person acquitted insane at the ground person of time the commission of the crime the verdict shall be ‘not alleged because guilty of so shall be committed to insanity/ person the state acquitted security and treatment. A not hospital safekeeping reason in- finding guilty by of of shall constitute a that the

sanity committed finding an act con- acquitted person crime, or an act a lesser stituting charged included constituting except offense that the did not criminal person intent. A possess requisite finding guilty of because shall be evidence that insanity prima is acquitted person facie or others or presently dangerous others.” persons property (Emphasis self amendment.) indicates

The court found that the 1980 amendment was demon- Jones strative of intent of for an in- legislative mandatory dividual found not and the result guilty by reached in was not inconsistent with the 1980 amendment. Jones 228 Kan. at 110. The court then out that extensive pointed Jones treatment received should val- psychiatric petitioner provide uable data for the state in its evaluation of the 228 Kan. at 112. petitioner. court concluded that in an habeas original corpus wherein commitment of

proceeding mandatory insanity acquittees, 22-3428, to K.S.A. 1979 on consti- challenged tutional commitment did not constitute grounds, mandatory (1) a law; denial of (2) of the a denial of due equal protection (3) or cruel and unusual 228 Kan. at 111-12. process; punishment. Foucha, Unlike the statute held unconstitutional 22-3428 is tailored. It that a criminal defendant found to narrowly provides have committed the act but who is not charged, legally responsible so because the defendant was crim- doing incapable forming intent, inal be committed to It is the security hospital. of the defendant that jury’s acquittal provides “primafacie that the to cause harm to presently likely or others” to commit found ill to the state person self The defendant is entitled to a within 120 security hospital. verdict to determine his or her days present sanity. tailored statute to its legislature passed narrowly protect citizens from someone who has committed criminal acts and has done so because he or she was insane. *14 Foucha references

The support vague majority’s Jones Neither case calls into the result are here troubling. fact, of 22-3428. In expressly approved constitutionality Jones in contained K.S.A. 1979 Supp. mandatory procedure 22-3428 22-3428a and the 1980 amendment to K.S.A. amendment, 22-3428(a). the 1980 majority analyzing and now asserts that the finding legislature disregards it does not seems precommitment hearing although require ma- make this determination to result. necessary justify decided to overrule but rather rélied instead Jones, jority upon facts” of this case. “unique It commit- There is about statute. mandates nothing vague of in- ment to the reason acquittal by reaches a decision that sanity. majority wholly unsupported or law. It is not within the of this court to by precedent province reach the statute precedent “right ignore unambiguous result.”

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Becker
Court Name: Supreme Court of Kansas
Date Published: Apr 24, 1998
Citation: 958 P.2d 627
Docket Number: 79,440
Court Abbreviation: Kan.
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