State v. BeaversState v. Beavers
Rendered on August 20, 2009
Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and John H. Cousins, IV, for appellee.
Olivia O. Singletary, for appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
KLATT, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Paula A. Beavers, appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, we affirm that judgment.
{¶2} On the evening of July 9, 2007, Columbus Police Officers Christopher Jones and Mark Baker were patrolling the area of South Linden and Cleveland Avenue when they stopped a car driven by Robert Spraggins. Appellant was a passenger in the car. As the officers approached the car, the driver sped off and nearly struck Officer Baker.
{¶4} The LEADS search revealed that appellant had an outstanding warrant for a probation violation. Officer Jones verified the warrant and arrested appellant. The officer then searched appellant and her purse. Officer Jones found an unlabeled pill bottle in appellant‘s purse. Inside the bottle was a white, powder substance that Officer Jones thought was heroin. A laboratory test later confirmed that the substance was heroin.
{¶5} As a result of these events, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted appellant with one count of possession of heroin in violation of
{¶6} Appellant appeals and assigns the following errors:
I. APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL WHEN COUNSEL FAILED TO FILE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS ALL EVIDENCE FROM THIS UNLAWFUL TRAFFIC STOP IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE THE PILL BOTTLE
AND HEROINE [SIC] WHICH WERE UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED FROM AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
{¶7} Appellant contends in her first assignment of error that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, she contends that she received deficient representation because her trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop. We disagree.
{¶8} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must satisfy the two-prong test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052; accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136. Initially, appellant must show that counsel‘s performance was deficient. To meet that requirement, appellant must show counsel‘s error was so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Appellant may prove counsel‘s conduct was deficient by identifying acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Strickland at 690. Appellant‘s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court‘s need to consider the other. Id. at 697.
{¶9} In analyzing the first prong under Strickland, there is a strong presumption that defense counsel‘s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. Appellant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Id., citing Michel v. Louisiana (1955), 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 164.
{¶10} If appellant successfully proves that counsel‘s assistance was deficient, the second prong under Strickland requires appellant to prove prejudice in order to prevail. Id. at 692. To meet that prong, appellant must show counsel‘s errors were so serious as
{¶11} Appellant challenges the initial stop of Spraggins’ car. She alleges that because the traffic stop was “questionable,” trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. Failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 2000-Ohio-448, citing Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986), 477 U.S. 365, 384, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2587. Failure to file a motion to suppress constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel only if, based on the record, the motion would have been granted. State v. Randall, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-352, 2003-Ohio-6111, ¶15; State v. Cline, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-869, 2006-Ohio-4782, ¶21.
{¶12} Under Ohio law, any traffic violation, even a minor traffic violation, witnessed by a police officer is, standing alone, sufficient grounds to stop a car observed violating the ordinance. Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12; State v. Molk, 11th Dist. No. 2001-L-146, 2002-Ohio-6926, ¶15. Although the officers that testified at trial could not recall why they stopped Spraggins’ car,1 appellant testified that the officers told her they stopped Spraggins’ car because the car‘s headlights were not on. She also admitted that Spraggins’ car had a problem with its headlights. Driving without headlights (from sunset to sunrise) violates both
{¶13} Appellant contends in her second assignment of error that the trial court committed plain error when it admitted into evidence the pill bottle and heroin obtained from the alleged unlawful traffic stop. We disagree.
{¶14} Appellant‘s trial counsel did not object to the admission of the pill bottle and heroin and has, therefore, waived all but plain error. State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 26, 1997-Ohio-243. Under
{¶15} Appellant alleges that the evidence found in her purse was improperly admitted because it was obtained as the result of an unlawful stop of Spraggins’ car. However, as we have previously determined, there was evidence at trial that the officers
{¶16} Additionally, we note that the officer searched appellant‘s purse after arresting her on an outstanding warrant. Generally, law enforcement officers may arrest an individual on a valid warrant. State v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-859, 2005-Ohio-2560, ¶39, citing State v. Groves (Feb. 23, 2000), 4th Dist. No. 99 CA 2630. A law enforcement officer may conduct a warrantless search of both the arrestee and the area within the individual‘s immediate control whenever the search is incident to a lawful arrest. State v. Dingess, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1232, 2002-Ohio-2775, ¶9, citing Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040. Normally, a woman‘s purse is within her immediate control. State v. Robinson (1998), 131 Ohio App.3d 356, 358. See also State v. Washington (May 1, 2001), 10th Dist. No. 00AP-663 (holding a police officer was authorized to search appellant‘s purse under the search incident to lawful arrest exception to the warrant requirement). Thus, not only was the initial stop of Spraggins’ car lawful, but the subsequent search of appellant‘s purse after her arrest was also lawful.
{¶17} The trial court did not err, let alone commit plain error, by admitting the pill bottle and heroin found in appellant‘s purse. Appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶18} In conclusion, we overrule appellant‘s two assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
TYACK and CONNOR, JJ., concur.