{¶ 5} The trial court sentenced Appellant after the Supreme Court of Ohio decided State v. Foster,
{¶ 6} While the Foster court declared that a sentencing court possesses full discretion in sentencing an offender, the court abrogated R.C.
{¶ 7} Under this statutory standard, we neither substitute our judgment for that of the trial court nor simply defer to its discretion.State v. Mustard, Pike App. No. 04CA724,
{¶ 8} In sentencing a felony offender, the sentencing court must consider the general guidance factors contained in R.C.
{¶ 9} Our review of the record indicates that the trial court considered the statutory guidelines as required by R.C.
With regard to the seriousness of Appellant's offense, the court noted in its entry that "[t]he defendant caused serious economic harm," and "[t]he defendant's relationship to the victim facilitated the offense." With regard to recidivism factors, the court noted that "[t]he defendant has prior adult and juvenile criminal convictions," including unruly, operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, driving under suspension and reckless operation as a juvenile. Further, the court noted that as an adult, Appellant had been convicted for fireworks in a village, alcohol under the age of 21, reckless operation, criminal trespass, open container, domestic battery, driving under the influence, theft, disorderly conduct by fighting, criminal damaging and disorderly conduct. With regard to recidivism factors, the court further found that Appellant "demonstrated a pattern of alcohol abuse related to the offense and refuses to acknowledge the pattern or refused treatment." Finally, the court found that its sentence was "reasonably calculated to achieve" the overriding purposes of felony sentencing.
{¶ 10} Here, the trial court imposed a sentence that was within the statutory limits. Before Appellant entered his guilty plea, the court explained to him that the maximum sentence was eighteen months. The court properly considered the factors in R.C.
{¶ 11} However, "[e]ven after Foster severed the factual requirements necessary for imposing a maximum sentence under former R.C.
{¶ 12} Here, the record shows that Appellant "poses the greatest likelihood of recidivism." Appellant, although a first time felony offender, has quite an extensive juvenile and adult record and the trial court made note of this factor in its consideration of the appropriate sentence. The trial court further found, with regard to recidivism, that Appellant demonstrated a pattern of alcohol abuse, and his prior record is evidence of that factor. Further, we find that the record shows that Appellant committed one of the worst forms of receiving stolen property for the following reasons. First, the grand jury indicted Appellant on two counts of receiving stolen property, *8 both fourth degree felonies, and two counts of grand theft, both third degree felonies. As part of a plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss all but one count of receiving stolen property, in exchange for Appellant's plea of guilt. Second, Appellant's relationship with the victim facilitated the commission of the offense. Third, the court found that Appellant had caused serious economic harm to the victim as a result of the commission of the offense.
{¶ 13} In State v. Starkey, Mahoning App. No. 06MA110,
Therefore, for the above stated reasons, we cannot clearly and convincingly find that the trial court failed to consider the statutory guidelines or that Appellant's sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶ 14} Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court imposed a maximum sentence to simply punish him for refusing to tell the court where the stolen guns were and to prove a point. It does appear, from a review of the record, that the trial court took into consideration the fact that Appellant would not disclose the location of the stolen guns. However, as set forth above and as correctly argued by Appellee, in addition to the seriousness and recidivism factors, the court may consider any other factor that it deems relevant to achieving the principles and purposes of sentencing. Therefore, we find that Appellant has not shown that his sentence is contrary to law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's imposition of a maximum sentence of eighteen months.
*10JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Abele, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.
*1Kline, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.