State v. BeaudetteState v. Beaudette
Thе defendant was indicted and convicted following a jury trial (Dalianis, J.) of accomplice to armed robbery,
Thе defendant, his minor son, and another male minor, on April 20, 1982, drove to Pierce Island in Portsmouth, allegedly to “rob someone and extort money.” Upon arriving there, the other minor, who testified for the State at the trial, met the victim and they agreed to engage in homosexual activity in the latter’s automobile. When the victim began performing fеllatio on the minor, he noticed a camera flash. He sat upright and observed the defendant pointing a rifle and a flashlight at him. The defendant’s son was standing on the other side of the automobile holding the camera, and рointing a pistol at the victim.
The defendant instructed the victim not to move and the defendant’s son took his wallet and keys. The victim was then handed a clipboard and instructed to write his name and address on the paper. During this pеriod, Officer Paul Famulari, of the Portsmouth Police Department, arrived on the scene and asked the victim fоr his driver’s license. He communicated to the police officer that
In searching the immediate area, the officer located a rifle and pistol, both being pellet guns, under the victim’s automobile. The rifle, which the defendant had held, wаs identified as an operable pellet gun that discharges a .177 caliber pellet, propelled by pnеumatic force. The prosecution’s expert witness testified that this rifle was capable of causing serious bodily injury or even death.
The defendant first contends that a pellet rifle does not fall within the class of weaрons proscribed by
To aid us in determining the plain meaning of the term in the statute, we refer to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 854 (1961), which defines a firearm as “a weapon from which a shot is discharged by gunpowder.”
Courts in other jurisdictiоns have considered this question and determined that gunpowder and the capability of discharge are the distinguishing fеatures of a firearm. See State v. Johnson,
Since the pellet from the defendant’s gun was propelled by pneumatic force, we rule that it was not a “firearm” within the meaning of
Secondly, the defеndant contends that the New Hampshire Constitution’s double-jeopardy prohibition was violated when he was cоnvicted of the crimes of accomplice to armed robbery and felonious use of a firearm. See Heald v. Perrin,
The defendant next contends that the indictment charging him as an аccomplice to armed robbery was defective because it failed to allege a material element of armed robbery; namely, that the defendant took the victim’s property “with a purpose to dеprive him thereof.”
The indictment stated:
“With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime of armed robbery, he, acting in concert with . . . and . . . , aided the commission of this offense as he purposely put Michael ... in fеar of the immediate use of physical force by brandishing a rifle which the said Michael . . . reasonably believеd to be a deadly weapon while the said . . . demanded and received Michael[’s]... wallet and took his cаr keys.”
“Whether an indictment is sufficient depends on whether ‘it gives the defendant enough information so that he can prepare for trial.’” State v. Taylor,
Finally, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction as accomplice to armed robbery. The defendant contends that he was part of a “sting” operatiоn or extortion scheme and did not intend theft, because he believed the keys and wallet would be returned. We find this аrgument without merit.
From the evidence introduced at trial, a reasonable jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant intended to deprive the victim of his property; thus, we uphold the jury’s verdict. State v. Goupil,
Conviction for felonious use of a firearm reversed; conviction for the crime of accomplice to armed robbery is affirmed.