The defendant, Brian A. Beauchemin, appeals his conviction following a bench trial on the violation level offense of baiting for wildlife during the closed season. See RSA 207:3-d, I (Supр. 2010); N.H. Admin. RULES, Fis 307.01(b). He argues that the Trial Court (Scheffy, J.) erred when it denied his motion to suppress and when it ruled that corn and salt-rich mineral blocks are covered substances within the definition of baiting undеr RSA 207:1, Il-a (Supp. 2010). We affirm.
The record reveals the following facts. It is illegal to bait for wildlife between April 15 and August 31.
See
N.H. Ajdmin. Rules, Fis 307.01(b). In October 2008, Conservation Officer Delayne Brown investigated the defendant for two deer carcasses hanging in his yard without corresponding registrations. Brown went onto the defendant’s porch and knocked on the
On August 30,2009, Brown was in Henniker checking on potential illegal pre-season baiting sites. Brown typically spends the last weeks in August patrolling areas heavily concentrated with hunters and game and walks in the woods looking for signs of animals. During his August 30,2009 rounds, Brown went back to the area around the defendant’s property and discovered whole kernel сorn and a salt-rich mineral block in the woods not far from the defendant’s residence, and also observed a foot path from the baiting site to his house.
Brown then proсeeded toward the defendant’s house and observed the defendant walking in his direction carrying two five-gallon buckets full of whole kernel corn. Brown approachеd the defendant, introduced himself, and asked what he was doing. The defendant responded that he was putting out bait for hunting. Brown informed the defendant that it was closed season and the defendant replied, “I can do whatever I damn want on my own property.” Brown explained the laws to the defendant and subsequently wrote him a ticket. The defendant protested that he was only feeding the deer and not baiting them for the purpose of hunting.
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress “evidence unlawfully seized or obtained,” arguing that one of the photographs provided in discovery taken during the 2008 investigation, was taken when Officer Brown was unlawfully on his porch. The State objectеd, and the trial court ruled that it would deal with the motion to suppress in the context of the trial. Following a bench trial, the defendant was found guilty of baiting during a closed season.
On appeal, the defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence unlawfully obtained in the 2008 investigation. The defendant asserts that thе illegal 2008 investigation “was the basis for the investigation in August 2009 in which more evidence was gathered to charge and convict [the defendant] in the present matter.”
“When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court’s findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous,” and we reviеw legal conclusions
de novo. State v. Craveiro,
The defendant focuses his entire argument on the 2008 investigation, arguing that Officer Brown took an illegal photograph of his property He argues thаt because Officer Brown came back for the 2009 investigation based entirely upon information gathered during the illegal 2008 investigation, the 2009 investigation was tainted and unlawful. The defendant argues that Officer Brown’s presence on his porch during the 2008 investigation violated both the officer’s statutory authority and his own constitutional right to be secure from unlаwful searches and seizures. RSA 206:26,1 (Supp. 2010) gives conservation officers the power to “enforce all laws, rules and regulations relating to all wildlife, and to go upon any property outside of buildings, posted or otherwise, in the performance of their duties.” The defendant asserts that a conservation officer’s powers only allow him to go on property outside of buildings, but do not permit him to go in or on porches. He argues that because Officer Brown went on his porch, he exceeded his statutory powers. We disagree.
The defendant also argues that Officer Brown’s presence on his porch was a violation of the Fourth Amendment and Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution. He argues that because Officer Brown did not have a warrant to be on his porch, any observations made from the porch were the fruit of the poisonous tree.
We first address the defendant’s argument under the State Constitution, and cite federal opinions for guidance only.
State v. Ball,
Becausе the State Constitution is at least as protective of the right to be free from unreasonable searches as the Federal Constitution,
see State v. MacElman,
The defendant next argues that the definition of baiting substances set forth in RSA 207:1, Il-a does not include corn or a salt-rich minеral block. RSA 207:1, Il-a defines baiting as “ft]he act of placing meat, carrion, honey or any other food or ingestible substance capable of luring or attracting cоyote, fur-bearing animals, game birds, or game animals with the exception of gray squirrel.” The defendant asserts that under the principle of ejusdem generis, the only substances included in the baiting definition by the words “other food or ingestible substance” are other substances similar to meat or honey.
We review a trial court’s statutory interpretation
de novo. State v. Breed,
“The principle of
ejusdem generis
provides that, where specific words in a statute follow general ones, the general words are construed to embracе only objects similar in nature to those enumerated by the specific words.”
Breed,
Here, the general term “food or ingеstible substance capable of luring or attracting coyote, fur-bearing animals, game birds, or game animals with the exception of gray squirrel,” provides the parameters of the nature of the specific enumerated words. Any food or ingestible substance that is capable of luring or attracting the animals listed in the statute is necessаrily an object “similar in nature to those enumerated by the specific words.” Id. In this case, whole kernel corn and a salt-rich mineral block are both food or ingestible substаnces that are capable of luring or attracting coyote, fur-bearing animals, game birds, or game animals. As such, both objects come within the statutory definition of baiting under RSA 207:1, II-a.
Affirmed.