State v. BeattyState v. Beatty
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Donnelly, Stewart, Brunner, Kennedy, Fischer, Deters, Dewine
Criminal law—
DONNELLY, J., announcing the judgment of the court.
{¶ 1} One of the more straightforward rules in Ohio‘s criminal-sentencing scheme is that “a prison term . . . shall be served concurrently with any other prison term” unless an exception applies,
I. BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} In 2021, Beatty was tried for offenses arising from allegations that he shot at a group of four people. A jury found Beatty guilty of four counts of felonious assault,
{¶ 3} At sentencing, the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas did not impose any prison term for the firearm specification attached to the firearm-discharge offense, but it imposed three-year prison terms for each of the four firearm specifications attached to the felonious-assault offenses. Two of those prison terms were mandatory under
{¶ 4} On appeal to the Twelfth District, Beatty argued that only two of his four firearm-specification prison terms should run consecutively and that the trial court‘s decision to run all four of those prison terms consecutively was not permitted by
{¶ 5} A three-judge panel of the Twelfth District disagreed with both parties, though it ultimately upheld the sentencing decision. 2022-Ohio-2329 (12th Dist.) (”Beatty I“). It held that
{¶ 6} The Twelfth District sua sponte determined that the conflict between its decisions in Beatty I and Isreal should be considered en banc. 2022-Ohio-3099, ¶ 1 (12th Dist.) (”Beatty II“). A majority of the en banc court reversed Beatty I and held, consistently with Isreal, that
{¶ 7} Beatty sought our discretionary review of the en banc court‘s decision. We accepted the appeal on the following proposition of law:
R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) does not provide statutory authority for the consecutive service of multiple prison terms imposed on firearm specifications; the service of those prison terms is set forth in, and limited to,R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) which only permits the consecutive service of “mandatory prison terms” imposed on firearm specifications.
See 2023-Ohio-86.
II. LAW
A. Standard of review
{¶ 8} The dispute here is over the meaning of multiple related statutory provisions. Questions involving statutory interpretation are legal questions that we review de novo. State v. Straley, 2014-Ohio-2139, ¶ 9. Our primary focus is on the text. “‘[O]ur inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.‘” State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland, 2005-Ohio-3807, ¶ 38, quoting BedRoc Ltd., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). The question that we ask in this inquiry “is not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.” Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. And if “a statute‘s meaning is clear and unambiguous, the statute is applied as written.” State v. Fazenbaker, 2020-Ohio-6731, ¶ 14.
B. Relevant statutes
1. Imposition of prison terms
{¶ 9} An offender convicted of a felony offense may be subject to an additional three-year prison term if the charge for the offense “specifies that the offender had a firearm on or about the offender‘s person or under the offender‘s control while committing the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated that the offender possessed the firearm, or used it to facilitate the offense.”
{¶ 10}
If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more felonies, if one or more of those felonies are aggravated murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, attempted murder, aggravated robbery, felonious assault, or rape, and if the offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described under division (B)(1)(a) of this section in connection with two or more of the felonies, the sentencing court shall impose on the offender the prison term specified under division (B)(1)(a) of this section for each of the two most serious specifications of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty and, in its discretion, also may impose on the offender the prison term specified under that division for any or all of the remaining specifications.
Thus, if an offender is convicted of a group of offenses and firearm specifications that were all part of the same transaction, the trial court must impose one prison term for the firearm specifications and it must not impose prison terms for any other firearm specifications. But if any of the offenses is a serious felony such as murder or felonious assault, the trial court must impose prison terms for two of the firearm specifications and it may impose prison terms for any remaining firearm specifications. Because the trial court “must” impose prison terms for two of the firearm specifications, those prison terms are “mandatory prison term[s],” which are defined as “the term[s] in prison that must be imposed for the offenses or circumstances set forth in . . . [
2. Concurrent or consecutive service of imposed prison terms
{¶ 11} The statutes governing concurrent or consecutive service of prison terms that we must examine in this appeal are
Except as provided in [
R.C. 2929.41(B) ,2929.14(C) , or2971.03(D) or(E) ], a prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this state, another state, or the United States.
{¶ 12}
Subject to [
R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(b) ], if a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) ] for having a firearm on or about the offender‘s person or under the offender‘s control whilecommitting a felony, if a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to [ R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(c) ] for committing a felony specified in that division by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, or if both types of mandatory prison terms are imposed, the offender shall serve any mandatory prison term imposed under either division consecutively to any other mandatory prison term imposed under either division or under [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(d) ], consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying felony pursuant to [R.C. 2929.14(A) ,(B)(2) , or(B)(3) ] or any other section of the Revised Code, and consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.
To sum up the portion of
{¶ 13} Finally,
C. Analysis
{¶ 14} There is no dispute that the trial court was required to impose prison terms for two of the four firearm specifications attached to Beatty‘s felonious-assault offenses under
{¶ 15} Our focus is on whether any of the foregoing statutory provisions creates an exception to the default of concurrent sentences in
1. R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) is not an exception to R.C. 2929.41(A)
{¶ 16} In Beatty II, the Twelfth District reiterated its previous holding that “‘pursuant to
{¶ 17} We disagree with the Twelfth District‘s reasoning in Isreal to the extent that it applied to Isreal‘s third firearm specification, and we disagree that such reasoning should be applied to Beatty‘s third and fourth firearm specifications. The phrase “court shall impose” in
{¶ 18} Accordingly, the language of
2. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) does not apply to specifications
{¶ 19} In Beatty I, the Twelfth District held that the power to run Beatty‘s third and fourth prison terms consecutively needed to come from
{¶ 20} We agree with the foregoing portion of the Twelfth District‘s reasoning. However, the Twelfth District went on to hold that the trial court had the discretion under
{¶ 21} We have held that a specification is “a penalty enhancement, not a criminal offense.” State v. Ford, 2011-Ohio-765, ¶ 19. Firearm specifications are not “offenses,” because they “do not contain a positive prohibition of conduct.” Id. at ¶ 16; see also
{¶ 22} We disagree with the Twelfth District‘s reasoning in Beatty I because it interjects the broader terms “sanction” and “punishment” into the language of
{¶ 23} Accordingly,
3. R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) does not cause discretionary prison terms to become mandatory
{¶ 24} The State argues that the language of
{¶ 25} If
4. There is no exception to R.C. 2929.41(A) for discretionary prison terms imposed under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g)
{¶ 26} The only statutory provision allowing for consecutive prison terms for firearm specifications—
{¶ 27} It is well-settled that judges have no inherent authority to create sentences. State v. Anderson, 2015-Ohio-2089, ¶ 10; State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75 (1984); Colegrove v. Burns, 175 Ohio St. 437, 438 (1964). Both crimes and criminal punishments are statutory, and “the only sentence which a trial court may impose is that provided for by statute.” Colegrove at 438. The General Assembly has not given trial courts the power to require that discretionary prison terms for firearm specifications be served consecutively, and therefore, under
{¶ 28} This conclusion, though based on the plain language of the applicable text, is by no means obvious. Ohio‘s criminal-sentencing scheme is a bloated labyrinth of specialized provisions, inter- and intra-statutory cross-references, exceptions, and exceptions to exceptions. The complexity of the scheme largely prevents criminal defendants and the general public from understanding how criminal sentencing works. It leaves trial courts struggling to impose sentences that are fair, proportional, and not repeatedly reversed for technical errors. In the event that the General Assembly changes the statutory language at issue, we pray that it does so in a way that creates clarity.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 29} The judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions that it amend its sentence to run the two discretionary prison terms imposed for the firearm specifications concurrently with each other and with the other prison terms imposed.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded to the trial court.
DETERS, J., joined by DEWINE, J., dissenting.
{¶ 30} Today the justices joining the lead opinion would render essentially meaningless the legislature‘s decision to give trial-court judges the option to impose sentences for firearm specifications beyond the first two. In the lead opinion‘s view, a trial-court judge may impose sentences for third and fourth firearm specifications but must run those sentences concurrently
{¶ 31} Because I would give the statutory scheme a sensible reading, I respectfully dissent.
The General Assembly gave trial-court judges the discretion to impose additional sentences
{¶ 32} Start with the language of
If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more felonies, if one or more of those felonies are aggravated murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, attempted murder, aggravated robbery, felonious assault, or rape, and if the offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described under division (B)(1)(a) of this section in connection with two or more of the felonies, the sentencing court shall impose on the offender the prison term specified under division (B)(1)(a) of this section for each of the two most serious specifications of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty and, in its discretion, also may impose on the offender the prison term specified under that division for any or all of the remaining specifications.
{¶ 33} By its plain language,
{¶ 34} To get to this point, the lead opinion takes a myopic view of another part of the statutory scheme and concludes that it doesn‘t apply to the prison terms imposed for the third and fourth specifications. I turn my attention to
[I]f a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(1)(a) of this section for having a firearm on or about the offender‘s person or under the offender‘s control while committing a felony, . . . the offender shall serve any mandatory prison term imposed . . . consecutively to any other mandatory prison term imposed under [division (B)(1)(a) of this section] . . . consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying felony pursuant to division (A), (B)(2), or (B)(3) of this section or any other section of the Revised Code, and consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.
{¶ 35} The statute requires that a mandatory prison term imposed for a firearm specification run consecutively to any other prison term imposed for a firearm specification and consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying felony. The faulty premise on which the lead opinion‘s conclusion is based is that because a trial-court judge is given discretion to impose a prison term for firearm specifications beyond the first two, a prison term so imposed is not a “mandatory prison term.” See lead opinion, ¶ 10. The lead opinion arrives at its conclusion with no analysis of what “mandatory”
“Mandatory” in the statutory scheme
{¶ 36} “Mandatory prison term” is defined as “the term in prison that must be imposed for the offenses or circumstances set forth in divisions (F)(1) to (8) or (F)(12) to (21) of section 2929.13 and division (B) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code.”
{¶ 37} A look at the sections referenced in the definition of “mandatory prison term” confirms that “mandatory” refers not to the trial court‘s decision to impose the term but to the requirement that the term be served in its entirety. Both
{¶ 38} The difference between mandatory prison terms and nonmandatory prison terms is brought into focus when the prison terms for firearm specifications are compared to those for felonies under
{¶ 39} Under certain circumstances, however, felony prison terms under
{¶ 40} The sentencing-hearing statute,
{¶ 41} The statutory scheme under which Aunrico Beatty was sentenced also supports this understanding of “mandatory.” Recall that for firearm specifications beyond the first and second,
{¶ 42} The lead opinion‘s discussion of
Imposition of a three-year mandatory prison term upon an offender under division (B)(1)(a)(ii) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code is precluded unless the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense specifies that the offender had a firearm on or about the offender‘s person or under the offender‘s control while committing the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated that the offender possessed the firearm, or used it to facilitate the offense.
(Emphasis added.) Beatty was sentenced to the term specified in
Conclusion
{¶ 43} The lead opinion bemoans the complexity of the criminal-sentencing scheme. Lead opinion at ¶ 28. That complexity is not an excuse for refusing to meaningfully engage with the word “mandatory” and its use throughout the statutory scheme. When the word “mandatory” is considered in the context of the scheme, it is clear that the word refers not to a trial-court judge‘s decision whether to impose prison terms for third and fourth firearm specifications but to the nature of those prison terms. A mandatory prison term is a specific term that must be served in its entirety.
{¶ 44} When the trial-court judge decided to impose prison terms for the third and fourth firearm specifications of which Beatty was convicted, the terms were mandatory prison terms. Under