{¶ 2} On April 27, 2007, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned a four-count indictment against appellant, including two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and two counts of OVI. The charges stemmed from an incident that ocсurred on March 28, 2007. On that evening, while intoxicated, appellant drove southbound in the northbound lanes of Interstate-71 and crashed into another vehicle, instantly killing its passenger, Roger Harr. On October 23, 2007, appellant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} The trial court held a sentencing hearing on December 17, 2007. At thе hearing, the trial court gave several people an opportunity to be heard, including family members of both the appellant and the victim, appellant's AA sponsor, a witness to the accident, and thе investigating officer. In particular, it was noted that on the evening of the accident, appellant had consumed at least five alcoholic beverages; had a blood alcohol content of 0.189, nearly twice the legal limit; had prescription and non-prescription drugs in her car; was not wearing her glasses; and was traveling the wrong direction on the highway. *4
{¶ 4} The court then proceeded to sentencing, first by acknowledging the guiding principles of R.C.
{¶ 5} Appellant was sentenced to the maximum penalty of eight years in prison, a $15,000 fine, and a lifetimе suspension of her driver's license.
{¶ 8} Appellant argues that her guilty plea is not valid because the trial court did not comply with Crim. R. 11. She specifically argues that she was not informed by the cоurt that she could not be compelled to testify against herself if she chose to go to trial. *5
{¶ 9} Crim. R. 11 (C), which deals with a trial court's acceptance of a plea of guilty to a felony offense, provides:
{¶ 10} "* * *
{¶ 11} "(2) In felоny cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and:
{¶ 12} "(a) Determining thаt he is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that he is not eligible for probation.
{¶ 13} "(b) Informing him of and determining that he understands the effect of his plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea may proceed with judgment and sentence.
{¶ 14} "(c) Informing him and determining that he understands that by his plea he is waiving his rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be сompelled to testify against himself."
{¶ 15} "Adherence to the provisions of Crim. R. 11(C)(2) requires anoral dialogue between the trial court and the defendant which enablesthe court to determine fully the defendants understanding of theconsequences of his plea of *6
guilty or no contest." (Emphasis added.) State v. Caudill (1976),
{¶ 16} In its recent opinion, State v. Veney, Slip Opinion No.
{¶ 17} In the case before us, the trial court stated during its plea сolloquy with appellant: "At trial you can present a defense, call witnesses, compel their appearance at trial by subpoena, testify yourself and tell your own side of the story; or you can choose not to testify and the prosecutor could not comment upon that fact in violation of your 5th Amendment right. Do you understand that?" Appellant answered that she did understand. Appellant's counsel also stated оn the record that he was satisfied that the court had complied with Crim. R. 11.
{¶ 18} We find that the trial court strictly complied with the mandates of Crim. R. 11(C) by orally informing appellant of her privilege against self-incrimination, even though it did not use a word-for-word recitation of Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(c).
{¶ 19} In State v. Scanlon (June 29, 1998), Licking App. No. 95-134, the Fifth District affirmed the trial court's acceptance of a guilty plea where the defendant made the same argument as appellant makes hеre. In Scanlon, the trial court did not inform the defendant that the state could not compel him to testify against himself, only that he had a right not to testify. On appeal, the court held that the trial court had complied with Crim. R. 11. See, also, State v. Adams (May 22, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 70045 ("trial court specifically informed appellant that he had the right to testify or to choose not to testify"). *8
{¶ 20} In the instant case, the words chosen by the trial court sufficiently informed appellant of the constitutional rights she is giving up by pleading guilty. We find that the court's wording that appellant could choose not to testify is the equivalent of saying that the state could not compel her to testify and amounts to strict compliance under Crim. R. 11(C)(2). Therefore, we overrule appellant's third assignment of error.
{¶ 22} In her first assignmеnt of error, appellant argues that the trial court did not consider the relevant sentencing factors; therefore, her sentence is contrary to law. She argues that the trial court sentenced her to a maximum of eight years in prison based on the fact that it found the value of a human life to be priceless. We find no merit in this argument.
{¶ 23} An appellate court may not disturb an imposed sentence unless it finds by clear and cоnvincing evidence that the sentence is not supported by the record or is "otherwise contrary to law." R.C.
{¶ 24} In State v. Foster,
{¶ 25} At sentencing, the trial court demonstrated that it considered the general guidelines found in R.C.
{¶ 26} We do not find that the imposition of a maximum sentence in this case is unsupported by the record or contrary to law. Therefore, we overrule appellant's first assignment of error.
{¶ 27} "II. The trial court's reliance on an unconstitutional statute constitutes reversible error."
{¶ 28} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by relying on R.C.
{¶ 29} With respect to the unconstitutionality of R.C.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
*11The court finds therе were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rulе 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., CONCURS; ANN DYKE, J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.