State v. BartlettState v. Bartlett
- Reporters:
- , , , ,
- Before:
- Turnage
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Albert D. Bartlett was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to sell. Prior to trial, the District Court for the Second Judicial District, Silver Bow County, denied the motion of Bartlett’s standby counsel that Bartlett undergo a mental examination. Bartlett proceeded to trial and was convicted. He appeals. We reverse.
The dispositive issue is whether the District Court erred when it denied the motion for mental examination.
In November 1993 two men, Smith and Patterson, were detained by Butte, Montana police officers minutes after they were seen breaking into a 1971 Ford Maverick and taking two duffle bags from it. Marijuana was found in the possession of the two men. Patterson told the officers that the marijuana had been inside a duffle bag taken from the Maverick.
The Maverick belonged to Albert D. Bartlett. When the police officers interviewed him about the incident, they found his response suspicious and uncooperative. Based upon Bartlett’s behavior and the recovery of the marijuana, they arrested him and obtained a warrant to search the car. They found six bundles of marijuana taped under the rear seat. The bundles contained a total of 6.79 pounds of marijuana.
Prior to trial, Bartlett had several changes of counsel. His initial court-appointed attorney withdrew by mutual agreement. Bartlett’s subsequent efforts to locate privately-retained counsel were unsuccessful. A second court-appointed attorney moved to be allowed to withdraw due to a conflict of interest.
On February 28, 1994, the District Court held a hearing to determine Bartlett’s competence to waive his right to counsel. Following the hearing, the court ordered that Bartlett would be allowed to proceed pro se. It later allowed Bartlett’s second attorney to withdraw and appointed a third attorney, Deirdre Caughlan, as standby counsel for Bartlett.
At the next pretrial hearing, on March 28,1994, Caughlan submitted a written motion and orally moved for a mental examination of Bartlett. She stated her belief, pursuant to
Following Caughlan’s oral motion at the hearing, Bartlett immediately stated, “She’s fired, period. Her word is without merit, as far as I’m concerned. She works for the
The prosecutor opposed the motion for a mental examination. He argued that while Bartlett was “difficult” to deal with, he was com petent and it was “time to move this case toward some kind of a disposition.”
The District Court denied the motion for a mental examination. It reasoned:
The Court notes that Defendant and the State opposed such motion. The Court finds that Defendant has appeared competent, and aware of the charges and consequences of this action, in all of his previous appearances before the Court. Defendant has appeared capable of acting with purpose or knowledge and has exhibited the ability to act in his own defense.
The court did not relieve Caughlan of her duties as standby counsel.
The case eventually proceeded to jury trial, with Bartlett conducting his own defense and Caughlan assisting him. He was convicted and sentenced to the maximum term of twenty years’ imprisonment.
Did the District Court err when it denied the motion for mental examination?
The statutory procedures for determining one’s competency to stand trial include the right of an accused to be examined for determination of his fitness to proceed.
46-14-202. Examination of defendant. (1) If the defendant or the defendant’s counsel files a written motion requesting an examination or if the issue of the defendant’s fitness to proceed is raised by the district court, prosecution, or defense counsel, the district court shall appoint at least one qualified psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist or shall request the superintendent of the Montana state hospital to designate at least one qualified psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist, which designation may be or include the superintendent, to examine and report upon the defendant’s mental condition.
As originally enacted, the statute provided that when “there is reason to doubt [the defendant’s] fitness to proceed ... the court shall appoint ...” See § 95-505, R.C.M. (1947). The statute was amended in 1981 to provide that the defendant or his counsel could raise the matter of the defendant’s fitness to be tried. In 1991, it was further amended to allow the court or the prosecution, as well as the defense, to raise the issue.
A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent. Godinez v. Moran (1993),_U.S._, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321. The State argues that Bartlett had been ruled competent to represent himself and that therefore he had the right to refuse a mental examination. However, courts have a continuing duty to review the issue of competency in criminal proceedings.
Even when a defendant is competent at the commencement of his trial, a trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial.
Drope v. Missouri (1975), 420 U.S. 162, 181, 95 S.Ct. 896, 908, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 119.
The State further contends that allowing standby counsel to force a mental examination would deprive Bartlett of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, citing Faretta v. California (1975), 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562.
The right to self-representation imposes some limitations on standby counsel’s unsolicited participation.
McKaskle v. Wiggins
(1984), 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122. In proceedings held in the presence of the jury, the pro se defendant must be allowed to preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present to the
Faretta rights are adequately vindicated ... if the pro se defendant is allowed to address the court freely on his own behalf and if disagreements between counsel and the pro se defendant are resolved in the defendant’s favor whenever the matter is one that would normally be left to the discretion of counsel.
McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 179, 104 S.Ct. at 951.
As set forth above, under
In this instance, we are faced with sometimes competing constitutional rights of a criminal defendant to represent himself if he competently so chooses, and not to be tried if he is incompetent to stand trial. Standby counsel for a pro se criminal defendant will commonly have greater exposure to and knowledge of the mental state of the defendant than will either the prosecution or the court. We conclude that the issue of defendant’s competence to stand trial, when raised by standby counsel, must be treated with as much deference as if the issue were raised by the prosecution or the court itself. We therefore hold that a motion by standby counsel for mental examination under
Having thus concluded that the District Court violated