State v. BartelState v. Bartel
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Johnson
Lead Opinion
Bartel was indicted for perjury pursuant to
In its sole enumeration of error, the státe contends the trial court erred in holding that “a witness is not capable of being prosecuted for perjury for knowingly and willfully making a false statement before a grand jury in a noncriminal proceeding.” We agree. In order to facilitate discussion of this case’s legal issues, we note that the oath administered to Bartel was ás follows: “Do you swear that the testimony you will give to this Floyd County Special Purpose Grand Jury in its civil investigation of the Hospital Authority of Floyd County and its affiliate organizations will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?” This oath informed him what was being investigated, and who was doing the investigation.
The law of Georgia does authorize a perjury prosecution against witnesses who swear falsely in testimony before local grand juries *697conducting civil investigations, so long as the grand jury is lawfully conducting an investigation authorized by state law To hold otherwise would be to fail to appreciate and give effect to the 1994 enactments of the legislature broadening the civil investigatory powers of grand juries, and to fail to limit the applicability of
Grand juries are authorized by the 1994 amendments to the grand jury statutes to investigate any public authority of the county. See
No set form for the oath to be taken by witnesses before grand juries conducting civil investigations is established in the Code. On its face, the oath prescribed by
Though the record in this case is not entirely clear regarding the authority under which the grand jury in the underlying matter was proceeding, it appears that there is no dispute that the civil investigation of the Floyd County Hospital Authority by the special purpose grand jury was authorized by law, and that the grand jury was authorized to compel Bartel to appear before it and present evidence relevant to the investigation. There is a dispute between the parties to this appeal as to whether this particular grand jury was operating under
Because State v. Williams, 181 Ga. App. 204 (351 SE2d 727) (1986), and Inman v. State, 187 Ga. App. 652 (371 SE2d 230) (1988), cited by Bartel, as well as Vaughn v. State, 259 Ga. 325 (381 SE2d 30) *698(1989), appear to require a different result, further discussion is required. Bartel argues that the grand jury in this case was a special grand jury drawing its powers from
Likewise, the trial court’s reliance upon Ashburn v. State, 15 Ga. 246 (1854), is misplaced. Ashburn was not only a criminal case, but the oath administered to grand jury witnesses in that case did not even require them to tell the truth. Rather, it required them merely to “testify concerning such matters as should be inquired of by the Grand Jury.” Id. at 247. But for punctuation and capitalization, the statutorily prescribed oath for witnesses before grand juries at the time Ashburn was decided is identical to that prescribed by
Inasmuch as it appears that the grand jury in the underlying matter was authorized by law to conduct this civil investigation, and to do so in part through the vehicle of taking oral testimony from live witnesses, it defies logic to suggest that the witnesses called by the grand jury to provide that oral evidence can lie with impunity. It fur*699ther defies logic to say that the oath administered in connection with the taking of testimony in civil cases has to be identical to that set out in
Judgment reversed.
Beasley, C. J., Birdsong, P. J., Pope, P. J., Andrews, Blackburn, Smith and Ruffin, JJ., concur. McMurray, P. J., dissents.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe the case sub judice is controlled by Inman v. State, 187 Ga. App. 652 (371 SE2d 230). I therefore would affirm the trial court’s order granting Bartel’s motion to dismiss the indictment.