State v. Barr

may spend purpose the funds for the same

by obtaining the same facilities from another

department City. City pays of the If the

fair premises, prac- value for the is no there

tiсal distinction two between the situations. expenditure

The is in the same amount and Therefore, purpose. the same we con- provision

clude that the constitutional autho-

rizes reimbursement of highway transfers any municipal department

user funds to

actually performs operational and overhead

support furthering “highway pur- and street

poses.” reasons, foregoing

For the affirm

decision of the tax court. GARBARINO, JJ.,

NOYES and concur.

904 P.2d 1258 Arizona, Appellee,

STATE BARR, Appellant.

Joel Kenton

No. 1 CA-CR 93-0275. Arizona, Appeals

Court of 1, Department

Division C.

May 1995.

Review Denied Oct. fencing, 184-087, (June 20, garages, appurtenances, Op.Atty.Gen. and other relat- 1984 WL 61299 facilities, they long directly ed so as are 1984). ‍‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍related Const, IX, § purposes of Ariz. art.

436 Woods, Atty.

Grant Gen. Paul J. McMurdie, Counsel, Appeals Chief Crim. .Section, Todd, Atty. Pressley and John Asst. Gen., Phoenix, appellee. for Antieau, Phoenix, appellant. John M. for OPINION VOSS, Judge.

Appellant Joel Kenton Barr was convicted jury after trial one count misdemeanor, trespass, class 3 felony. one count of a class 6 Appellant to trial The court sentenced time conviction, trespassing served placed probation years three arrest conviction. appeals his to. convictions and sentences this court. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY light We view the facts most sustaining favorable to verdict. Atwood, 506 U.S. 1058,122 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d time, Ap- At this arrived. Low A third officer president of the Show Appellant, as him in front of arms were locked Utility applied pellant’s Corporation, Water Pines forth, trying to Necessity “jerking back and and he was of Convenience Certificate Attempt- of the officers.” Corporation Commission. efforts from the Arizona resist the arrest, the third officer hearing ing on this matter was with this A to assist Commission arms so grabbed 9:30 a.m. on October one scheduled for Minutes three officers hearing Mark Stern. could handcuffed. The before officer be a.m., floor. yet arrived 9:30 Stern had then fell after room, Ap- him in designated hearing prompting third officer and kicked looked at the go thigh. Finally, Appеllant office to ask was subdued pellant to to Stem’s when I replied, hearing begin. “When would Stem and arrested. Appellant to the get in the room.” returned third-degree charged with Appellant was pres-

hearing announced to those room and conduct, and re- trespass, criminal at a appointment a 10:00 a.m. ent that he had trial, a he sisting After arrest. then the company. He left cable television resisting trespassing of convicted building requesting a continuance.' without He was acquitted disorderly conduct. of but thereafter, Ap- hearing begаn and the Soon trespassing for the to time served sentenced pellant’s was deemed defaulted application years proba- placed on three conviction his absence. In conviction. tion the day, addition, perform returned Appellant That same Petitioner was ordered to hearing community room around noon. Commission service. 100 hours of officer, Burns, hearing Ann chief Beth court, timely appealed to this Appellant room and asked entered (1) following arguments: five raises In a could be of assistance. whеther she sup- insufficient evidence That there voice, Appellant that he indicated raised (2) convictions; court the trial that port his hearing be After convened. wanted by admitting evidence abused its discretion hearing him Burns informed that (3) acts; that the trial prior two of absence, com- his occurred in to show excluding evidence offered by erred rights and then plained that his were violated (4) mind; the trial court of that his state shouting, walked into an office ‘Where for a mistrial denying his motion erred Ap- everybody?” Burns then asked hell prejudice; and judicial bias and because of leave, ‍‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍acknowledge pellant to but he did not (5) by refusing to trial court erred At request “hollering.” continued this proposed jury instruction. give his Capitol police were request, Burns’s Appellant to leave three called. Bums asked DISCUSSION times, which he the office more after left hallway. a sat on couch a Sufficiency the Evidence. A of arrived, responding two officers When the case, Appellant of the State’s At the close longer had Appellant was advised that no he in- evidence contended thе State’s building in the asked business and was a and moved support conviction sufficient premises at times. leave the least three acquittal counts on all judgment for a of Ultimately, he was told that be he would 20(a), Arizona Rules of pursuant to Rule leave, if did not he arrested he which 20(a)”). (“Rule The trial Procedure Criminal responded, “Go ahead and arrest me.” appeal, Appel- this motion. On court denied attempted place Appel- the officers court erred lant contends trespassing, he resisted lant under arrest did denying this motion beсause State refusing by moving his hands and to hold to sustain present substantial evidence his back. also was behind them third-degree criminal tres- his of convictions time, telephone at holding portable a We pass and of arrest. attempted to re- one of the officers which 20(a) requires the trial court partly he because feared move there is judgment acquittal of “if weapon. use it as to enter might 438

no substantial private evidence to warrant a solely legis- convic statute property. The 1, 4, tion.” v. Landrigan, 176 Ariz distinguished 859 pri- lature could have between — not; P.2d rather, 114 public property, vate and U.S. but did -, (1993); phrase “any property” S.Ct. used the real in the L.Ed.2d.279 Fodor, Generally, definition of this 880 P.2d offense. “the is, (App.1994). sense, ‘any’ If word in its persons ordinary broadly reasonable may Tanner, fairly City differ as to inclusive.” whether evidence es Phoenix issue, fact in Ariz. tablishes a such evidence is Landrigan, Supreme substantial. the United at States Court Fodor, 114; 451, 880 recognized P.2d at has propriety applying 179Ariz. at trespass prohibiting “trespass upon statute property public property, another” to Third-Degree Trеspass. noting State, Criminal pri- “[t]he no less than a property, pre- vate power owner has Appellant raises arguments three to chal- property serve the under its control lenge sufficiency of support- the evidence lawfully use to which it is dedicated.” Ad- ing conviction Florida, derley v. U.S. S.Ct. (1) trespass. He contends: That the tres- (1966). 247, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 pass applies only private property; statute to (2) Finally, by persuaded are not that we the two showing there no evidence that support or decisions has his “unlawfully” he entered cited to remained at the 13-1502(A) (3) argument Commission; that A.R.S. section Corporation that his public does not to trespass apply property. The first conviction is inconsistent with his (cid:127) decision, v. Blakely, 181 Mont. acquittal the charge on of conduct. readily distinguishable P.2d 501 is arguments All three are meritless. There, from present property case. Appellant’s argument first involves open public, signs issue was to the statutory construction. Arizona Revised prohibited by livestock, grazing pres- not the (“A.R.S.”) Statutes Annotated section 13- Thus, persons. ence of Id. 592 502. P.2d at 1502(A) (1989) third-degree defines present unlike the case where trespass as follows: requested premises, to leave the the defen- person A trespass A. commits criminal Blakely request dant in had no such or no- degree by: the third Moreover, tice. Id. at court 503. found Knowingly entering remaining or un- a “complete proof’ failure of that the defen- lawfully any property on real after a rea- public property dant was on the on the date request by sonable to leave owner or charged. In the decision Id. second cited any person having other lawful control Cutnose, by Appellant, State v. 87 N.M. property, over such or reasonable notice (App.1975), 532 P.2d 891-92 the court prohibiting entry. general that New concluded Mexico’s tres- pass apply not public property statute did statute, construing a we look to the specifically because another statute was en- statutory language give effect to the property. only for public acted Not is Cut- phrases words and in accordance with their distinguishable nose insofar as Arizona does commonly accepted meaning unless legis- specific proscribing not a hаve statute tres- lature has offered its own definitions or a passing public property, on but Cutnose special meaning also apparent is from the context. has been overruled Mexico (1994); New Su- § AR.S. 1-213 Reynolds, McCormack, preme Court in State v. (1992). 823 P.2d (1984). N.M. 674 P.2d 1120-21 upon our Based examination of the plain of language 13-1502(A), A.R.S. section person We hold a therefore can applies we it to both private conclude be convicted of criminal tres public property. is no pass There public property pursuant indication on to A.R.S. 13-1502(A). оr legisla the statute that the Accordingly, elsewhere section the occur ture intended limit this criminal trespass public property of did rence this incident on Disorderly conduct trespass conviction. judgment acquit- a not entitle trespass. of criminal is not an element tal. Moreover, jury’s acquittal on the disor- Appellant’s now address second We charge not inconsis- derly did create conduct argument—that present failed the State so, and, there done tent verdicts even demonstrating that he substantial evidence on jury’s that a verdicts requirement is no Corpo unlawfully at the or remained entered v. Zak- be different counts consistent. State request a ration after reasonable Commission har, 83, 84 by person a with lawful control over to leave property. we conclude that the court Accordingly, 20(a) mo- correctly Rule denied 13-1501(1) (1991)1 de A.R.S. section charge respect with to the acquittal tion for unlawfully” mean fines or remain “enter trespass. third-degree criminal or person “an who enters remains act of so person’s intent for premises when such Resisting Arrest. licensed, remaining is autho entering or not privileged.” rized otherwise or Appellant also contends 20(a) every request agree with denying his motion erred public proper employee charge. state leave respect with purposes ty necessarily reasonable no argues that there Specifically, he 13-1502(A). Rather, we section A.R.S. “a substan proving that he evidence created that “lawfulness” of defendant’s injury.” believe causing physical We tial risk of public property presence on reason employee’s requеst state ableness charged pursuant A.R.S. Defendant was property jury are for to

leave such issues the 13-2508(A)(2) (1989), provides: which section light in of the circumstances of each decide A person A. commits particular case. attempting or to intentionally preventing Here, presented the with evi- reasonably to him prevent person known a Corporation dence left the officer, acting of a under color peace to be requesting without a continu- Commission authority, peace from such officer’s official hearing ance his of then returned several by: effecting an arrest hearing hours after had concluded. the was informed Burns that the he creating Using any a sub- other means no had hearing longer and that he over causing physical injury to stantial risk of Commission, business at the peace the officer or another. Burns, began yelling. authority who had to premises, request- ask to the Here, someone leave in front of Appellant locked arms leaving, of ed that leave. Instead jerked him and back and forth when the yell disrup- to continued and was sought officers to handcuff him. He also Therеafter, Appellant tive. refused to com- phone one officer portable held which ply requests with the the officers’ leave weapon. More- feared could be used as premises. jury reasonably Because over, Appellant and the officers fell when Appel- could this conclude from evidence that floor, thigh. them in the he kicked one of pur- lant at the Commission for a remained facts, persons could Given these reasonable pose other than official business a rea- after Appellant сreated sub- differ as to whether leave, request presented sonable State causing physical injury. of stantial risk substantial to warrant a evidence conviction there was substantial evidence Because third-degree trespass. conviction for support Appellant’s by denying Finally, reject Appellant’s we trial court did err 20(a) acquittal of argument acquittal Appellant’s third on the Rule motion for because his charge conduct is immaterial this offense. amendments, however, legislature neither this The affect The has amended statute since 13-1501(1) analysis § (Supp.1994). this case. 1992. See A.R.S. nor resolution of which, B. Acts Other Evidence. of provision Rules Evidence—a purposes analysis, of this mirrors the rele- Appellant contends that portions 404(b), vant of Rule Federal Rules by admitting its abused discretion Atwood, of Evidence. See 171 Ariz. at testimony previously evidence that he had P.2d at 655. Corporation chained himself to the Commis flagpole spray-painted sion and had “Article here, Applying analysis the Huddleston 6” on wall of alleg the Commission. He conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 404(b), еs that this Rule violated Arizona by admitting testimony discretion about of Rules Evidence. We First, acts in they these evidence. were crimes,

Admission of wrongs, purposes respect other introduced for with proper or acts within the trial court’s charged crimes—disorderly discretion to the three cond appeal uct,2 will not be an reversed absent trespass, and re Robinson, abuse of discretion. v. trial, sisting Appellant gave arrest. Prior to Rule might notice that he raise several defenses 404(b), Arizona provides: Rules of Evidence trial, among specific of these were lack crimes, intent, intent, of wrongs,

Evidence or insufficiency other no criminal acts is not to prove admissible prior provid the charac- acts State’s evidence. The person ter of a order show action in ed of Appellant’s evidence intent—an ele however, conformity may, therewith. It be ment each offense the State purposes, admissible for other such as proving. Ap burden of ‍‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍because motive, intent, proof opportunity, prepa- pellant both prior acts to committed rаtion, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab- protest Corporation actions of the Commis sence of or mistake accident. sion, .they certainly were evidence motive conduct here States, In Huddleston United 485 U.S. protest hearing of the Commission October 108 S.Ct. 99 L.Ed.2d 771 Therefore, 22, 1992. was of evidence interpret Supreme States Court United 404(b), proper purpose pursuant for a Evidence, fered ed Rule Rules of Federal 404(b).' Second, jury reasonably could recognized provi the existence four prior conclude that acts ocсurred and protect sions from unfair defendants First, Appellant only prejudice. that was the actor. Not did the evidence must be ex testify personally Burns that she had ob amined to determine whether it is for offered proper purpose Appellant flagpole, prove and not to char served chained the but the 691, 108 Appellant actually acter of Id. of the defendant. at S.Ct. convicted Second, damage at painting the trial court deter a wall must “Article 6” on of Moreover, Corporation Ap mine whether the evidence is relevant under the Commission. Id. pellant pri- “[i]n Rule 402. The Court noted both that admitted that he committed 404(b) context, Thus, the similar Rule act evidence or relevant for acts. the evidence was only Third, jury reasonably probative is relevant if can purposes of the Rule 402. significant conclude that the act occurred Appellant’s prior and that the of acts was value defendant the actor.” Id. at they provided 108 as circumstantial evidence Third, bearing S.Ct. at 1501. Appellant’s it must be on and determined intent motive. probative whether the сomparison, value of By danger the evidence there little that substantially is outweighed by danger unduly this evidence would confuse or influ prejudice. unfair jurors Id. at 108 at improp S.Ct. ence on an decide case Finally, emotion, give the trial court sympathy, must er basis such as or hor instruction, limiting requested. Schurz, if Id. The ror. See State v. — Supreme Arizona Court has noted that the protections against -, preju same four unfair U.S. 126 L.Ed.2d 598 S.Ct. 404(b), (1993). dice are embodied in Rule Finally, Appellant Arizona both state and 13-2904(A)(2)(1989) family person, 2. A.R.S. section quiet neighborhood, defines this of a or оr so, person disorderly person offense as follows: "A knowledge doing commits with such ... if, conduct with peace intent to disturb the or [m]akes unreasonable noise.” materially in may give court to a standard have influenced the requested the trial Moya, 136 Ariz. at acts, concerning arriving and the at its verdict.” prior instruction Serrano, gave specific proper (citing instruction P.2d at 237 (1972)). challenged Ariz.App. on of the evidence. P.2d 547 the limited use Accordingly, we conclude that trial Here, agree Appellant with court did abuse its discretion admit- not рroposed testimony was an admissible extra- concerning ting testimony Appel- in evidence judicial because it was offered statement prior lant’s two acts. prove show on him and not the effect Nonetheless, truth matter of the asserted. Testimony. C. Exclusion of testimony preclusion of this the trial court’s case-in-chief, of Burns’s not error. The effect is reversible In State’s only Appellant on was relevant Ap her “exact words” Burns testified about comments Corporation charge—the of- pellant he returned to the conduct when аttempted testify acquitted. As Appellant was Commission. fense of which words,” offenses, but the trial about Burns’s “exact crim- two other hearsay objection court sustained the State’s is diffi- inal it trespass precluded testimony. this testimony cult to how envision contends this amounted to reversible error. might we are have been relevant. We relevancy Ap- speculate about left testimony he pellant’s precluded because 801(c), Rules of Ev Rule Arizona pursuant proof an failed to make offer of statement, hearsay as idence “a оther defines 103(a)(2). Although Burns testified Rule testify than one the declarant while made if she could be of asked she ing hearing, or offered evi and that she informed assistance to.prove the truth of the matter as dence hearing proceeded in his ab- Supreme Arizona Court has serted.” The sence, testimony at trial offers no evi- relevant, that, extrajudicial recognized if Thus, on the dence about her “exact words.” writings prove “words or offered to the effect us, appear reason- record before does or reader admissiblе the hearer are where ably possible preclusion of the court’s offered to show their on one effect whose materially Appellant’s testimony influenced Rivera, issue.” conduct third-degree crimi- jury’s verdicts on the trespass nal arrest offenses. 103(a)(2), Arizona Rules Evidence (“Rule 103(a)(2)”) addresses situations when sum, to speculate In left because we are evidence, erroneously the trial court excludes Appellant’s pre- about both the substance provides: any resulting testimony as as cluded well may upon predicatеd Error not be a Appellant, is not war- prejudice to reversal ruling which admits or excludes evidence ranted. party right unless a substantial of the is

affected, ruling ... [i]n case the is one Appellant’s D. Motion a Mis- Denial evidence, excluding the substance of the trial by evidence was made known court apparent or proof] [of offer from the trial, Appellant testified at questions which were context within asked. him interrupted to answer court and directed question on a number occasions. asked Prejudice rights to of a the substantial dеfen evidence, Appellant At moved the close of presumed appear will not be and ‍‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍must dant mistrial, interrup arguing court’s 534, that the Moya, v. in the record. State 136 Ariz. jury. eyes him of the 537, 234, prejudiced tions in the (App.1983) (citing 667 P.2d 237 Brewer, 408, con now v. Ariz.App. 26 549 The motion denied. State P.2d (1976)). trial court committed revers determining tends that “The standard motion. dis prejudicial by denying We is is it ible error whether error whether reasonably possible appears agree. the error duty

The trial court has a rights to see prejudice a defendant and such orderly Islas, is appears conducted an on the record. v. State manner, may require and this 590, 591, an occasional 1188, Ariz. (App. 647 P.2d 1982). admonishment a witness. See State v. 313, 323, 1375, 174 Ariz. 848 P.2d

Hill Here, Appellant proposed following ad- — (1993), denied, U.S.-, cert. 114 S.Ct. ditional instruction: (1993). 126 L.Ed.2d 219 A claim of Mere non[-]submission not covered un- improper judicial remarks must be evaluated der this offense. The offense is limited according to the circumstances of each case. involving forcible resistance some substan- Hunter, 33, 59, Gaston v. 121 Ariz. 588 P.2d danger. tial reason, (App.1978). “Within display [court] does not preju bias or сause rejected The trial court this instruction be- acting sponte dice when sua to control the by given cause was covered instruc- Bible, courtroom and the trial.” 175 tions, provided: which (1993), resisting requires The crime of — denied, -, cert. U.S. 114 S.Ct. proof following things: four (1994). 128 L.Ed.2d 221 officer, peace 1. A acting in his or her Here, Appellant began when giving long capacity, official sought to arrest answers, narrative explained the trial court defendant; and to both and his counsel that he knew, 2. The defendant or had reason to testimony proceed wished tо have “in ques- know, person seeking that the to make Thereafter, tion and answer mode.” when officer; peace the arrest was a testify- continued to ramble when ing, repeatedly the trial court him directed intentionally prevented The defendant only question answer asked. After re- attempted prevent peace or offi- record, viewing the we conclude arrest; making from cer entirely court’s comments to were 4. The means used the defendant appropriate under the circumstances. prevent the arrеst created a substantial risk of physical injury to either Appellant’s E. to Give “Mere Non- Refusal peace or officer another. Submission” Instruction. legally justified Whether the arrest was argument final is that is irrelevant. the trial court committed reversible error refusing give proposed argument instruction con Mere with or criticism of a cerning peace grounds, “mere non-submission” for officer is not the of sufficient more, person guilty fense of without arrest. We find a “resisting arrest.” particular The lack of a instruc instructions, tion is not fatal where the Although Aрpellant’s read proposed instruction , whole, as a sufficiently set forth correctly the law. notes that “mere non-submission” Villafuerte, 690 is support insufficient a conviction for agree U.S. with trial 105 S.Ct. 84 L.Ed.2d 371 given the instructions adequately in- jury properly the instructed on the jury formed the the elements the of- law, applicable the trial court is required resisting fense of Appel- arrest. To convict provide to additional merely arrest, instructions that resisting lant of required the enlarge reiterate or the instructions in a to find more than “mere non-submission.” language. Salazar, defendant’s Indeed, State v. 173 required the finding instructions 399, 409, 566, 844 P.2d intentionally used some means — -, U.S. 113 S.Ct. prevent, attempt prevent, or to his L.Ed.2d 707 Finally, by Therefore, the failure arrest. because the instructions the trial give court to an instruction is not implicitly required jury to the find more than prejudicial reversible error unless it is “mere non-submission” to convict the rele- given I am unable to discern instructions resisting the crimi- prior-act evidence to the vance of the were sufficient.3 describing the charges. nal The evidence trial court did not err Accordingly, the did riot indicаte earlier behavior defendant’s “mere non- refusing Appellant’s proposed had been asked leave whether he instruction. submission” § 13-1502. premises and refused. A.R.S. Cf suggest that the did not Similarly, the state CONCLUSION had in an arrest prior incidents resulted A.R.S. which the defendant resisted. Cf for funda- the record We have examined Finally, § the defendant 13-2508. while 13- pursuant to A.R.S. section mental error intentionally present in the case accused (1989) For the arid have found none. quiet of a disturbing peace and Commis- reasons, foregoing Appellant’s convictions noise, by making unreasonable employee sion are affirmed. and sentences prior his explain that at no time did the state A.R.S. conduct. acts the same concerned Cf WEISBERG, J., concurs. § acts demonstrated 13-2904. What the occasion, on this not the defendant’s intent EHRLICH, Judge, dissenting. that, past, had shown himself but in the he majority respectfully dissent from the I dealings in with tiie person difficult be a I the trial opinion because conclude what Rule precisely This is Commission. by admitting ‍‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍clearly erred evidence court .404(b) prevent. was intended had previously chained defendant errоr, trial compound To further pole spray-painted to a and “Article himself in motion limine court the defendant’s denied Accordingly, I 6” on wall. the Commission’s of the any weighing of relevance without convictions for would reverse the defendant’s against prejudicial its ef prior-act evidence and trespass arrest 403 demands. See State fect as Rule trial.4 remand the matter for new Taylor, 817 P.2d 169 Ariz. (1991) (Rule balancing important test majority’s I take issue with the determina- 404(b) inquiry). State v. Gon prior properly acts tion that the defendant’s Cf. zales, 349, 351, 681 P.2d 140 Ariz. the intent re- were admitted establish (1984) (“In determining proba whether quired trespass, for criminal conduct, outweighs danger prove or to the de- tive value of evidence confusion, contrary, prejudice fendant’s motive. To the consider- purpose [Ci of the offer. must ing presented the facts when it ruled examine Salazar, omitted.]”); limine, 181 Ariz. motion in the trial court tation defendant’s (“[T]he (App.1994) from which to make had insufficient evidence showing prejudice is over-bal admissibility regarding the onus of determinations instance, good faith should rest on prior-act For the state anced need evidence. omitted.]). with, most, Al provided only [Citations Government.” the court prior-act describing though I maintain that the evidence skeletal facts the defendant’s ear- inadmissible, risk did not sub- and thus prosecution lier incidents. The was irrelevant jury would use great mit too that the the dates on which those acts occurred also was i.e., purpose, improper for an develop manner which such evidence failed probably did so this they allegedly corresponded charged “if did it before he he al, Arizona Prae- Morris K. Udall еt offenses. time.” Leslie, Appel of law. State v. 3. We also note that the second sentence of is an incorrect statement 48-49, proposed lant’s instruction the offense to limited 729-30 "forcible That of the law resistance." statement (1985); Rodriquez, 145 Ariz. see also State v. 13-2508(A)(2); § is incorrect. See A.R.S. also State v. see 855, (App.1984). P.2d Womack, 1992) (App. (statutory intent is "to decided, Consequently, have as the 4. I would not prohibit threats or conduct that creates a does, remaining majority three the defendant’s another”). injury substantial risk of A trial appeal. issues on by refusing does not err an instruction that (3d § at 90 tice—Law Evidence ed.

1991) States, (quoting Gordon v. United (D.C.Cir.1967),

F.2d U.S. 1029, 1421, 20 88 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 287

(1968)). I would reverse.

904 P.2d 1268 AND

SOUTHWEST AUTO PAINTING REPAIR, INC.,

BODY an Arizona

Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Jay Binsfeld, BINSFELD and Jane Doe Wife;

Husband and General Southwest Inc., Agency,

Insurance an Arizona Cor-

poration, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 93-0305. Arizona, Appeals

Court 1, Department

Division A.

May 1995.

As Corrected June

Review Denied Oct.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Barr

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Arizona

Date Published: May 16, 1995

Citation: 904 P.2d 1258

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 93-0275

Court Abbreviation: Ariz. Ct. App.