State v. BarrState v. Barr
This case comes before us on certification from Division Two of the Court of Appeals. Appellant Charles Barr seeks review of a trial court order conditioning appellant's probation on restitution to the wife and child of his victim. We affirm.
On July 12, 1980, defendant Charles Barr made a left-hand turn in front of a motorcycle. The driver of the motorcycle, Donald Howe, died from injuries suffered in this accident. His wife, Diane Howe, riding as a passenger, sustained serious injuries, including a compound fracture of the femur, a cracked collarbone, and a closed skull fracture. As a result of this accident, Diane Howe incurred $33,000 in medical expenses and suffered permanent disabilities.
Following the accident a Breathalyzer test revealed that Mr. Barr had a blood alcohol content of .20 percent. Mr. Barr pleaded guilty to one charge of violating
Whether a person convicted of negligent homicide may, as a condition of probation underRCW 9.95.210 , be required to pay restitution to the spouse and minor child of the victim.
We hold that the trial court's actions were authorized by
The court may also require the defendant to make such monetary payments, on such terms as it deems appropriate under the circumstances, as are necessary ... (2) to make restitution to any person or persons who may have suffered loss or damage by reason of the commission of the crime in question . . .
The defendant argues that
Defendant's reliance on Eilts is misplaced. The trial court's order of restitution to Diane and Dawn Howe was not based on their status as victims of uncharged crimes but rather as persons who suffered loss or damage because of Donald Howe's death. The trial court recognized the rule in Eilts but distinguished the case as follows:
State v. Eilts, [supra] is distinguishable from the case at bar. Eilts involved a series of criminal acts, each said act generating loss to different victims, and the defendant having been charged and convicted of only a portion of said criminal acts. In the case at bar, the defendant committed and was convicted of only one criminal act which generated loss to more than one victim. Therefore, the ruling of Eilts does not apply in the case at bar to eliminate persons other than the deceased, Donald Howe, as victims of the crime in question.
Clerk's Papers, at 30-31. The broad language of
to make restitution to any person or persons who may have suffered loss or damage by reason of the commission of the crime in question or when the offender pleads guilty to a lesser offense or fewer offenses and agrees with the prosecutor's recommendation that the offender be required to pay restitution to a victim of an offense or offenses which are not prosecuted pursuant to a plea agreement [.]
Laws of 1982, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 47, § 10, p. 1325. The language of the new statute effectively overrules our decision in
Eilts.
Although the amendment does not govern this case, it clearly indicates the Legislature's intent that this
Appellant argues, however, that a restrictive reading of the statute is necessary because criminal proceedings are inappropriate forums for determining civil damages. This argument has merit but is not persuasive here, since the trial judge's order is not an award of civil damages. Appellant errs by misinterpreting the purpose of restitution. Restitution, as a condition of probation, is primarily a rehabilitative tool. See, e.g., Siegel, Court Ordered Victim-Restitution: An Overview of Theory and Action, 5 New Eng. J. Prison L. 135, 138-41 (1979); Best & Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 Geo. L.J. 809, 827-28 (1963). These commentators suggest that restitution increases the defendant's self-awareness and sense of control over his/her own life. See Siegel, at 139. Furthermore, the use of restitution has met with some success in reducing recidivism. See B. Galaway & J. Hudson, Offender Restitution in Theory and Action (1977). One study reveals a significantly smaller recidivism rate for those involved in restitution programs as opposed to incarceration. See B. Galaway & J. Hudson, at 155. Appellant's arguments ignore this aspect of restitution in favor of the view that restitution compensates the victim. Though partial compensation may be a concomitant result of restitution, it is not the primary purpose of such an order.
In addition, the restitution ordered here does not preempt the defendant's right to a civil determination of liability and damages. The $12,000 that Barr must pay represents less than one-half of Diane's current medical expenses. It does not include any amount for loss of wages, pain and suffering, or future medicals. Under these circumstances, a civil trial would still be necessary to determine the extent of Diane's damages and Mr. Barr's liability.
Furthermore, the trial court's order of restitution best serves the rehabilitative goals suggested by commentators. By requiring payment to the wife and child of Mr. Howe, the trial judge reemphasized that Mr. Barr's criminal act has consequences above and beyond the death of one man.
Finally, we observe that the trial court's order was authorized by prior decisions from this court and the Court of Appeals.
See State v. Morgan,
With the limitation discussed above, we conclude that the trial court's order serves legitimate legislative goals and is authorized by this statute.
We therefore affirm.
Williams, C.J., and Stafford, Utter, Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Dore, Dimmick, and Pearson, JJ., concur.
Notes
Judge D. J. Cunningham is serving as a justice pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Const. art. 4, § (a) (amend. 38).