34 W. Va. 74 | W. Va. | 1890
Kendall Barnett was indicted in the Circuit Court of Jackson county, in August, 1889, for unlawfully carrying a revolver, and a jury was waived, and the case, tried by the court, which found him guilty and passed judgment against him for twenty five dollars fine, to which he obtained this writ of error.
He assigns as error, that the Circuit Court erred in finding him guilty and rendering judgment against him. The bill of exceptions shows that the defendant admitted that
The fact of the carrying of the weapon is admitted. Has the defendant established a defence ? A question presented itself to my mind as to how this bill of exceptions should be regarded as to that feature stating that it was proved that defendant was a quiet and peaceable citizen, and had good cause to believe, and did believe, that he was in
Viewing this bill as exhibiting the evidence, we hold that the evidence does not show that defendant had good cause to fear death or great bodily harm at the hands of Scott. Kendall says he carried the revolver only when carrying the mail, though Scott lived near him. This shows that he had no real fear of Scott.
The threats made by Scott were conditional and appear insufficient to inspire any serious ground of fear. He threatened, according to defendant’s own evidence, to beat and whip the defendant, and have his blood, if he killed his dog, not absolutely; and, according to---Barnett, he threatened to beat defendant to death if he did not pay over certain money which had been bet. It is not shown that the dog was killed, or whether or not the money was paid over. These are mere idle threats or bravado. Not a single act of violence or attempted violence on Scott’s part appears ; and, though a quarrel is shown, it is not proved that Scott did or said anything special in it, and the character and details of the quarrel are not given. A mere threat standing isolated and alone, while admissible in evidence in defence as an item of evidence, does not establish sufficient ground for the defendant to fear death or harm, especially a conditional or idle threat, wholly unattended by
"Wo do not think any fear, which the defendant may have felt of injury from a dog, constitutes anyjustification for carrying a revolver. The statute specifies several exceptions, but this is not one of them. The careful specification of particular exceptions in the statute shows that other’s were not intended. The statute should not be frittered away by the introduction of such exceptions.
We do not think the defendant’s position as a mail-carrier gave him the right to carry a revolver under the clause giving officers charged with the execution of the laws of the state the right to carry certain weapons. Judgment affirmed.
AlfEIRMEI).