146 Wash. 2d 74 | Wash. | 2002
— Petitioner David Jeffrey Barnes seeks discretionary review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One, which affirmed his conviction for resisting arrest as charged in an additional count in an amended information granted before trial by the King County Superior Court, but not filed with the clerk of the court. Petitioner argues that failure by the State to file the amended information which added the resisting arrest charge divested the King County Superior Court of subject matter jurisdiction over that count. We granted review. We affirm.
QUESTION PRESENTED
The question presented in this case is whether a superior court loses subject matter jurisdiction when the State does not file an amended information adding a second count, even though it was approved by the court and was used by the court as the case proceeded to trial before a jury which convicted Petitioner of the second count charged in the amended information.
On May 3, 2000 Petitioner David Jeffrey Barnes was charged by information in the King County Superior Court with assault in the third degree.
Trial began in the King County Superior Court before the Honorable William L. Downing on July 12, 2000.
Officer Elias radioed for assistance.
Petitioner Barnes testified at trial. He testified that Officer Elias ordered everyone to vacate Pioneer Park where he was standing;
Petitioner testified that police officers alighted from their patrol vehicles and forced him to the ground onto his stomach.
On July 19, 2000 the jury convicted Petitioner on Count II, the resisting arrest count, but was unable to reach a verdict on Count I, the assault in the third degree count
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, Division One, on August 24, 2000. Relying on State v. Corrado,
Petitioner sought review, claiming the decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One, conflicts with the decision of Division Two in Corrado.
DISCUSSION
Commencement of a criminal action by filing an information instead of by grand jury indictment is constitutional.
CrR 2.1 provides that a criminal proceeding is commenced when the State files an initial pleading either by indictment or information.
The initial information filed in the King County Superior Court on May 3, 2000 is not at issue. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the criminal proceeding when the State filed that information charging Petitioner with assault in the third degree.
CrR 2.1(d) authorizes the court to amend any information “at any time before verdict or finding if sub
Petitioner contends the King County Superior Court was divested of subject matter jurisdiction in this case because the State did not file the amended information with the clerk of the court.
In support of his assertion, Petitioner cites State v. Corrado for the proposition that “a superior court acquires subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal action only at such time as an indictment or information is filed.”
The facts in this case are distinguishable from the facts in Corrado. This case involves an amended information, a document used at arraignment and for trial before a jury but apparently lost or misplaced in the filing process. The court in Corrado emphasized that because the original information was dismissed without prejudice, there remained no legally cognizable charge before the court. In
Petitioner contends that challenges to charging documents implicate subject matter jurisdiction
In Franks the appellant argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the State failed to name her in the charging portion of the information. The court held that superior courts do not acquire or lose subject matter jurisdiction based upon procedural events and errors.
the analysis is flawed in its assumption that a superior court must “acquire” subject matter jurisdiction in each particular case, and that the court may “lose” such jurisdiction due to procedural error. As the Supreme Court made clear in Marley v. Department of Labor & Industries [, 125 Wn.2d 533, 886 P.2d 189 (1994)], subject matter jurisdiction is not temporal, and its existence is not dependent upon compliance with procedural rules ....
This court in Marley v. Department of Labor & Industries acknowledged that the term “subject matter jurisdiction” is often misused.
In this case, Petitioner asserts that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the resisting arrest
From the record in this case it is apparent that the trial court had in hand and relied upon an informal copy of the amended information, although the original doubtless had not been filed with the clerk. The amended information complied with CrR 2.1(d) and did not prejudice any substantial right of Petitioner. Prior to trial he and his counsel were served with copies of the amended information, he was arraigned on the amended information, and he pleaded “not guilty” to both Counts I and II.
Jurisdiction becomes an issue only if no offense is charged at all.
This court tangentially considered whether challenges to defective informations implicate subject matter jurisdiction in State v. Kjorsvik, in which the petitioner challenged the constitutional sufficiency of an amended information. The court stated, “case law from this court has not viewed charging document challenges as involving subject matter jurisdictional issues, and we decline to adopt such a view.”
Plain Language of CrR 2.1(d)
Petitioner’s argument assumes that amendment of an information under CrR 2.1(d) requires filing with the clerk before the amended information becomes effective. Such a reading is not justified under the plain language of the rule. Language which is clear upon its face does not
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the superior court’s continuing subject matter jurisdiction over the criminal action did not depend on the procedural act of filing the amended information with the clerk of the court and that failure by the State to do so did not warrant reversal of Petitioner’s conviction for resisting arrest as charged in Count II.
Petitioner relies on State v. Corrado which states that “a superior court acquires subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal action only at such time as an indictment or information is filed.”
An initial pleading invokes the jurisdiction of the court under CrR 2.1. Without dispute, the initial information in this case was properly filed. Because the State amended the initial information in accordance with CrR 2.1(d), the trial court retained jurisdiction over the additional charge in the amended information. The State’s failure to file the
From the record in this case it is apparent the trial court had in hand and relied upon an informal copy of the amended information, although the original doubtless had not been filed with the clerk. The amended information complied with CrR 2.1(d) and did not prejudice any substantial right of Petitioner. Prior to trial he and his counsel were served with copies of the amended information, he was arraigned on the amended information, and he pleaded “not guilty” to both Counts I and II. The case proceeded to trial under the amended information. The jury found Petitioner “guilty” of resisting arrest. The court and both parties proceeded with the trial with the understanding that the informal copy of the amended information correctly reflected the amended information which was to have been filed with the clerk. The trial court instructed the jury on both counts. The jury found Petitioner “guilty” of Count II, resisting arrest, but was unable to reach a verdict on Count I, assault in the third degree. That count was dismissed.
The King County Superior Court acquired jurisdiction when the initial information was filed on May 3, 2000 and retained jurisdiction after the amended information, adding Count II, was approved on June 28, 2000. The court at all times had the authority to adjudicate both charges in the amended information.
We affirm the Court of Appeals, Division One, which concluded that the King County Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case in which Petitioner David Jeffrey Barnes was convicted of resisting arrest, even though the amended information under which the case proceeded and upon which the jury convicted him was apparently not filed with the clerk of the court.
Alexander, C.J., and Johnson, Madsen, Sanders, Ireland, Bridge, Chambers, and Owens, JJ., concur.
Clerk’s Papers at 1-4; RCW 9A.36.031(l)(g).
15 Suppl. Clerk’s Papers, indexed as Clerk’s Papers at 29.
Id. See Mins., King County Superior Ct. Clerk, Verbatim Tr. of Proceedings (June 28, 2000) at 5-6.
Id.
Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 11.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings (July 12, 2000).
Verbatim Report of Proceedings (July 13, 2000) at 4-5.
Id. The information was in fact amended on June 28, 2000.
Id. The court indicated that the resisting arrest charge related to Police Officer Patricia Manning’s arrest of Petitioner and the assault charge related to the
See Clerk’s Papers at 2. See also Verbatim Report of Proceedings (July 13, 2000) at 18-19.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings (July 13, 2000) at 19-20.
Id. at 20-21.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23-24.
Id.
Id. at 24-25.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings (July 17, 2000) at 10-19, 74-88.
id.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 100-01.
Id.
Id. at 101-02.
Id. at 102, 135.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 108.
Clerk’s Papers at 21-23, 28.
State v. Corrado, 78 Wn. App. 612, 898 P.2d 860 (1995).
Clerk’s Papers at 24-27.
State v. Barnes, No. 47298-4-I, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 1428, at *3, 2001WL 747734, at *1 (citing State v. Franks, 105 Wn. App. 950, 954-55, 22 P.3d 269 (2001)), review granted, 145 Wn.2d 1007 (2001).
RAP 13.4(b)(2); see also Pet. for Review at 2. An unpublished opinion, State v. Hodges, No. 47187-2-I, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 1427, 2001WL 746623 (Wash. Ct. App. July 2, 2001), undermines Petitioner’s assertion that a split of authority exists between Divisions One and Two of the Court of Appeals. The court in Hodges follows the reasoning in Barnes and Franks.
Order Granting Review.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884) (states are not required to indict felony defendants by use of a grand jury; the Fourteenth
State v. Dunn, 70 Wn.2d 572, 424 P.2d 897, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 867 (1967); State v. Haner, 95 Wn.2d 858, 631 P.2d 381 (1981).
See RCW 10.37.050, .052.
CrR 2.1(a); see Wash. Const, art. I, § 25. See, e.g., State v. Westphal, 62 Wn.2d 301, 382 P.2d 269, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 947 (1963).
State v. Sponburgh, 84 Wn.2d 203, 206, 525 P.2d 238 (1974) (citing Wash. Const, art. IV, §§ 1, 6; Swan v. Landgren, 6 Wn. App. 713, 495 P.2d 1044 (1972); Daniel v. Daniel, 116 Wash. 82, 198 P. 728 (1921)).
See Clerk’s Papers at 1-4.
Pet. for Review at 1.
CrR 2.1(d).
See id.; State v. Pelkey, 109 Wn.2d 484, 490, 745 P.2d 854 (1987) (stating that amendments to an information are liberally allowed prior to trial); State v. James, 108 Wn.2d 483, 489-90, 739 P.2d 699 (1987) (finding petitioner failed to meet the burden of showing specific prejudice resulting from the amended information because petitioner did not claim surprise or an inability to prepare a defense); State v. Dallas, 126 Wn.2d 324, 327, 892 P.2d 1082 (1995) (“[T]he State may not amend a criminal charging document to charge a different crime after the State has rested its case unless the amended charge is a lesser degree of the same charge or a lesser included offense.”).
State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 101, 812 P.2d 86 (1991).
See Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93; see also State v. Garcia, 65 Wn. App. 681, 686 n.3, 829 P.2d 241, review denied, 120 Wn.2d 1003 (1992). This court adopted the federal liberal construction rule in Kjorsvik, holding that “[cjharging documents which are not challenged until after the verdict will be more liberally construed in favor of validity than those challenged before or during trial.” Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 102. Although this standard of review is generally applied to cases challenging the content of the information, and not to the appropriate method for amending an information, its principles may apply to amended informations. This court adopted the standard out of concern that dissatisfied, convicted defendants could subvert the orderly administration of criminal justice by deferring their attacks against informations or indictments until statutes of limitation had run, witnesses had disappeared, and those charged with prosecutorial duties had lost interest. See Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 105 (citing State v. Majors, 94 Wn.2d 354, 358-59, 616 P.2d 1237 (1980) (quoting Keto v. United States, 189 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1951))).
Br. of Pet’r at 10.
Br. of Resp’t at 7-8.
See id.
Corrado, 78 Wn. App. at 615.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 615-16.
Contra State v. Gallegos, 65 Wn. App. 230, 235, 828 P.2d 37 (1992) (citing Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 108).
See id.; State v. Baker, 48 Wn. App. 222, 226, 738 P.2d 327 (1987); State v. Franks, 105 Wn. App. 950, 22 P.3d 269 (2001).
State v. Barnes, No. 47298-4-1, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 2897, at *2, 2001WL 747734, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 2, 2001) (citing State v. Baker, 48 Wn. App. 222, 738 P.2d 327 (1987); State v. Franks, 105 Wn. App. 950, 22 P.3d 269 (2001)).
State v. Baker, 48 Wn. App. at 226.
Franks, 105 Wn. App. at 957.
Franks, 105 Wn. App. at 954-55 (citing Marley v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 125 Wn.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994)).
Marley v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 125 Wn.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994).
Id.
State v. Werner, 129 Wn.2d 485, 493, 918 P.2d 916 (1996).
See Black’s Law Dictionary 857 (7th ed. 1999).
State v. Werner, 129 Wn.2d at 493 (quoting State ex rel. N.Y. Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Wn.2d 834, 839, 199 P.2d 581 (1948)).
Id. at 493.
“The superior court shall have original jurisdiction ... in all criminal cases amounting to felony....” Wash. Const, art. IV, § 6.
Verbatim Tr. of Proceedings (June 28, 2000) at 5-6.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings (July 13, 2000) at 4-5.
See State v. Sims, 59 Wn. App. 127, 132, 796 P.2d 434 (1990).
See Baker, 48 Wn. App. 222; Franks, 105 Wn. App. 950.
See Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 5, 6.
CrR 2.1(d).
The State apparently did not monitor its responsibility for filing this significant and material document and casually excuses it as a clerical mistake under CrR 7.8(a). The State in its brief suggested a corrective procedure under which the trial court could authenticate a copy of the lost or missing amended information, but apparently has assumed no responsibility for correcting its own loss or misplacement of the document.
State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 108, 812 P.2d 86 (1991).
State v. McIntyre, 92 Wn.2d 620, 622, 600 P.2d 1009 (1979).
State v. Corrado, 78 Wn. App. 612, 615, 898 P.2d 860 (1995).
