Lead Opinion
{¶ 2} Defendant was indicted on one count of rape for engaging in sexual conduct with a 12-year-old female when he was 19. The trial court found that Defendant was indigent and appointed him counsel. On June 12, 2006, Defendant pled guilty to the amended charge of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, a violation of R.C.
"The trial court erred as a matter of law by declaring that Ohio Revised Code §2950.01 mandated the classification of [Defendant] as a habitual sexual offender due to a prior juvenile conviction."
{¶ 3} Defendant contends that the trial court erred in classifying him as a habitual sex offender by improperly applying the relevant statute. We determine that Defendant has not provided this court with a record that is sufficient to allow us to review this issue, and affirm the decision of the trial court.
{¶ 4} The trial judge ordered that a presentence investigation report be prepared prior to Defendant's sentencing. The transcript of the sentencing hearing demonstrates that the judge did read and rely upon the presentence investigation report in reaching his conclusions, and that the report included the Defendant's juvenile record. However, Defendant has not provided this court with a copy of the presentence investigation report.
{¶ 5} Pursuant to App.R. 9(B) and Loc.R. 5(A), it is the duty of the appellant to ensure that the record necessary to determine the appeal is filed with *3
the appellate court. State v. Williams (1995),
{¶ 6} We must presume that the juvenile record before the trial court in the presentence investigation report supports the court's finding that Defendant should be labeled a habitual sex offender. The court clearly indicated that the juvenile adjudication was for rape, which is a sexually oriented offense. We must then presume that the adjudication was accompanied by Defendant's classification as a juvenile offender, which is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of R.C.
"The trial court acted contrary to law by ordering Defendant to pay the costs of court appointed counsel without determining whether or not Defendant could be reasonably expected to have the necessary financial means."
{¶ 7} Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay his court-appointed counsel costs as part of his sentence. He argues that the court *4 did not make findings on the record that Defendant was financially capable of repaying those costs.
{¶ 8} A trial court may, as a condition of probation, order a criminal defendant to repay the costs of his appointed counsel. State v.Trembly (Mar. 27, 2000),
{¶ 9} Defendant's first assignment of error is unsupported by the record he has supplied, and the decision of the trial court is therefore affirmed. Defendant's second assignment of error is forfeited, and the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
*6Costs taxed to Appellant.
WHITMORE, J., CONCURS
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 10} I concur with the majority's resolution of the first assignment of error, but must disagree with the resolution of the second assignment of error. A defendant is not required to object to his sentence in order to preserve any errors with the sentence for appeal. State v. Reid, 8th Dist. No. 83206,
