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State v. Barmon
679 P.2d 888
Or. Ct. App.
1984
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*1 January 12; Argued and submitted resubmitted In Banc June reversed and 4,May petition remanded for new trial March reconsideration denied for review 22,1984 (297 May 227) denied Or OREGON,

STATE OF Respondent, BARMON, HARRY MITCHELL Appellant. (20-791; A23867) CA

679 P2d 888 *2 Portland, the cause for Sepenuk, argued Norman Collins, on the was James L. appellant. With him brief Portland. General, Salem, Attorney Denney,

Thomas H. Assistant him on the brief were respondent. the cause for With argued General, Gary, F. Frohnmayer, Attorney and William Dave General, Salem. Solicitor

NEWMAN, J. Hoomissen, J., part, dissenting specially concurring Van part. NEWMAN, J. in the rape appeals

Defendant his convictions burglary degreе sexual abuse in the second degree, first (1) trial court assigns He as errors that degree. the first questions in the absence provided jury written answers (2) notice to them and defendant and his counsel and without made to Detective ruled that statements were County Sheriffs Office Washington Schultze of erred we hold that the trial court admissible at trial. Because Schultze, made to we in not statements defendant suppressing remand for a new trial and do not consider reverse and court’s answers assignment regarding of error to jury questions. allegedly

Defendant entered the home of victim April mid-morning reported arоund 1 a.m. on 1981. she had her police. the incident to the She said defendant told defendant, previously his name. Schultze knew whom he had hired to remodel his house. Schultze told defendant’s wife that defendant in a prime suspect burglary-rape-sodomy that, did not contact investigation Schultze p.m., for defendant’s arrest. would seek warrant *3 p.m., attorney telephoned About 4 Schultze and lawyer, advised him that he was defendant’s by that he had police p.m., would come to station 5:15 advised defendant not to talk to the and that defendant would not make a statement. p.m.,

About 5:20 defendant came to the statiоn inter- without his counsel. Schultze took defendant into the defendant, this, view room. He first asked “Other than how began Defendant broke down and to things going?” have been asked, I’m cry. right being He then “Do I have a to know what “Yes, rape, sodomy and charged responded, with?” Schultze exclaimed, any- Defendant then “I didn’t steal burglary.” defendant of his Miranda thing!” Schultze then advised rights just a card. Either rights. signed Defendant waiver the Miranda warnings, but gave before or after Schultze exclamation, anything,” “I didn’t steal following defendant’s can, you got if I but I’ve “Harry, help Schultze said: I’d like to made I do.” Defendant then your story to side of the before gеt incriminating extensive statements to Schultze. to determine pretrial “Miranda” ruled that defendant’s statements to

admissibility, the court at trial. It found that defendant Schultze were admissible competent that he and rights, knew and understood his was knowingly of the circumstances and that he adequately aware testimony as to voluntarily rights.1 and waived his Schultze’s part him became a significant defendant’s statements to that his statements to state’s case.2 Defendant asserts pretrial hearing provide: findings Miranda The trial court’s and order from April by “1. made defendant to Louis Schultze on That the verbal statements promise freely voluntarily, or were made and without consideration lenience, coercion; and without threat or prior being rights, “2. advised of his the defendant volunteered That to statement, anything’; ‘I didn’t steal police, prior any interrogation defendant was advised of “3. That to following rights: silent; to remain “a. against anything could used the defendant “b. That the defendant said be Court; prior during questioning; counsel to and

“c. to indigent; right Court-appointed counsel the defendant is “d. The competent rights, and understood these and was “4. That defendant knew circumstances, voluntarily knowingly adequately waived and and aware of * * * these statement, testimony opening prosecutor that Schultze In his described the give: would — you simply, you will “Put he will describe to Detective Schultze describe said, and, very significant, again, but in detail what Mr. Barmon that will be — drug. basically lonely; His brain it he took some he took he lights; eyes following bright exploded. him or There are no statements about two July got lonely He He and went to this house. saw no Fourth of effects. put through sliding-glass door. He his shoulder to her bedroom woman. He went gloves. put just her her. No He didn’t his hands around door. He wanted to talk to throat; suggest you put hear what I are them on her shoulders. You will — versiоn, well, extremely mitigating mitigating factors from Mr. Barmon’s said, effect, you that this woman submitted or wanted will hear that he over, things, kissing him him. She wanted to kiss her all do these and she started effect, participated, instigated these acts.

and she Barmon, testimony and the statement that Mr. “That will be the signifi- Defendant, Again, gave next afternoon. that will be to Lou Schultze the — may may *4 cant, have been said in of what have not and I think terms you and, credibility. going certainly, Who are to in terms of the issue of later particular these facts? in situation and under believe this * case in chief* *.” “So that’s the State’s in case in chief to the statеments Schultze testified the state’s in the state’s rebuttal case. defendant’s statements to him. He also testified ‍​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‍to made remain violation of his to were obtained in Schultze States Amendment to the United under the Fifth silent *3 under the Fifth right, raises his He also Constitution.* inter counsel at custodial Amendment, to the assistance of Arizona, 477, 101 Ct S on Edwards v. rogation, relying (1981).4 1880, 2d 68 L Ed jury, emphasized prosecutor, closing argument the differences in his

The testimony at trial: to Schultze and defendant’s between defendant’s statements * * “Now, any charge burglary *. about that? fourth is Is there doubt “* * * words, entered, knowingly. [Wjhen it In other he was aware he did crime, doing intent to commit a either the he was and he did it with the what then, crime, sodomy, rape assault and I submit crime of or the crime of a sexual — putting gets in in the defense aside for what that us to the State’s case chief — you upon from the victim and from is based the facts that heard both moment — 1, through his interview with the Defendant No. Detective Schultze credibility there, being but to Detective issue exists because the Defendant admits — — important things finding there’s he admits an unlocked Schultze and some hall, putting sliding glass opening going He down the his door and it. admits * * a locked bedroom door shoulder to pleading guilty, given written notice to thе state In addition to not defendant had rely responsibility excluding under ORS of intent to on mental disease or defect 161.309(1), responsibility diminishing under ORS 161.300 161.295 and ORS and also case, 161.309(2). psychiatrist, part that in Defendant’s as of defendant’s testified ingesting opinion suffering her defendant was from a mental disease or defect from statements, light testimony prosecutor, on LSD. In cross-examination, of Schultze’s as to defendant’s diagnosis “if the asked her what effect it would have on her you recounting happened being truthful with in what defendant was not being evening?” psychiatrist replied thought truthful and The that she defendant any diagnosis. change her lаter answered that in event it would not were obtained Defendant does not assert that his statements to Schultze Constitution, I, 12, Oregon and so we under violation of his Article section question. do not consider the state constitutional extensively. pretrial court, argues Edwards At In his brief 1981, decided, September, court argu held after Edwards was the trial Miranda specifically Following the close of the evidence and the considered Edwards. counsel, the stated: ments of court — see, been, I have been I have as counsel can “The trouble I have here — attorney looking an tells the officer thаt at some case law and that when statement, bring vs. State going it within Edwards to make a does client is not accused, that, U.S.Supreme Spring ‘When an Court this last said of Arizona. police only through Edwards, expressed having his desire to deal with the such as counsel, interrogation by subject until counsel has further the authorities is not him, further commu- the accused himself initiates been made available to unless nication, police.’ exchanges is does So one issue we have or conversation with attorney equate the officer is told also with the fact situation where that that, ‘My so, you you going speak period. And if he tries to do client is me.’, words to that effect.” should call or some (1984), Stumes, _US_, L Ct 79 Ed 2d 579 In Salem v. 104 S Edwards, May apply Supreme decided Court declined to the United States *5 Arizona, v. to Edwards court, referring The trial supra, at the that “the accused pretrial commented initiate, actually exchange with begin himself has to has to that “defendant himself did the the officer.” It concluded however, preceded the initiating.” ruling, The trial court’s Oregon v. analysis in Supreme Court’s United States Bradshaw, 2830, (1983), 1039, 103 77 L Ed 2d 405 462 US S Ct facts to applied standard to be to the constitutional Moreover, we dialogue. although determine who initiated thе facts, historical we by findings are bound the trial court’s by its constitutional conclusions. Ball v. Glad are not bound Warner, den, State v. see also 485, (1968); 250 Or 443 P2d 621 Bishop, State v. (1978); App 147, 681 49 Or 284 Or 585 P2d (1981). rev den 1023, (1980), 290 Or 727 Who 621 P2d 1196 light of the Fifth Amendment exchange “initiates” the of constitutional fact but a conclusion not historical Bradshaw, see also 1045; Oregon supra, at 462 US import. Arizona, below, supra. Edwards v. we conclude explained As Schultze, defendant, “initi from the historical facts dialogue. ated” the He

First, custody.” that defendant was “in it is clear and under at Schultze’s demand police went to the station his name. had told the victim threat of arrest. Defendant аnd had was the man he wanted Schultze knew defendant had defendant’s that afternoon. He told looked for defendant by get 4 or he would p.m., defendant contact him wife to have demand, defen response his arrest. to that warrant attorney called to tell him dant’s Schultze by p.m., 5:15 and would come to the station Schultze, “Do I have a the station. When he asked went to with?”, being charged what I am Schultze to know There is not the “Yes, rape, sodomy burglary.” replied, defendant and doubt that Schultze intended arrest slightest suppression hearing free to leave. At the that he was not court asked: corpus retrоactively in the federal court to a final state review on habeas a collateral opinion eight years before Edwards. Its states “[f]or court conviction rendered Edwards.”_US case, purposes at--We all we need decide about of this that is retroactively applies appeal review that Edwards in a direct have held on direct Taylor, State v. Edwards was decided. 56 Or rulings in the case that were made before Oregon 708, (1982). apply Edwards 703, App P2d We are free here to

Bradshaw, 2830, (1983), interpreted 1039, 103 it. 77 L Ed 2d 405 which S Ct Barmon, in, meaning Mr. I assumed “When he had come — voluntarily; going go to be leave that was not allowedto is that correct?” replied, “That’s correct.” From the moment defen-

Schultze custody. dant met at the he was in See Schultze station Roberti, 59, 1104, 236, 646 P2d State v. 293 Or 644 P2d 293 Or Paz, (1977), 31 Or 572 P2d 1036 rev den 282 Or 189 counsel,

Next, we conclude that defendant’s meeting telephone p.m., anticipation call at Schultze, remain silent and with invoked defendant’s interrogation. to have the assistance of counsel at custodial (1983).5 See State v. 296 Or 672 P2d 1182 Sparklin, *6 Finally, defendant cannot be found to have waived his Fifth Amendment here unless he initated the Bradshaw, dialogue Oregon with the authorities. supra; Arizona, Edwards, supra. Edwards v. the court stated: “* * * now hold that when an accusedhas his invoked [W]e present during to have counsel a interrogation, custodial by valid showing waiver that cannot be established of only responded police-initiated that he to custodial further interrogation rights. even he has advised been his We of accused, Edwards, further hold that an expressed counsel, having such as police only his through desire to deal with the subject interrogation by is not to further him, authorities until counsel has been made available to communication, unless the accused initiates himself further exchanges police.” or with conversations 451 US at omitted.) (Emphasis supplied; 484-85. foоtnote Bradshaw, In Oregon supra, meaning the court discussed the phrase communication, “initiates further exchanges or police.” police questioned conversations with the There the police the defendant at death a station about passenger pickup in his truck in a one-vehicle accident. The police Miranda to the defendant. The defen- gave warnings dant denied involvement in the traffic accident but admitted Sparklin, supra, In 296 Or at the court stated: of, Sparklin request anticipation during, interroga- “Had made a similar protections have been entitled to thе minimum afforded the fifth

tion would amendment, attorney interrogations until the cessation of all an was made (Footnote omitted.) available to him.” minor, victim, liquor. a with He was arrested providing the traffic questioned offense. An officer him about again con- requested attorney. and the defendant an accident in a police placed versation terminated. Later the county him station to the patrol car to take from initiative, a 10 to 15 miles. On his own jail, distance about police by with the opened the defendant the conversation “Well, to me now?” The asking, going happen what is tаlk reminded the defendant that he did not have to officer attorney. The defendant said requested because he had understood, and a discussion ensued that led to that he incriminating and to the polygraph to take a test agreement statements. the defendant’s

In Bradshaw the court ruled that evinced “Well, happen to me now?” question, going what discussion about willingness generalized “a and desire for stated: plurality A of the court investigation.” inquiries, request such as a for a drink of “There are some request telephone to use a that are so routine water or a fairly represent pаrt they be said to a desire on the cannot relating open up generalized discussion an accused to a more indirectly investigation. inquiries or directly or to the Such officer, statements, by relating to either an accused or a relationship, gener- will incidents of the custodial routine ally in which that word ‘initiate’ a conversation the sense in Edwards. was used ambiguous, respondent’s question

“Although happen him evinced a going as to what was case generalized willingness discussion ‍​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‍about the and a desire for merely necessary inquiry arising investigation; it was not *7 relationship.” 462 US at of the incidents of the custodial out (Emphasis supplied.) 1045-46. therefore, or here, is whether defendant Schultze

The issue a and desire by conveying “willingness the exchange initiated investigation.” about the generalized for a discussion exchange the conclude that Schultze initiated We can, I I’ve said, “Harry, help you got I’d like to if but when he story I do.” That statement side of the before get your to about generalized a discussion “desire for evinced Schultze’s also constituted “words The statement investigation.” the normally than those part police, the other actions on custody, police the should know arrest and attеndant on incriminating response reasonably likely from to solicit an are Fitzgerald, suspect.” P2d 60 Or the (1982); 301-02, 100 Innis, S Island v. Rhode Rodriguez, see also State 1682, 64 L Ed 2d 297 Ct App 355, P2d 487 Or contrary in

Moreover, to the circumstances sequence setting, events and the conver- Bradshaw, police. were orchestrated sation with defendant sought to demanded that he come out defendant and Schultze police station, at the defendant arrived station. When began the room and took him into the interview Schultze things by saying, this, than how have conversation “Other question, Despite apparently opening going?” his neutral been reasonably intention can conclude that Schultze’s we bringing to initiate a the interview room was defendant into investigation. dialogue with him about the criminal question Schultze, “Do I Furthermore, defendant’s to being charged right is not a a know what I’m with?” have generalized question evinced “a for a discussion desire question investigation.” the defendant’s about the Unlike inquiry Bradshaw, here related more to “rou- relationship. wanted tine” incident of the custodial Defendant succeeding charges against Moreover, him. his to know the anything,” response exclamation, “I didn’t steal charges, evince a recitation of the also did not Schultze’s desire to investiga- open generalized discussion about limiting apparently nature of tion. Schultze realized help you response, “Harry, stated, I’dlike to he then because story got get your I do.” can, I before but I’ve side exchange statement, into a turned the With this Schultze investigation generalized and “initi- criminal discussion of the meaning exchange Bradshaw. within the ated” the requires Bradshaw, the court stated that Edwards analysis two-step Amendment. As the Court under the Fifth Bradshaw, an accused has invoked ruled in after interrogation custodial not conduct counsel the communication, unless, first, initiates the аccused exchanges second, and, or conversation with the subsequent initiation the accused to the state shows that intelligently knowingly Amendment the Fifth waived interrogation. present during do We to have counsel *8 378 waiver, however, we conclude reach the issue of because dialogue initiate with the

that the defendant did not the police.6 Accordingly, which defendant’s statements followed “Harry, help you statement, can, like if I I’d but Schultze’s your story get got do,” I’ve I should have side of the before suppressed. been beyond a

The trial error was not harmless court’s Chapman 18, 27, California, doubt. v. 87 S reasonable (1967). 824,17 Ct L Ed 2d 705 trial.

Reversed and remanded a new specially concurring HOOMISSEN, J., VAN part; dissenting part. majority is

I concur with the entitled reject trial, I to a but the stated. the new not for reason analysis suppression agree majority’s and would the issue court are with the trial that defendant’s statements admissi- required, judge however, ble.1 trial is the trial A new because by communicating jury committed reversible error with defendant’s absence. suppression issue, as framed defendant in this way litigated trial; i.e., issue at

court, reflects was knowing, were made after whether defendant’s statements voluntary rights.2 intelligent waiver of his Mirаnda argue he had did not in the trial court that asserted Defendant 6 Sparklin, supra, State stated: court retained, attorney interrogation appointed is can be no of a “Once an there concerning surrounding charged crime unless the defendant the events attorney representing charge on that is notified and afforded a the defendant right opportunity No waiver occur until reasonable to attend. of that attorney.” 296 has consulted with his Or at 93. <<:}: sfc if: sft if: represented by attorney against an for the crimes “Because defendant was Mansell, interrogation subject improper and no waiver on this was Steve case, However, regard given effect. with the unrelated Davidson can be * * *” 296 Or at 98. defendant’s waiver valid. statement, anything,” was found “I didn’t steal 1 Thetrial court that defendant’s majority agree I does also. I with that conclusion and understand that admissible. Booth, Austin, States United

See State v. P2d Or 1231, 1237 (9th 1981) rev den Cir F2d Rather, prosecutor suppress. made did not file a written motion to 2 Defendant admissibility pretrial hearing to Miranda determine oral motion for defendant’s statements. questioning.3 attorney present during have an police had not here, There, only argued as remain silent. his desire to scrupulously hоnored Detective Schultz’s found that The trial court going?” this, things how have been inquiry, “Other than *9 see State equivalent,4 functional interrogation neither nor its (1982), and P2d 1289 Fitzgerald, v. 60 Or I’m to know what right “Do I have question, that defendant’s exclamation, “I didn’t steal his with?” and being charged charged being that he was being after informed anything!” ‍​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‍The were “volunteered.” sodomy burglary, and rape, with threats, duress or were no court found that “there also ade- was made coercion,” rights “the advisement of that was not that defendant’s free will quately properly” and and “overcome.” application specifically rejected

The court Arizona, stating: Edwards v. inopposite Arizona is “I case that Edwards v. find this [sic] And, initiating. there-

in that the defendant himself did fore, made, properly and he was the statements since adquately stances, rights and understood his circum- advised of his at his trial.”

the statements will be admissible concluded: The court and, two,

“So, one, rights; his I find Mr. Barmon understood up rights effectively gave those when waived those and * * *” responses he made to Detective Schultz. trial court. I with the conclusion of the agree his that defendant asserted majority The assumes interrogation attorney present during an right to have 1886, Arizona, 477, 68 L 451 US 101 S Ct applies Edwаrds v. Bradshaw, 1039, 103 462 US S (1981), Oregon v. Ed 2d 378 (1983), analysis. majority 2830, 2d 405 its Ct 77 L Ed silent and to remain right between the blurs distinction to an is material attorney present, an which to have this distinction Edwards noted analysis of waiver. 1602, L 436, Arizona, 86 S Ct 384 US made in Miranda I, Amendment, under Article claim under the Sixth 3 Defendant makes no 11, Oregon section Constitution. custody purposes. Miranda that defendant was 4 The state assumes Mosley, Michigan 96, 96 Ed 2d 694 see also S Ct 46 L Ed 2d 313 rights, accused, an after asserts his

When advice silent, make to remain he indicates that he chooses to his requests However, consultation with own decisions. when he attorney attorney present, an or to have an he indicates deciding make a stаtement need for assistance in whether to questions. The interdiction of Edwards is based on or answer precise distinction. The Edwards court said: Edwards, accused, having such “We further hold that an as only expressed police through his desire to deal with counsel, subject interrogation the authorities until has been made available.” 451 US 485. counsel procedures the must follow Edwards discussed further requests presence attorney. of an Those when accused poses procedures here. are irrelevant the issue attorney them Defendant’s called the and told appear but would not makе a statement. would attorney’s attorney requested the Neither the nor defendant *10 presence any subsequent questioning. The issue then is at having silent, whether, asserted his to remain right.5 later that waived initially police that he an accused tells the

Even when silent, later determine wishes to remain right previously asserted. Edwards v. wishes to waive the Mosley,supra, supra, Michigan Arizona, 484; 423 451 US at v. App Jackson, 681, 685, P2d 592 102-04; State v. 60 Or 655 US (1983). (1982) Nothing in Edwards rev den 294 Or 792 prevents police, advising a defendant of his Miranda after rights, asking and is from then him if he waives willing to talk. suspect question

The whether a has waived his usually uniquely and one of fact. It must to remain silent is presence attorney urges adopt per requiring of an 5Defendant that we se rule any alleged previously right if the are aware at the time waiver of a asserted of attorney. Supreme specifically person represented by Court has that a is The 383, 398-99, (1981); Quinn, rejected approach. P2d 630 State State v. 290 Or (1979), (1980); Haynes, 59, 70, den 446 US 945 State 288 Or 602 P2d 272 cert Jackson, App Singleton, 89, 100, State v. 60 Or 288 Or 602 P2d 1059 (1982), (1983). P2d rev den 294 Or 792 has had court that of the trial judgment left to the should be weight assessing the evidence and of the benefit Broadsword, 65 Or testimony. See credibility and of the circum- totality The of P2d 366 on conclusion the trial court’s here convinces me that stances it. correct, uphold I and would question was suppression trial, entitled to a new Nonetheless, defendant imper- judge’s the trial correctly as error assigns because he jury The commenced jury. with the missible communications and his evening hours. Defendant early in the its deliberations informing judge nearby restaurant after counsel went to a return to they would be able to and that of their destination occasions separate On three the courtroom on short notice. deliberations, jury sent written of their during the course gave the judge each occasion judge.6 to the On questions given answers asked and the questions answer. written were: - “(1) rape guilty guilty If can he be found he is found of - III degree sodomy? II & or does the lesser On Count only ‍​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‍apply degree if lesser I?

“Answer: Yes

“(2) degree of sexual abuse on Count Can we find lesser only (Sodomy). explain. II III Please finding any more of may make a on one or “Answer: You in other words regarding the counts a lesser offense each of independent the other. each count is “(3) guilty him Counts If we find on #2 #3 degree? degree, we have to vote on the lesser first do

“Answer: No.” present when defendant nor his counsel

Neither attempt given. answers No were asked and the questions counsel became them. Defendant’s aware was made to contact 17.325, 59D, formerly provides: ORS 6ORCP *11 any deliberation, jury requests on if the information “After retirement law, having charge point judge require in conduct them to the the officer of court, being brought Upon jury the information into court. them into of, presence orally writing given, given in or requested, or in shall be either to, parties or their counsel.” after notice Heintz, See, e.g., proceedings. applied provision has been criminal This (1978). 155, 580 App Or P2d possibility only returning jury communications after employe from the restaurant. His associate observed a court alоud, give partially a note to the who read it and then judge, said, “No,” a it something piece paper wrote on and handed to the The associate to the employe. brought this attention counsel, a suspected might who that it have been confirmed, however, jury communication. That fact was not until after the verdict was returned. At the on defen- trial, judge acknowledged dant’s motion for a new his concluded, however, prejudicial. error.'He that it was not that, if argues brought The state defense counsel had suspicions judge’s his to the attention before the verdict was received, the hаve judge opportunity would had correct error, significantly, by or at least to attenuate it receiving jury questioned the verdict until had been appropriately. argues cautioned It further error, a precluded raising from because the denial of an appealable ruling motion for new trial is not when the motion is had party knowledge based on matters of which See, Truxall, 214, 216-17, trial. during e.g., State Or reject 467 P2d 643 I that The constitutional argument. defendant’s, and there is statutory rights issue here are judge’s no evidence that he or his counsel were aware of the best, error before the verdict was returned. At the record suspected might support finding that defendant’s counsel suspicion some of that did not irregularity. Confirmation occur, however, until after the verdict was returned. There- fore, those rights. there was no waiver of argues preju-

The state next that defendant was not diced the error. I likewise The state reject argument. ques- concedes in its brief that an examination of the jury’s and the had some judge’s jury tions answers shows difficulty applying the instructions. The understanding simple “yes” response state also that the judge’s concedes question “probably first unclear.” As to the jury’s jury’s question, posits: third the state аmbiguity, jury’s question, on a

“Because of its third point questions, different from that addressed the first two two; potential may seem have more for error than the first any but it is evident that error would have been to defendant’s benefit, potential did not materialize. and that error convict asks, required question Either the third ‘Are we *12 acquit him abuse if of the lesser offense sexual we defendant — answered, sodomy?’ correctly case the court which — asks, question vote on the even have to or the ‘Do we ‘no’ acquit if we defendant offense of sexual abuse lesser — sodomy?’ negative results case the court’s аnswer which case, charge. In there is acquittal on that either defendant; fact, the prejudice to but in it clear that no seems question, they ulti- jury asking inasmuch as was the former acquitted sodomy found mately of one count of guity of offense of sexual abuse on the other.” him the lesser asking or jury on what the was speculate I would decline to on might have had the influence the answers judge’s what jury’s deliberations. asking for the argues

The state also is a per requiring judge of a se rule reversal whenever adoption provides requests answers to a written jury’s written of its instructions in the absence of defendant clarification White, 55 a rule in v. Or rejected per and counsel. We se State (1982), attempted 729, P2d 1291 the trial App judge where counsel, unsuccessfully to contact defense whose whereabouts Thereafter, sent the a written judge jury were unknown. had given objection. instruction he earlier without We said: question comply

“The is whether the trial court’s failure prejudicial grounds ORCP 59D error and therefore with was procedure that it The followed for a mistrial. We hold was not. by made judge the trial because of the record was reviewable appeal. judge The oral communication with on triаl had no by question, He him jury. received a written delivered to by question delivering The the bailiff. answered verdict, Following trial jury the written instruction. explained procedure had followed. judge on the record the part question are of the record. The instruction error Although it have been technical to reinstruct absence, prejudicial it error that jury in counsels’ was not omitted.) (Citations requires Or 732. a mistrial.” 55 at also distinguishable here are from White. See State The facts (1967). Beeson, 411, 248 Or 434 P2d 460 that, made Finally, argues judge state because the new motion for a trial it clear at the on defendant’s unnecessary. recur, is See likely is reversal that his error (1983). 505, Gortmaker, Or P2d 354 Gortmaker State v. distinguishable. question there was whether defen- by properly jury dant’s conviction constituted trial should improperly have grand been reversed because of an selected jury. regularity Gortmaker, Unlike in here the of the trial is in question. present,

Defendant did not waive his to be nor participate did he waive his to have his counsel in the jury’s questions decision of how the all, answered, should be if at judge. say I cannot that the error was harmless beyond Chapman a reasonable doubt. California, 18, 27, 824, 87 S 705, Ct 17 L Ed 2d reh den 386 US 987 Stilling, 285 Or 590 P2d 1223 It is because *13 given of this error defendant must be trial, a new not the alleged majority error the embraces. Judges, join

Richardson, Rossman, Warren and specially ‍​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‍concurring dissenting opinion.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Barmon
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Oregon
Date Published: Mar 14, 1984
Citation: 679 P.2d 888
Docket Number: 20-791; CA A23867
Court Abbreviation: Or. Ct. App.
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