No. COA99-798 | N.C. Ct. App. | Jun 6, 2000
Lead Opinion
The State contends that the trial court erred in granting respondents’ motion to dismiss because respondents did not have standing to challenge the statute on grounds that it is unconstitutionally vague. We agree, and reverse the ruling of the trial court.
“It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.” United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1975-01-21" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-mazurie-109134?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="109134">419 U.S. 544, 550, 42 L. Ed. 2d 706, 713 (1975). “Objections to vagueness under the Due Process Clause rest on the lack of notice, and hence may be overcome in any specific case where reasonable persons would know that their conduct is at risk.” Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1988-06-06" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/maynard-v-cartwright-112084?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="112084">486 U.S. 356, 361, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372, 380 (1988). A statute is not vague as applied where it gives “clear notice that a reasonably ascertainable standard of conduct is mandated” and it “intelligibly forbids a definite course of conduct[.]” United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1975-12-09" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-powell-109335?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="109335">423 U.S. 87, 92-93, 46 L. Ed. 2d 228, 234 (1975). See also Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1975-01-21" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-mazurie-109134?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="109134">419 U.S. at 553, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 714 (statute is not impermissibly vague where it is sufficiently precise for a man of average intelligence to “ ‘reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed.’ ” Id. (citation omitted)).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-140.4(a) provides, in pertinent part, that
(a) No person shall operate a motorcycle or moped upon a highway or public vehicular area:
* * * *
(2) Unless the operator and all passengers thereon wear safety helmets of a type approved by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
“A litigant who challenges a statute as unconstitutional must have standing. To have standing, he must be adversely affected by the statute.” In Re Jackson, 60 N.C. App. 581" court="N.C. Ct. App." date_filed="1983-02-01" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/matter-of-jackson-1333048?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="1333048">60 N.C. App. 581, 584, 299 S.E.2d 677, 679 (1983). “One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.” Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1974-06-19" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/parker-v-levy-109077?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="109077">417 U.S. 733, 756, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439, 458 (1974). A statute which by its terms, or as authoritatively construed, applies without question to certain activities, but whose application to other behavior is uncertain, is not vague as applied to “hard-core” violators of the statute. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1974-03-25" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/smith-v-goguen-108988?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="108988">415 U.S. 566, 577-78, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1974-03-25" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/smith-v-goguen-108988?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="108988">39 L. Ed. 2d 605, 614 (1974). In this case, a motorist would be adversely affected by the statute if he wore some type of safety helmet while operating a motorcycle and was nevertheless cited for violating the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20440.4(a)(2) for wearing a helmet not of a type approved by DMV. Because respondents were not wearing safety helmets of any kind when they were cited, they do not fall in the class of persons adversely affected by the statute and therefore lack standing to challenge the statute on constitutional grounds.
Other jurisdictions have confronted this issue and ruled in similar fashion. See, for example, City of Kennewick v. Henricks, 84 Wash. App. 323, 326, 927 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1996) (where statute required motorcycle riders to wear “protective helmets” and petitioners were wearing no helmets at the time of the citations, petitioners violated the “hard-core” provisions of the statute and lacked standing to claim vagueness as to the rules relating to acceptable types of helmets), disc. review denied, 131 Wash. 2d 1022, 937 P.2d 1102 (Wash. 1997).
Reversed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I join in the majority opinion. However, I write separately to point out that we determine today only that these defendants do not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-140.4 because they chose to wear no helmets at all. It follows that standing may be obtained by an individual who is charged with wearing a type of helmet that does not comply with the statute. Thus, the more challenging issue remains — is N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-140.4 unconstitutionally vague because neither the Legislature nor the Commissioner for the Division of Motor Vehicles has clearly set forth what constitutes a helmet that meets the requirements of the statute?
North Carolina’s motorcycle helmet statute requires the wearing of a safety helmet “of a type approved by the Commissioner” for the Division of Motor Vehicles. Although the State argues that the Commissioner has adopted the federal guidelines on helmet safety standards, questions remain as to whether the Commissioner formally adopted the standards; whether the Commissioner informally adopted the standards; and whether the public has received consistent information about the federal standards. An issue also remains as to whether the federal guidelines are sufficiently clear to avoid a challenge on the grounds of vagueness. Thus, in light of what appears to be inevitable further litigation on this issue, it may be prudent for either the Legislature or the Commissioner to examine whether the present application of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-140.4 clearly sets forth the types of helmets approved for riding a motorcycle in North Carolina.