150 N.C. 792
N.C.
1909
Walker, J.,

-after stating the case: The general rule has been settled by authority that “The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the Legislature, to the end that the same may be enforced. This meaning and intention must be sought, first of all, in the language of the statute itself, for it must be presumed that the means employed by the Legislature to express its will are adequate to the purpose and do express that will correctly.” Black’s Int. of Laws, p. 35. “It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation and, when the words have a definite and precise meaning, to go elsewhere .in search of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the meaning” (page 37). The decision of this case turns upon the ineaning of the word “mainland,” which is used in the statute to express the intention of the Legislature. That word has a single and definite meaning, which is “the principal land — opposed to island.” Webster’s Int. Diet. We must give it that sense, as, under the rule we have stated, the Legislature is presumed to have intended that to be its true meaning. Besides, the use of the word clearly implies that there is other land in Currituck Sound which is not within the description of “mainland,” and that land must be such as is separated or insulated by water from the mainland. This is insular land, or islands. This brings us to the consideration of the other question raised,' whether what is called “Duce Quarter Island” is in fact and in law an island or a part of the mainland. At one time, many years ago, it was a part of the mainland, but when the statute in question was enacted, and at the time of the commission of the offense alleged in the indictment, it had been severed from the mainland in the manner described by the witnesses. The owner of the land had dug marsh turf to put under his watermelons, and at the place from which the turf was taken a creek or slough, of the size stated in the evidence, was formed by the action of the wind tide, there being no ocean tide, or ebb and flow of the water, in the sound. The body of land which was cut off by the stream thus formed was about three miles in length and six or seven hundred feet *797 in width. The stream, which was gradually formed by the washing of the tide, and widened and deepened from time to time, ranges in width from forty-eight to sixty feet and is navigable by small boats. The tide passes through it. It seems to us that the land cut off by this stream is an island, within the meaning of that word, which is defined by the authorities to be “a body of land surrounded by water.” 23 Oyc., 357; 17 Am. and Eng. Enc. (2d Ed.), 530, and notes; Webber v. Boom, Co., 62 Mich., 626; Stover v. Jack, 60 Pa. St., 339. We have attached no importance to the fact that it was called “Duce Quarter Island,” but have based our decision solely upon the other facts showing-its physical characteristics.

The ease of Robinson v. Lamb, 131 N. C., 229, which is cited by the defendant in his brief, does not support his contention, that “Duce Quarter” is a part of the mainland. That case merely decided that “Goat Island” is a part of the territory of Camden County, because it lies northeast of Pasquotank River and is within the general boundaries described in the statute creating Camden County. It is recognized as an island by the Court, though a part of. Camden County, for the reason that the water or slough which divides it from the mainland is no part of Pas-quotank River. The' island .may be within the boundaries of Camden County and yet not be mainland. So in this case “Duce Quarter” is an island, though the land composing it may still belong* to the person who owned it before it was cut off by the new stream.

We conclude that the court correctly instructed the jury as to the legal effect of their findings of fact.

No Error.