1 Conn. Cir. Ct. 584 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1962
The defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while his right to operate was suspended, in violation of General Statutes § 14-215. The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts, and in its memorandum of decision the court set out the reasons for its finding of guilty. This memorandum was not in accordance with Circuit Court Rule 7.30.2. While we do not sanction this irregularity, we shall, in fairness to the defendant, accept the procedure followed by the parties and adopted by the court and consider the assignments of error as presented. Mayron’s Bake Shops, Inc. v. Arrow Stores, Inc., 149 Conn. 149, 152.
The stipulated facts, with such fair and logical inferences as the court could reasonably draw therefrom, show the following: The defendant at no time had been a licensed automobile operator in the state of Connecticut. He had never been a registered owner of a motor vehicle in this state. On March 2, 1960, he was convicted o£ the crime of tampering with a motor vehicle. General Statutes § 14-145. Such a conviction calls for a mandatory suspension of an operator’s license or the right to operate. §14-111 (b). At that time, the defendant resided at 171 Liberty Street, Pawcatuck, in Connecticut. Soon after the conviction, the commissioner of motor vehicles, acting under the provisions of § 14-111 (a) and without a hearing, suspended the defendant’s right to operate a motor vehicle. On March 18, 1960, a notice of the suspension was sent by registered mail to “Douglas E. Bacher” at said address. On March 19, 1960, the envelope containing the notice was returned to the department of motor vehicles with the postal carrier’s notation thereon, “Unknown at address given.” On March 16, 1962, the defendant was convicted of operating an unregistered motor vehicle. On March 5, 1962, in the course of its in
The errors assigned are directed solely to the question of notice to or knowledge of the defendant of the action of the commissioner in suspending his right to operate a motor vehicle. The words “right to operate” as used in the statutes must be construed as a “privilege” which no one may exercise except on meeting the qualifications imposed by statute. Dempsey v. Tynan, 143 Conn. 202, 207; Cusack v. William Laube & Co., 104 Conn. 487, 490; State v. Verville, 16 Conn. Sup. 178, 179; State v. Roy, 23 Conn. Sup. 26, 28. The defendant had never qualified. The question raised by the defendant is whether, as a condition precedent, he was entitled to a notice under § 14-111 (a) before the suspension, which is not disputed, could be effective as to him. The claim made by the state is that he had actual
The notice by registered mail provided in § 14-111 (a) is required only as to a person “registered as owner or operator of any motor vehicle as shown by the records of the commissioner.” No service of such notice is required. Whether the statute creates a rebuttable presumption, placing on the defendant the burden of refutation, we are not called upon to decide. The defendant was not entitled to the notice provided under the statute.
The fact that such a notice had been sent to the defendant by the commissioner, on the basis of information the defendant may have supplied to the police, and the inaccuracy in the spelling of his name, resulting in the return of the notice, do not make his right to notice superior to that of a licensed operator. If he had held an operator’s license under an alias or with a wrong address, his position would have been no better. The granting or suspension of a license or the right to operate a motor vehicle is an administrative act resting in the power of the commissioner, reasonably exercised. The exercise of that power is not punitive, but civil, in nature and is directed toward the prevention of accidents involving life, limb and property on the public highways of the state. The commissioner’s authority extends to the suspension of the right to operate of those whose conduct indicates to him a propensity which, if continued, would menace the safety of others, as well as his own, in the use of public highways. Meany v. Connor, 7 Conn. Sup. 165,177.
Section 14-111 (a) confers on the commissioner of motor vehicles the authority to suspend or revoke an operator’s license or the right to operate for any cause he may deem sufficient, with or with
The fact of suspension at the time of the defendant’s arrest on April 29 is not questioned. The principal complaint is that he had not received a notice of suspension as required by law. We have stated that he was not within the class of persons for whom the statutory notice was intended. Nor was it necessary for the state to prove, at least in the first instance, that a notice complying with the statute had been received. That does not mean that the defendant was not entitled to any notice of the commissioner’s action in suspending his right to operate, for by such suspension he became liable to greater penalties for operating a motor vehicle than otherwise might be imposed, and thus might be presented the question of deprivation of his right to due process. The commissioner did send him a notice in the exact manner provided by statute. This notice was returned unopened with the nota
In the case before us, the state relies not on the statutory notice but upon imputed knowledge or actual notice. At the time of his first arrest on March 26, the defendant was informed of the charge of operating while his right to do so was under suspension. The information, thus imparted him was the precise knowledge he had the right to have and to rely on for his defense. It was supplied not by casual volunteers but by officers of the law entrusted not only with enforcement of motor vehicle laws generally but, through direct communication with the department of motor vehicles, with the implementation of the commissioner’s orders respecting suspension and revocation of licenses. §14-111 (d). When the defendant chose to ignore this information and to operate his motor vehicle on April 29, he was doing so with the imputed
It is to be noted in this connection that, at the time the defendant’s right to operate was suspended, the suspension was mandatory because of the offense he had committed. §14-111 (b). The defendant was presumed to know that the law required suspension of his right to operate; or, expressed more ■ correctly, ignorance of the law did not excuse him from being cognizant of that fact. Atlas Realty Corporation v. House, 123 Conn. 94, 101.
There is no error.