State v. BarberState v. Barber
- Reporters:
- , , , ,
- Before:
- Jacobs, George
The stipulated facts, with such fair and logical inferences as the court could reаsonably draw therefrom, show the following: The defendant at no time had been a licensed automobile operator in the
The errors assigned are directed solely to the question of notice to or knowledge of the defendant of the action of the commissioner in suspending his right to operate a motor vehicle. The words “right to operate” as used in the statutes must be construed as a “privilege” which no one may exercise except on meeting the qualifications imposed by statute. Dempsey v. Tynan, 143 Conn. 202, 207; Cusack v. William Laube Co., 104 Conn. 487, 490; State v. Verville, 16 Conn. Sup. 178, 179; State v. Roy, 23 Conn. Sup. 26, 28. The defendаnt had never qualified. The question raised by the defendant is whether, as a condition precedent, he was entitled to a notice under
The notice by registered mail provided in
The fact that such a notice had been sent to the defendant by the commissioner, on the basis of information the defendant may have supplied to the police, and the inaccuracy in the spelling of his name, resulting in the return of the notice, do not make his right to notice superior to that of a licensed
The fact of suspension at the time of the defendant‘s arrest on April 29 is not questioned. The principal complaint is that he had not received a notice of suspеnsion as required by law. We have stated that he was not within the class of persons for whom the statutory notice was intended. Nor was it necessary for the state to prove, at least in the first instance, that a nоtice complying with the statute had been received. That does not mean that the defendant was not entitled to any notice of the commissioner‘s action in suspending his right to operate, for by such suspеnsion he became liable to greater penalties for operating a motor vehicle than otherwise might be imposed, and thus might be presented the question of deprivation of his right to due process. The commissioner did send him a notice in the exact manner provided by statute. This notice was returned unopened with the notation described above. We need not consider whether the sending of such a notice was sufficient compliance with the statute, resulting in a legal presumption of suspension. The statute provides for a constructive notice, which is the law‘s substitute for actual notice. 39 Am. Jur. 236, Notice аnd Notices, § 7. It raises a legal inference that the method used will reasonably serve to inform the party addressed of the nature and contents of the notification. In the present case, it is claimed that because of the incorrectness in the surname of the addressee, there was no valid notice to charge the defendant with constructive knowledge of his status. 1 Merrill, Notice, § 642. This is apparently on thе theory that where a specified mode of giving notice is prescribed by statute, that method is exclusive. 39 Am. Jur. 237, Notice and Notices, § 9. We do not decide whether, under the circumstances, the notice
In the case before us, the state relies not on the statutory nоtice but upon imputed knowledge or actual notice. At the time of his first arrest on March 26, the defendant was informed of the charge of operating while his right to do so was under suspension. The information thus imparted him was the precise knowledge he had the right to have and to rely on for his defense. It was supplied not by casual volunteers but by officers of the law entrusted not only with enforcement of motor vehicle laws generally but, through direct communication with the department of motor vehicles, with the implementation of the commissioner‘s orders respecting suspension and revocation of licenses.
It is to be noted in this connection that, at the time the defendant‘s right to operate was suspended, the suspension was mandatory because of the offense he had committed.
There is no error.
In this opinion JACOBS and GEORGE, JS.,