OPINION
Thе defendant, Michael A. Ballard (Ballard), appeals from the Superior Court’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentences. A jury convicted Ballard in 1979 of conspiracy to kidnap with intent to extort, two counts of kidnapping with intent to extort, kidnapping, carrying a pistol without a license, and three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon. His coconspirators, Alan R. Gomel (Gomel) and Salvatore L. Savastano, Jr. (Savastano), entered guilty pleas before trial and were sentenced to serve twenty-five years.
1
Bal
*15
lard, on the other hand, received two life sentences for his kidnapping-with-intent-to-extort convictions plus an additional sixty-five years to serve on the remaining counts, all to run consecutively.
2
This court affirmed the convictions.
State v. Ballard,
Thereafter, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, Ballard filed a timely motion to reduce his sentences. After a series of delays, the motion was finally heard in 1992, after which the trial justice rеduced Ballard’s sentences by having the sixty-five-year-imprisonment portion run concurrently with the two consecutive life sentences. On February 17, 1994, this court issued a per curiam opinion affirming “by an evenly divided court” the trial justice’s decision on the motion to reduce the sentences.
State v. Ballard,
Under his present sentence Ballard would be eligible to apply for parole after he has served twеnty years, G.L.1956 § 13-8-13;
see also DeCiantis v. State,
In
State v. Fortes,
114 R.1.161,173,
“We believe this power should be exercised only in an exceptional case, * * * where a sentence is manifestly excessive even though within authorized statutory limits, * * * and in the context of a strong policy against interference with the discretion exercised by the trial court in passing sentence. * * * We should use this power only when the record points convincingly to the conclusion that the sentеncing justice has without justification imposed a sentence which is grossly disparate from sentences generally imposed for similar offenses.”
See also State v. Vaccaro,
Here, from the information provided to us by the parties
3
and from our own collective experience, we have little trouble in concluding that Ballard’s consecutive life sentences were “grossly disparate” in comparison with the sentences imposed on other defendants who have been convicted of kidnappings with intent to extort in other cases in this jurisdiction. But since every sentencing presents different and potentially unique circumstances,
e.g., State v. Marini,
What gives us more concern, however, than the сomparative severity of Ballard’s sentences vis-a-vis other convictions for kidnapping with intent to extort and vis-a-vis those sentences given to Ballard’s coconspir-ators is whether there are sufficient aggravating circumstances present to justify this extreme degree of incremental severity. 4 *17 Indeed, unless the comparatively severe sentences imposed on Ballard are “without justification,” then the fact that they are grossly disparate from other sentences generally imposed for these types of crimes is immaterial.
Here there was plenty of factual justification for the trial justice to impose substantially more severe sentences on Ballard than on his coconspirator defendants.
See, e.g., State v. Flores,
Still, notwithstanding these aggravating circumstances and the consequent justification for sentencing Ballard much more severely than his coeonspirators, we are left with the distinct impression that the consecutive life-term sentences he reсeived are unjustifiably out of proportion to the severity of his crimes. Moreover, we also conclude that his sentences go beyond a term of years to be served that would reasonably contribute to the acceptable goals of punishment and rehabilitation.
See State v. McGranahan,
We come to this determination with great reluctance, mindful always of the “strong policy against interference with the discretion exercised by the trial court in passing sentence,”
Fortes,
Although a sentencing justice’s decision concerning whether a defendant ought to be sentenced to serve concurrent or consecutive sentences is discretionary, “[cjontemporary thinking is that consecutive sentences are appropriate only in rare instances.” 3 Charles Alan Wright,
Federal Practice and Procedure,
Criminal 2d § 527 at 115 (1982);
see also
3 American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 18-4.5(b), at 290 (2d ed. 1986 Supplement) (“[cjonsecutive sentences should not routinely be imposed”); Model Penal Code § 7.06 (while leaving decision concerning imposition of concurrent or consecutive sentences to court, reasonable limits are set on the extent to which multiple sentences can be cumulated) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). Rather where, as here, a criminal defendant commits multiple criminal endeavors concurrently, thereby giving rise to multiple convictions, that defendant generally ought to be committed to serve sentences for thоse convictions concurrently, absent the presence of extraordinary aggravating circumstances beyond those manifest in this case. All three teenagers were abducted at gunpoint by the same masked man (Savastano) at the same time from the same place in the same automobile.
Ballard,
As previously noted, the sentencing justice modified Ballard’s sentences by making the sixty-five-year portion concurrent with the two-eonsecutive-life terms, instead of having them all run consecutively, as had been originally decreed. It appears, then, that on the motion to reduсe his sentence, Ballard indeed found the sentencing justice “‘in a more
*19
sympathetic or receptive frame of mind,”’
State v. Smith,
Althоugh we are aware that “reduction of sentence normally ought not to be made by a reviewing court but should be left on remand to the sentencing court,”
Fortes,
Accordingly we are of the opinion that the time to be served by Ballard for all the crimes he committed should be served concurrently. For these reasons the appeal is sustained, and the papers in this case are remanded for entry of an amended order and judgment granting Ballard’s motion to reduce his sentence, as follows: Ballard shall serve the two life sentences he received for his Mdnapping-with-intent-to-extort convictions together with his sixty-five-year sentence for his remaining convictions concurrently.
APPENDIX
Supreme Court
No. 89-558-C.A.
State v. Keith Pittman.
ORDER
The defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to reduce sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendant was the driver of a stolen automobile in which a confederate was riding as a passenger. The defendant and his confederate pulled alongside an elderly female victim on May 30, 1984. the confederate jumped from the car, grabbed the victim’s handbag, knocked her down and returned to the car. Shortly after defendant and his confederate left the scene in the stolen automobile they were apprehended by Providence police officers.
The confederate pleaded nolo contendere to the crime of robbery and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment, the first six years to be sеrved, the remaining two years suspended. The defendant was tried before a jury, convicted of robbery and sentenced to a term of fifty-years imprisonment, the first forty years to be served and the remaining ten years suspended. At the time of this offense defendant was sixteen years of age, but had been waived from the jurisdiction of the Family Court. The defendant was also convicted of possession of a stolen automobile and was given a consecutive ten-year sеntence on that charge. This sentence was suspended, with a ten-year period of probation to begin upon defendant’s release from custody for the robbery sentence.
After defendant’s conviction had been affirmed,
State v. Pittman,
After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that the sentence imposed upon the defendant was entirely disproportionate to the sentence imposed upon his confederate. We have examined the priоr record of the defendant and are of the opinion that it did not justify a sentence of this length. Although we are aware of our limited scope of review of a trial justice’s ruling on the Rule 35 motion,
see State v. Gordon,
Entered as an Order of this Court this 25th day of May 1990.
By Order,
[Signature] Clerk
Notes
. Gomel received the following concurrent sentences: count 1 (conspiracy to kidnap with intent to extort) — ten years; count 2 (kidnapping Tammy E. Galleshaw with intent to extort) — fifty years (twenty-five years to serve, twenty-five years' рrobation); count 3 (kidnapping Francis T. Galleshaw III with intent to extort) — fifly years (twenty-five years to serve, twenty-five years' probation); count 4 (kidnapping Kenneth Fullman) — ten years; count 6 (carrying a pistol *15 without a license) — two years; count 7 (assault with a dangerous weapon against Tammy E. Galleshaw) — five years; count 8 (assault with a dangerous weapon against Francis T. Galleshaw III) — five years; count 9 (assault with a dangerous weapon against Kenneth Fullman) — five years.
Savastano received the following concurrent sentences: count 1 (conspiracy to kidnap with intent to extort) — ten years; count 2 (kidnapping Tammy E. Galleshaw with intent to extort) — fifty years (twenty-five years to serve, twenty-five years’ probation); count 3 (kidnapping Francis T. Galleshaw III with intent to extort) — fifty years (twenty-five years to serve, twenty-five years’ probation); count 4 (kidnapping Kenneth Fullman) — twenty years; count 6 (carrying a pistol without a license) — five years; count 7 (assault with a dаngerous weapon against Tammy E. Galleshaw) — ten years; count 8 (assault with a dangerous weapon against Francis T. Gallesh-aw III) — ten years; count 9 (assault with a dangerous weapon against Kenneth Fullman) — ten years. Gomel’s motion to reduce his sentence was denied. Savastano's motion to reduce his sentence was granted with the approval of the victims’ family on the basis of his out-of-state prison record. As a result his sentences for his kidnapping-with-intent-to-extоrt convictions were reduced from twenty-five years to twenty years with a concomitant increase to thirty years’ probation upon release. Gomel’s and Savasta-no’s lesser sentences vis-á-vis Ballard are doubtless explained in part by their guilty pleas.
See State v. Tieman,
. More partiсularly, Ballard received the following sentences: count 1 (conspiracy to kidnap with intent to extort) — ten years; count 2 (kidnapping Tammy E. Galleshaw with intent to extort) — life; count 3 (kidnapping Francis T. Gal-leshaw III with intent to extort) — life; count 4 (kidnapping Kenneth Fullman) — twenty years; count 6 (carrying a pistol without a license) — five years; count 7 (assault with a dangerous weapon against Tammy E. Galleshaw) — ten years; count 8 (assault with a dangerous weapon against Francis T. Galleshаw III) — ten years; count 9 (assault with a dangerous weapon against Kenneth Fullman) — ten years.
. Ballard relies upon a Rhode Island Criminal Information System listing of post-1979 indictments that have resulted in convictions on any kidnapping-with-intent-to-extort counts. He claims, relying on this data, that the average sentence to serve for kidnapping with intent to extort imposed in Rhode Island within the last eighteen years is eight and one-half years, or a term ten to twelve times smaller than his sentencе. However, as we stated in
State
v.
Travis,
"Although this list is somewhat illuminating, it is ultimately of no use to us since we are not informed of the background of each defendant.
"An excessive sentence argument calls into question the propriety of the sentencing justice's exercise of discretion. Sentences are imposed in cases such as this one after a complete presentence report is proffered to the trial justice. * * * For us to make a threshold determinatiоn that the challenged sentence is disparate to others, without beginning to consider whether the sentence was justified, we must know what the sentencing justices knew when they imposed the various sentences.”
Cf. State
v.
Fortes,
. “In determining a fair sentence, a trial justice considers various factors including the severity of the crime, the defendant’s personal, educational, and employment background, the potential for rehabilitation, societal deterrence, and the appropriateness of the punishment.”
State v. Brigham,
“Most of these factors are multidimensional and require a trial justice to reflect upon a variety of subsidiary factors. * * * For example, with respect to the element of rehabilitation, a trial justice may consider a 'defendant’s attitude toward society, his sense of remorse, as well as his inclination and capacity to take his place as an honest and useful member of *17 society.' * * * Likewise, a defendant's giving of false testimony may be probative of his attitude toward society and consequently his prospects for rehabilitation.” Tieman,645 A.2d at 485 .
. As the trial justice made clear, however, the fact that Ballard refused to plead guilty and instead opted for a trial was not considered an aggravating circumstance.
See Tieman,
. In so stating, we do not intend to minimize the Galleshaw victims’ horrific experience of having been abducted at gunpoint, transported away to an unknown fate while being locked into the trunk of a car, and then forcibly held for a day by their kidnappers. However, we note that there was no torture, no sexual abuse, and no other similar attempt to injure the kidnapped children during the relatively brief period of their unlawful detention. Moreover, this was not a case wherein the trial justice pointed to the defendant's long prior record of violent crimes as a justification for the sentences imposed.
See, e.g., State v. McVeigh,
. The trial justice noted that he gave the "matter serious thought and * * * would like to at least leave a little hope for someone out there.”