State v. Ball

Hall, upon and neither Hall than all of the property than did claims possession express nor American had the determination that there is no district court is May just (Emphasis 1984. The delay. after reason add- ed). and the reversed on this issue therefore of dam- remanded for a determination case judgment entered the instant case ages by Hall and American. suffered pertinent part: reads in IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this complaint in interven- II. First amended jurisdiction Court reserves to deter- tion. damage mine the claims of the Plaintiffs argues American that it On Complaint and the First Amended in In- process of law in that it was denied due tervention, Judgment being this final as premises prior ejected from the to the was possession issue of the complaint hearing its first amended only, expressly and it is determined that alleged in intervention which a violation Judgment shall be entered and there dis the New Mexico anti-trust laws. We just delay. (Emphasis is no reason for agree. added). 13(i) (Repl. Civ.P. Rule Thus, rules, above-quoted under the Pamp.1980) states: sepa- district court had discretion to order a separate pro- If the court orders trial as hearing rate on American’s amended com- 42(b), judgment vided Rule on a coun- plaint in intervention. American may terclaim or crossclaim be rendered process. denied due The district court is in accordance with the terms of Rule affirmed on this issue. 54(b), jurisdiction when the court has so We therefore determine that the district do, if opposing even the claims of the part is affirmed in party have been dismissed or otherwise part. reversed in The case is remanded for disposed of. damages, any, a determination of if what although We note that the district court were incurred Hall and American as a jurisdiction eject lacked to hear Dickens’ wrongful being result of the eviction action action, jurisdiction ment it did have over filed. complaint American’s first amended in in IT IS SO ORDERED. Sangre Develop tervention. See de Cristo Fe, Corp., ment City Inc. v. Santa SOSA, J., FEDERICI, J., Senior con- (1972), denied, 503 P.2d 323 cert. cur. 411 U.S. 93 S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d 400 Under NMSA Rule Civ.P. 42(b) (Repl.Pamp.1980) the district court

may, in the interest of convenience and

expediency: [Ojrder claim, separate any trial of

cross-claim, counterclaim, third-party Mexico, Petitioner, STATE of New claim, any separate or of issue or of claims, cross-claims, number of counter- * claims, claims, third-party or issues *. BALL, Eugene Respondent. Martin No. 15755. 54(b)(1) (Repl. Civ.P. Rule Pamp.1980) pertinent part states in that: Supreme Court of New Mexico. more than one claim for relief is [WJhen April

presented action, in an whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third- claim, the court enter a final

judgment as to one or more but fewer Justice,

Sosa, Senior dissented and opinion.

filed

Walters, J., opinion. dissented and filed Ball, who, pursuant

extend to defendant disposition agreement, an oral pleaded guilty exchange sentencing for a prosecutor recommendation Gen., Bardacke, Atty. Elizabeth Ma- Paul rejected by court? Gen., Romero, Sp. Atty. Dennis Asst. jor, guaran- We hold that the constitutional Fe, Gen., petitioner. Atty. Santa Asst. right appeal by tee of the of was intended Defender, Robins, Jacquelyn Chief Public persons ag- its framers to to extend Defender, Shapiro, Asst. Public Albu- Mark courts, grieved by judgments of inferior respondent. querque, for and that none of these defendants is such person entitled to a de novo OPINION appeal. trial on STOWERS, Justice. Statutory I. Constitutional Provi- entered either a of Each defendant sions. contendere to misdemeanor guilty or nolo Const, VI, N.M. art. Section 27 states: charges metropolitan court. Found “Appeals shall be allowed in all cases from by metropolitan guilty and sentenced the the and decisions of the court, appealed each defendant to district probate courts and other inferior courts to court, seeking a trial de novo. The district courts, appeals, the district and in all such appeals, their and defend court dismissed had de trial shall be novo unless otherwise appealed Appeals. to the Court of ants provided by law.” Appeals

The of held unconstitutional Court 34-8A-6(C) (Repl. 34-8A-6(C) provides Subsection Subsection that: Pamp.1981), Rule and NMSA Metro. Any aggrieved by any judg- 71(a) (Repl.Pamp.1985), “ag limit which to by metropolitan ment rendered the court grieved” appeals defendants from metro to the district court of the politan judgments. court It held that N.M. county judgment in which such has been VI, guarantees ap days entry Const. art. rendered within fifteen after well, unaggrieved peals judgment. upon to defendants as All criminal trials metropolitan from the court shall and reversed and remanded each case for specified by be de novo unless otherwise trial de novo district court. added.) supreme (Emphasis court rule. certiorari, granted and now reverse provided appellate similarly This Court has Appeals the Court of decision. procedures “aggrieved” defendants in presents following This case the issues: 71(a) Metro.Rule and NMSA Metro. (1) 34-8A-6(C), Does which Subsection 71(i) (Repl.Pamp.1985). Rule permits “[a]ny person aggrieved by any duty uphold It is the of this Court to by metropolitan rendered the beyond statutes unless it is satisfied all court” the to to district the reasonable doubt that went language does the similar of Metro.Rule enacting the outside Constitution 71(a) impermissibly abridge right of challenged legislation. Espanola Housing VI, appeal guaranteed by N.M. Const. art. Atencio, Authority Section 27? first task Our (2) right judg- Does the of from scope interpret is to of the constitution by Const, ments rendered right appeal given by N.M. al of art. extend to the five defendants in this case VI, 27. pleas who or nolo conten- entered of Interpretation charges metropoli- Appeals dere to misdemeanor of of II. Court Const, VI, tan court? N.M. art. Section 27. 23-8A-6(C) (3) concluding right judg- In that Subsection Does the 71(a) unconstitutionally Metro.Rule by ments rendered procedural appeals de appeal granted form of from novo right of abridge the Const, appellate, the Court not in substantive art. N.M. precedents, appeal. Appeals examined its upon phrase “unless attention focused Appeals Court of then turned law,” upon otherwise phrase “[a]ppeals shall be allowed in all power to alter the Legislature’s Const, in N.M. 27. cases” art. N.M. appeal. See cases,” Focusing on the words “in all it like the Court of precedents, Those limiting ap concluded that case, in this failed to examine peal aggrieved persons, 34- Subsection meaning “appeals.” 8A-6(C) impermissibly diminished the con Sanchez, 81 City Albuquerque re stitutional This Court (Ct.App.1970), argument jected nearly identical pleaded who court held that defendants “wholly many ago in years without merit” charges municipal guilty misdemeanor Houston, Levers appeal to to district court were entitled 761, (1945)(statutory P.2d 764 time limita As court for trials de novo. the Court of tions). observed, Appeals in this case the Sanchez Appeals The Court of decision erred 1953, upon its court rested decision Const, VI, analysis its of N.M. art. Section (Cum.Supp.1969), 21-10-1 which Section completely 27 because it failed to consider appeals that from inferior “[a]ll meaning “appeals” provision. the of in that to the district courts shall be tried tribunals We must examine the intention of the Con merits, their if no anew said courts on as stitution’s framers in order to define the below, except trial had been had as other right appeal they guaranteed by of the dictum, provided by law.” In wise how VI, adoption of N.M. Const. art. Section 27. ever, the Sanchez court concluded that the Legislature might appeals guilty limit after Const, Meaning “appeal” in III. of N.M. Const, pleas, language of for the N.M. art. VI, art. 27. VI, “legislative 27 authorized thera Sanchez, py” change right granted. to the expressly has No New Mexicocase deter- 273, 81 N.M. at 466 P.2d at 119. After the scope right mined the and limitations of the 34-8A-6(C), enactment of Subsection which appeal guaranteed of to criminal defend- Const, pertinent part provides “[a]ny per that VI, art. 27. ants N.M. aggrieved by any judgment son rendered holding Ap- of The alternate Court may appeal the to presents thorough peals in Bazan the most ...,” Ap the district court the of Court Quoting of the issue. N.M. examination Const, peals “legislative therapy held that VI, 1978, 27, [had] art. as well as NMSA § place” taken a must 34-8A-6, that 39-3-1 and and NMSA Sections aggrieved in order to take an from 1978, 71, Appeals of Metro.Rule the Court metropolitan court to district court. State “ag- the defendant was held that whether 531, 534, 1078, Bazan, 97 N.M. question grieved” was a threshold to denied, 483, (Ct.App.), 1081 cert. 97 N.M. regarding to Ba- (1982)(alternate holding). zan, 533-34, 641 P.2d 1080-81. 97 N.M. at upon the

The Court of in the case Our other cases have relied statutes, provision. precedents now not the constitutional before us reviewed its statutory right purported to find a suggestion, concluded that the fol Sanchez Sanchez Bazan, entering lowed in to for a trial de novo after Sanchez, change appeal, guilty plea authorized in an inferior court. to a 273, 466 P.2d at 119. Prior to correctly interpreted was inaccurate. It 81 N.M. at Constitution, phrase adoption Mexico’s provided by of New “unless otherwise Const, Supreme in dictum law” in N.M. the Territorial Court art. statute then effect legislative changes authorization in the commented that the give great we must a de novo a construction to which appeal for trial gave Campbell, 86, weight. entered who 94, 956, Douthitt v. peace. justice of before a 535, 530, 342, Bailey, 99 P. (1908) under (a case decided criminal Early of the Peace B. Justice Statutes. 3305). Douthitt 1897, The dic- § At time Constitution Faggard dictum in in more tum was cited adopted, many of New Mexico’s statutes 510, 512, 138 P. Cunningham, peace magis- regarding justices of the 264, (1914), civil case decided under comprehen- trates had enacted been and without discussion

the same statute January Act 1876. sive 1875-76 Const, art. recently adopted N.M. N.M.Laws, 124. ch. The ante- §§ Section 27. cedents of act be traced to the Kearney and to the Code of 1846 Law Interpretation A. Constitutional January 9, gave Language. “[a]ny person aggrieved by any ordinary definition of an See by any justice.” rendered superior court to review the a resort to a Code, Powers, Kearney Courts and Judicial Law Black’s inferior decision of an 24, 43; January Law §§ (rev. 1979), Dictionary 5th ed. does not N.M.Rev.Stat., ch. art. adequately describe the issue Indeed, distinguished have here. January Act of Section 74 of the by N.M. addressed 1876, 1897, 3305 codified NMSA Section regarding infe Section 27 and the statutes adopted, at the the Constitution was time meaning, dictionary rior from the courts “[a]ny person similarly provided ag- that it as the of a and have described removal grieved by by any any rendered superior inferior to a court. cause from the himself, justice, by agent may appeal or Reg v. County McCaskey Lea State Bank court____” attorney Act to the district 459, 577, Co., 454, ister P.2d 39 N.M. 49 1853, 12, January codified at NMSA of also In re Es (1935); see Ortiz’s 579-80 1897, 2897, required that all such Section tate, 427, 429, 908, 246 P. 909 31 N.M. Act of appeals January be tried de novo. (1926). language is constitutional When N.M.Rev.Stat., 12, 1853, 29, ch. 1865 14. Constitution, § the resort not defined within Act, Section 94 of the 1876 codified at to the rules of construction 3339, 1897, provided that Section King, ex rel. Wood appropriate. appeals all taken from the sentences 715, 718, 223, (1979). “[i]n 93 226 N.M. justices peace, appellant the shall of of the ambiguity in the There is an constitutional district court cause be filed a tran- [in must language which we resolve accord script]____” those rules. See New Mexico ance with Education State Board v. Board of of Supreme An held early Court decision 590, 530, Education, 588, 624 95 N.M. provisions appli- that the former two were (1981). 532 only, that cable to the last civil cases provision gave the of in crimi- interpretation Our of the Constitution Lowitski, Territory literal, cases. duty must for it is nal not be too our 496, (1891) (decided 235, 237-38, P. give spirit and the effect to the intent of 2414). 1884, This distinc- County Constitution’s framers. Board under § McCulloh, tion, however, disregarded 210, by the was Commissioners 1005, 1908, upheld it a criminal 215-16, (1948). when The Court “any constructive, knowledge, or framers’ actual defendant’s to NMSA aggrieved” pursuant Sec- of the in force at the the Consti- laws time Douthitt, 14 N.M. at 99 P. adopted practical tution amounts tion was language, at 343. of the construction Const, VI, VI, art. D. Amendment of N.M. Const. art. N.M. Enactment

C. significant reorganization The first adopted time our Constitution At the regarding justice peace the statutes peace the statutes justice of the Const, VI, courts occurred after N.M. art. unaltered, books, virtually on the had been ap- 27 was amended to authorize had existed years, and thirty-five for peals of “the from the Territory’s throughout the his- some form probate courts and other inferior courts” appeals by permitted tory. Douthitt had probate jus- rather than “the courts and defendants, no but “aggrieved” criminal Const, peace.” tices of the art. appeals fol- had authorized judicial decision 1966). (1911, amended A mere sixteen § guilty. The framers lowing pleas of later, months abolished the the state of the knew this was Constitution justice peace, established office of Const, art. they drafted N.M. law when courts, magistrate consolidated nothing in the brief record statutory provisions appeals. Act of convention indicates of the constitutional N.M.Laws, February ch. expand existing they intended to that heading “Appeals to 172.3 Under §§ .1 they provided that when —Right appeal,” “[a]ny it in all cases.” “[ajppeals shall be allowed party aggrieved by any judgment rendered that the framers intended magistrate any The inference court in civil action ag- or the de- appeal only statutory proceeding, special to extend aggrieved by any judgment is reinforced ren- grieved criminal defendants fendant magistrate court in crimi- giv- dered contemporaneous construction1 action, nal to the district court by the Section 27 en N.M. ****’’ N.M.Laws, ch. legislators, many § of whom had new state’s (Cum. in NMSA 36-15-1 codified the framers’ opportunity to understand Repl.Pamp.1972 (emphasis Supp.1969 & Campbell, 75 N.M. at intentions. See added). Contemporary legislators P.2d at 962. adoption of the apparently felt magis- provision governing We view this change in the compelled no Constitution courts, in presently trate codified NMSA justices peace. of the regarding laws 1978, 35-13-1, provi- and the similar Section provisions cited statutory critical three metropolitan courts at issue governing sion 2897, 1897, 3305, above, 34-8A-6(C), Sections here, NMSA as restate- Subsection 3339, reappeared continuous, interpre- in NMSA and unaltered consistent ments of a 3220, 4529, 3238, 1915, respec- appeal guaranteed by and Sections tation of Const, also See ap- 27. Virtually language art. tively. identical N.M. 1978, 39(a) (Repl.Pamp.1985) 1929, 1941, compila- Mun.R. and 1953 NMSA peared in the appeals). nearly For one (Municipal court tions.2 4529; 1915, formally re- NMSA "Contemporaneous construction” is here used 1. 18, interpretation contemporary of March pealed with the Section 60 of the Act to mean N.M.Laws, 43, provision. 1917, This of the constitutional 59 § enactment ch. 60. Section 1917 meaning Campbell. Act, however, that of substantially is the common and reenacted of that 43, 59, N.M.Laws, recently, "contempo- ch. provision. § More this Court has used 1917 same interpretation 1929, raneous construction" to mean provisions § in NMSA 105-2533. codified light in of the 1911 Constitution 1953, contemporary repealed Humana Sections 36- economic necessities. NMSA Act 3.The 62, Mexico, N.M.Laws, County 36-18-8, New Inc. v. Board Commis- ch. and 1968 18-1 34, 36, 806, (1978). sioners, 1953, N.M. 582 P.2d 808 171, place 92 in their NMSA and enacted (Repl.Pamp.1972), and—2 Sections 36-15-1 79-501, 105-2533, 1929, 2. See NMSA Sections 62, 148, N.M.Laws, See also §§ ch. 1968 1941, 79-519, respectively; and 151, N.M.Laws, 62, 150, codified §§ ch. 1968 38-1808, 38-1801, 19-1001, respectively; and 1953, 36-15-3, (Repl.Pamp.1972). -4 §§ 36-18-1, 21-10-1, 1953, and and NMSA Sections 36-18-8, respectively. 182 638, (Ct.App.1979); see also New Mexi- 640 laws of forty years,

hundred Castillo, 352, 354, de- N.M. right to as of granted an co have N.M. (Ct.App.), quashed, of the cert. judgments by the fendants (1980); Bazan, 97 N.M. P.2d 992 at courts. inferior 534, 641 P.2d at 1081. Constitutionality 84- of Subsection E. 8A-6(C). recog- in Bazan Our Court scrutinizing constitutionality every defendant sentenced nized that statute, Legisla metropolitan “aggriev- is an presume court of a kept within the for a trial de duty its ed” entitled performed ture 34-8A-6(C). In re It held Constitution. novo under Subsection fixed bounds Santillanes, sen- that a court defendant legislative entering disposition en tenced after Numerous aggrieved party agreement have linked was not an and reenactments actments “appeals” term no because he ambiguous Constitutional had Bazan, aggriev “agree[d] aggrieved.” instance of novo at the not to be to trials de (alternate disregard contempo 534, 641 P.2d at 1081 parties. We cannot N.M. at ed court, however, did interpretation holding). The Bazan raneous adoption question of N.M. whether a defend- right subsequent to not address the Const, pleaded guilty 27 in art. ant who has without plea agreement likewise is not subsequent its amendment benefit of a aggrieved party. revi resulted in no substantive Campbell, 75 N.M. at sions. See jurisdic courts of other The decisions of hold, therefore P.2d at 964. We New Mexico’s tions do little to elucidate Legislature did not violate statutes, for the extent authorizing appeals Section 27 judgment fol appeal from an inferior court by aggrieved court upon widely lowing guilty plea depends defendants, and that Subsection 34-8A- statutory language. 42 A.L. varying See 6(C) 71(a) do not violate our and Metro.Rule (1955). Typically, R.2d Constitution. guilty plea appeal following a has been in which the inferior extended in situations “Aggrieved” Status of Defendants IV. procedurally inade proceeding was 34-8A-6(C). under Subsection inaccurate, oppressive, quate, or constitu question in this case is The decisive See, tionally e.g., North v. Rus deficient. defendants, plead- all of whom whether the sell, 49 L.Ed.2d 96 S.Ct. U.S. guilty of nolo contendere to crimi- ed either Davis, (1976); 46 Ariz. Burris charges metropolitan misdemeanor nal hand, other On the court, attempted then sys in which the inferior situations aggriev- in district are trials de novo criteria, surpris constitutional tem meets persons appeals pursu- to such ed entitled ing of decisions have held that number 34-8A-6(C). No New ant to Subsection by is guaranteed statute “trial de novo” question, al- Mexico case has decided See, scope. e.g., Jenkins v. Ca limited though suggested dictum Douthitt Court, Municipal 116 N.H. 366 naan granting statutory language plea (1976) (appeal guilty 208 after A.2d “any person aggrieved” gave the to ex sentencing questions); State limited to Douthitt, person pleaded guilty. to a who 414 City Meyers, 513 S.W.2d rel. Kansas v. P. N.M. at at 343. plea limited (Mo.1974)(appeal guilty after “Aggrieved Party.” A. Definition of sufficiency jurisdiction, questions of to charges, appellate to review of “aggrieved party” An has been defined criminal see, e.g., v. validity plea). But State personal ad as one whose interests are Fox, N.C.App. 239 S.E.2d versely by affected an order of the court. Gay, 285 490, 492, (1977); v. Pernell, ex rel. O’Neill 92 N.M. 590 P.2d State re (W.Va.1981) (holding subse S.E.2d Common sense tells us that a de who, quently by legislation forbidding voluntarily reversed fendant and aware of the consequences, pleads guilty or nolo appeals guilty pleas from where defendant conten dere, aggrieved cannot claim to counsel, be represented by because W.Va.Code he did not receive a trial. Nor can he claim (Cum.Supp.1985)). 50-5-13 § aggrieved to by be and sen statutory language analogous most against him, tence long rendered so as the 34-8A-6(C) appears to that of Subsection metropolitan court acted within its sentenc (1978), to be that of Mo.Rev.Stat. 543.290 ing discretion. Therefore we hold that the grants “any person a de trial novo defendants in this case “aggriev were not if, days, convicted” within ten he files a parties ed” under 34-8A-6(C). Subsection “aggrieved statement that he is agree with the Bazan Because we judgment” verdict and of the inferior court. aggrieved that defendants’ status is the date, early From an Missouri courts held question threshold under all our law re that defendants upon guilty sentenced garding “convicted,” pleas were not and therefore we further hold cases, denied them trials de novo. Later that the defendants in this case were not however, permitted appeals limited to the appeals entitled to de novo district court constitutional, jurisdictional, review of 34-8A-6(C) under Subsection and N.M. sentencing precedent claims. Practice and Section 27. limited the scope statutory broad O’Neal, language, State it was held in “Aggrieved Party” B. Waiver of Sta- therefore, (Mo.App.1981); 626 S.W.2d 693 tus. defendant opportunity denied the to with- Alternatively, if we were to con guilty plea draw his could not “aggrieved sider the parties” defendants aggrieved trial de novo person as an under adversely by metropolitan affected statute, appellate but was entitled to Pemell, orders under In re it would be particular grievance. review of his See necessary for us to consider they whether also City Meyers, State ex rel. Kansas waived that entering status and cases cited therein. pleas or nolo contendere. We us, plea guilty, have held voluntarily In the case that a before the defendants proper made after advice of counsel and objections raise no to the manner in which understanding with full handled; conse pleas their they were are less quences, binding objections and waives clearly “aggrieved” than the State v. prior State proceedings. defects in the O’Neal defendant. There is no definitive Tipton, 600, 601, 78 N.M. question, aggriev- answer to the is an who plea A of nolo contendere like party? ed A approach common sense is in object wise waives the formal order. v. Rab proceedings. defects in the urn, 681, 684, 76 N.M. in Bazan con Our Court of agrees cluded that a who not to be aggrieved by entering plea into a and dis rights Other and constitutional position agreement, allege does not who defendant. Baird v. waived invalidity of his State, agreement, and who does not seek to with State, (1977); Neller v. plea, aggrieved party. draw his is not an 949, 445 P.2d 954 The Court of

Bazan, 534, 97 N.M. at 641 P.2d at 1081 Appeals in Bazan concluded that a metro- (alternate holding). with the Ba agree We politan enters a writ- court defendant who zan and we believe its conclusion agreement similar plea disposition ten and 7.00, does aspects 1978, not rest on the validly contractual of to NMSA Criminal Form plea disposition agreement. right appeal, along and with all waives the 184 “Aggrieved” defenses, re- of Ball “motions, objections or Status Defendant V. other 34-8A-6(C). raised, or under he has made or Subsection quests which * * ”* Bazan, 97 hereafter could assert pleaded guilty in accord- Defendant Ball (alternate 533, P.2d at 1080 at 641 N.M. agreement in plea with an ance oral holding). prosecutor agreed to that recommend signed agreements were plea No formal prison The no term. he be sentenced to case, nor in this by any of the defendants recom- accept court chose not to trial required to ad metropolitan court was the mendation, to seven and sentenced Ball not be that there would the defendants vise State, imprisonment. days of v. Eller they pleaded any kind if a future trial of 52, 53-54, 824, 825-826 contest, require because that guilty or no (1978), must we held that trial 56.1(c) ment of NMSA Metro.Rule accept plea, or the recommendation and at the not in effect (Repl.Pamp.1985),was give reject must and the defendant it both v. pleas. See State time defendants’ (dis- plea opportunity to withdraw his Roland, P.2d 565 1953, 41- trict case under denied, 90 N.M. (Ct.App.), 1039 cert. Accordingly, 23-21(g)(4)(Cum.Supp.1975)). defendants P.2d These 567 486 opportunity to with- Ball was afforded counsel, in the represented by and were plea. his do so. draw He declined to contrary, allegations to we of absence analogous position Ball's thereafter was fully in they may presume that were en- that of the He other defendants. possible consequences of formed of the plea guilty tered and his with- maintained at pleas. Tipton, their disposition participating plea in a out P.2d at 432. might agreement. The inference Moreover, plea guilty of surrounding arise from the circumstances operates as a waiver nolo contendere itself was, guilty plea perhaps, he is that rights; statutory of or constitutional legal rights he was better informed of the validity dependent is of the waiver waiving than are some other defendants aspects plea upon bargain a formal of right plead guilty. Ball’s who disposition agreement. Baird v. Cf. invalidity alleging novo trial de without State, at 196 90 N.M. at plea indistinguishable from the of his (waiver grand prior defects in de- enjoyed the other authority proceeding). weight

jury guilty or pleaded who fendants this case finds that jurisdictions from other likewise Therefore, hold that nolo contendere. or nolo contendere entered not an defendant Ball was a waiver of in an inferior court constitutes for a trial de novo entitled See, e.g., appeal de to an novo. 34-8A-6(C). district court under Subsection (Del. State, 375 A.2d Shoemaker v. State, 1977); 385 So.2d Sanchez v. Conclusion. VI. (Miss.1980); v. Munici Jenkins Canaan Appeals decision Court, We reverse the Court N.H. 366 A.2d 208 pal 34-8A-6(C) Metro.Rule Gibson, Subsection (1976); 7 that Maxwell v. 71(a) unconstitutionally abridge the Eckert, (Utah 1978); 123 Wash. State art. guaranteed by N.M. Const. (1923); see, e.g., P. 551 but Sanchez, for the Fox, We overrule N.C.App. 239 S.E.2d erred, in that (1977); Gay, 285 Court rel. State ex O’Neill right of first, defining hold, the constitutional (W.Va.1981). there S.E.2d second, interpreting broadly; too fore, case defendants in this authoriz Section 27 as entering pleas of N.M. knowingly voluntarily “legislative therapy” to alter a constitu ing guilty or nolo contendere waived third, inexplicably fail right; upon novo tional they might had trials de have to. 36-15-1 ing to discuss which, RIORDAN, (Cum.Supp.1969), C.J., FEDERICI, consistent with J., and con- cur. years hundred of New Mexico over one

law, appeals persons limited de novo to SOSA, Justice, dissenting. Senior by “aggrieved” of the inferi- WALTERS, J., dissenting. Bazan, We overrule as well or court. Appeals that the Court of in that the extent SOSA, Justice, Senior dissenting. suggested that the constitutional what, I dissent from my judgment, in be, appeal been, could and had attempt by an change Court to by “legislative therapy.” modified Constitution, Article by judi appeal hold that the from We cial edict or fiat. The cannot judgments granted by inferior court change the by legislative Constitution en always Const. has en we, actments and neither should inter compassed appeals by aggrieved par pretation legislative intent or our history unchallenged An unbroken ties. fiat, own agree be allowed to do so. I

statutory enactments evidences the fact totally scholarly analysis with the framers of penned that the our Constitution intend by Judge law as William Bivins of “appeals proceedings Appeals ed in all cases” to be the Court of Opinion, his I hereby adopt Opinion brought aggrieved my at the his par instance dissent and hereby printed instruct that it ties, pub in the form of trials de novo in district my lished as entirety.* dissent its Therefore, uphold court. Subsection 34-8A-6(C) 71(a). and Metro.Rule APPENDIX hold that under the provisions authorizing ap- OPINION courts,

peals from inferior a defendant who BIVINS, Judge. plea properly guilty has entered a in metropolitan nolo contendere court is not In each of these seven cases the defend- “aggrieved” party entitled to plea ants either entered a or a court for a trial de plea the district novo. To of no contest in court to dictum Douthitt sug- charges. appealed All the extent misdemeanor to the court. gests district each case the district pleads guilty that a defendant who court dismissed the Defendants an inferior court is before now to this court from that dismis- enjoy does for a trial de sal. Because cases of defendants novo, that decision is overruled. Romero, Polys, Storey, Moreno and Fichera Finally, we hold that a defendant who common all involve issues we consolidated guilty plea has chosen not to withdraw his assigned legal cases and them to the those originally part entered as of a calendar. State v. Ball involves the same disposition agreement rejected by the met- issues and we now consolidate that case “aggrieved” ropolitan court is not an others; however, State v. Ball with the entitled to for a trial de novo. We requires additional discussion because hold, therefore, that the district court acted manner in this defendant entered correctly dismissing appeals of all of guilty plea. these defendants. present The cases before us the follow- We reverse the Court of decision ing issues: two and remand to it with instructions to rein- (1) “ag- party must be an Whether a state the orders of dismissal the district grieved” person in order to court. or decisions in criminal dis- IT entered IS SO ORDERED. cases * appendix. Ed. Note: see merits, if no courts on their as trial had ques- to that court; if the answer and

trict below, except pro- been had as otherwise then, affirmative, in the tion is law,” held a vided we defendant had said, right appeal. We “The terms of pleads no defendant who (2) a Whether that section are clear and without limita- plea to criminal guilty a or enters contest qualifies tion.” 81 N.M. at 273. metropolitan charges in court person entitled to aggrieved an resting its decision in on While Sanchez to district court. and sentence 21-10-1, this in dictum Section court com- VI, on a does not have mented article Section which we hold that we Since ap- meaning in order aggrieved person carries the same as the stat- an note to be argued second issue. city do not reach the ute. The in that to peal, we Sanchez plea additional issue presents Ball allow an after a would plea and delay orderly speedy that defendant’s impede as to whether or right ap- agreement response, bars disposition justice. In we administration that circumstances of peal. said, agree, Under “With this we do not as- but Thus, not. we reverse case, correct, hold does it suming we it is then this is a situation for trial de and remand in all the cases legislative therapy calls which for the district court. in judicial novo Id. at surgery.” VI, citing After article Section we said court dismissed case the district In each “im- that the framers Constitution metropolitan appeal from defendant’s except posed proviso no condition a that the had that the defendant ground on the court could, law, change right not, person. be, aggrieved an was but granted.” (empha- at Id. in squarely before us question put The added). phrase We referred to the “un- sis defendant has appeals is whether a these provided by ap- less otherwise law” which to district unqualified pears at the end of article Section 27. judg- a de novo from final trial court Finding change no in Section 21-10-1 or in criminal cases entered or decision ment elsewhere, upheld we defendant’s must he whether in did, however, This court find in a appeal. appeal. aggrieved person in order be an “legislative had therapy” later case that ag- 1. Do the defendants have to be place following taken Sanchez. grieved persons appeal? in order to Bazan, In State v. begin our discussion with the New (Ct.App.1982), this court held Mexico Constitution. N.M. pleads who provides: guilty metropoli- defendant Section pursuant plea tan court to a written Appeals shall be allowed all cases disposition agreement is not to a entitled and decisions trial de novo in district court. court This probate courts and other inferior grounds its on based alternate courts, courts to the district and in all (1) the defendant had waived his appeals, such trial shall had de novo appeal for a de trial novo the terms of provided by (As unless otherwise law. disposition agreement, which 8, 1966.) amended November we will consider later in connection with City Albuquerque Sanchez, case; (2) defendant Ball's defendant (Ct.App.1970) aggrieved party, not an focus of court had occasion to decide whether a Thus, present our discussion. Bazan pled guilty defendant who ato misdemean- recognized expressly that a defendant municipal or in court had charged with a crime to district court. on NMSA Based to be in order to had (now (Supp.1969) 21-10-1 39-3-1), making ruling its states, “All Bazan which 34-8A-6(C) appeals from on inferior dis- relied tribunals (Repl.Pamp.1981) provides: trict courts shall be tried anew in said examination, On closer article by any judg- Any person aggrieved reads, “Appeals shall be allowed in all metropolitan by the court ment rendered judgments cases from the final and deci- * * * may appeal district court of the to the appeals, sions and in all such trial judgment in has county which such been pro- shall be had de novo unless otherwise days entry rendered within fifteen after added.) by (Emphasis vided law.” upon All judgment. of the criminal trials There is no comma “de between novo” metropolitan appeal from the court shall provided by and “unless otherwise law.” specified by de novo unless otherwise be only applies restrictive clause the to “[A] added.) supreme (Emphasis court rule. preceding it, phrase immediately or words “legislative therapy” held that the We and not to others more remote.” State v. place by had taken prescribed Sanchez Stevens, 1310, 100 N.M. 1979, the enactment and amendment (1983); Estate, Goldsworthy’s In re 1980, 34-8A-6(C). also not- of Section 406, 115 P.2d 627 A com- adopting in by that ed placed ma must not be between the restric- (i) 71(a) (Cum.Supp.1984), Metro.Rule Id.; tive clause and that which it restricts. requires supreme court likewise the Corp., Hughes see also v. Samedan Oil aggrieved person in order to party be an (10th Cir.1948). 166 F.2d 871 Restrictive metropolitan court to district they clauses and limit the words follow court.1 modify by not set off and are commas. Because article 27 allows an “[Rjelative qualify- Stevens. appeal “in all cases” while Section 34-8A- words, ing phrases, and clauses are to be 6(C) recognize right and Metro.Rule 71 applied phrase immediately to the words appeal only by aggrieved person, an we are preceding, and are not to be construed as conflict, an unmistakable confronted with extending including others re- to or more provision can unless the constitutional be Estate, Goldsworthy’s mote.” In re Legislature change permit read to the to C.J., (quoting N.M. at 583). Statutes, § ag- By limiting Therefore, “un- article 34-8A-6(C) implic- grieved persons, Section provided by must less otherwise law” be appeal by anyone aggriev- itly bars an modify only the form of the construed to metropolitan by judgment ed of the i.e., novo, by and not other appeal, trial de question court. The then arises whether Thus, phrases the constitu- more remote. general this statute violates the rule that provision Legislature tional allows statute, Legislature, by not dimin- change from metro- the form of right expressly provided by the Con- ish a politan district court to other than court to Santillanes, stitution. See State Legislature may by trial de novo. But the (Ct.App.1980), P.2d 359 rev’d statute, not, by change or limit the first grounds, 96 N.M. on other allows part of the section which question to this The answer deci- from final all cases on whether article Section 27 turns metropolitan court. sions of the change the authorized the appeal, suggests, as as Sanchez The state contends that con- Bazan opposed appeal, as de- to the manner of interplay sidered the between constitu- argue. fendants here statutory provisions. tional and Based on ****** Bazan, provides in 1. MetroJRule as cited in part: (i) upon appeals pertinent All trials Trial de novo. (a) metropolitan district court Right court to the appeal by from the defendant. A defend- by by any judgment governed rendered ant who is be de novo and shall shall may appeal to the for the District Criminal Procedure Rules of county within which the added.) district court of the (Emphasis Courts. days metropolitan court is located within fifteen entry or final order. after Legis- than trial novo. We note that the de Legisla- language respect that the lature to civil in Sanchez has done with right granted, change by making Bazan ture could actions consider, assumed, actually but did not court of record as those actions do so accuracy of statement. We providing appellate the dis- review 34-8A-6(B) here. trict court. See Sections (D); (Repl.Pamp. Metro.R. 76 argues if state that even further 1981); Catering v. Southwestern Johnson applies law” “unless otherwise (Ct.App. Corp., only to the form 1983). 34-8A-6(C) 71(a) provide and Metro.Rule aggrieved per- only de for for a trial novo cases appellate While there are no court Thus, any reasons that the state sons. dealing precise in New Mexico with the person relegated to unaggrieved must be presented by appeals, issue these the result review, a trial appellate rather than an support cases. we reach finds in two recent anew, proffer here and because defendants Giraudo, P.2d State court, by metropolitan there is no error the (Ct.App.1983), this had occasion court nothing reject circu- to We this review. right to determine whether the state had argument. metropolitan the itous Because VI, not- appeal of under article respect not a of record with court is court limiting provisions withstanding of Metro. 34-8A-6(B), actions, to criminal see 71(b). In that court Rule case the district person unaggrieved appel- limit an to an to the appeal ruled that the state had no deprive review in effect the late would to metropolitan court’s for failure dismissal right appeal.. A more defendant 71(b) timely prosecute. limits Metro.Rule argu- rejecting for compelling reason right prosecution’s appeal from a the to may in the be statute and ment found dismissing judgment complaint the “on the To follow the state’s supreme court rule. ordinance, or section basis that an statute reasoning, interpret we have to both would unconstitutional, or invalid or thereof is 71(a) 34-8A-6(C) and Metro.Rule as not complaint part or a thereof is the omitting unaggrieved persons only from an legally On the otherwise sufficient.” Id. not either interpret de novo. We do VI, basis that article Section 27 controlled The obvious sense of the in this manner. rule, reversed, holding: we over the language to no for provide is at all However, light Metro.P. N.M.R. anyone aggrieved. That was the basis (1981 1(b), Repl.Pamph.) N.M.S.A.1978 ap- to dismiss for the state’s motion these provision, than the rather constitutional peals. 71(b), supra, Rule controls the narrower Finally, the state also contends that to appeal. to Metro.Rule State’s bypass metropolitan allow defendants 1(b) provides: court would the overall frustrate [Metropolitan rules shall These Court] grants jurisdiction scheme which over mis- liberally secure the construed to be metropolitan demeanors to the court. The just, speedy inexpensive determi- argues state that the defendant should not ac- every metropolitan court nation of metropoli- choice have a of forums between They construed shall not be tion. court, again tan court and the district jurisdiction limit the extend claiming effectively to allow such would abridge, enlarge or modi- or to negate jurisdiction any liti- rights fy the substantive over cases. court misdemeanor added.) (Emphasis gant. agree 27 does that article We a substantive right to is that, The just but because constitution- 311, 183 Arnold, 51 N.M. right. provides trial de provision for novo. al Met apply Were we to P.2d 845 phrase law” “unless otherwise 71(b), instead Article provide ro.Rule Legislature to permit would constitution, abridg- we would our rather appellate by the district court review appeal. though missed Ball’s Even we hold right of the State ing substantive that Ball did not have to be an 1(b), Metro.Rule with appeal. Consistent holding in order to does provi- supra, apply the question effect, not answer the of what if judg- final requires only a sion, which any, plea agreement had in Ball’s is a of dismissal the order ment. Since appeal it to the State In Bazan this court held that defendant district court. waived his to an for a trial de P.2d 1333. N.M. at by entering disposition novo into a court Smith supreme yearA later Bazan agreement. distinguishable. (1984) Love, P.2d 37 First, Bazan ap- language of Metro.Rule restrictive held the proved agreement. In Ball’s case the abridging or di- 71(b) unconstitutional Eller v. rejected agreement. See expressly pro- minishing right of State, constitution, article Sec- by the vided agreement Ball could not be bound tion Second, in Bazan rejected by the court. expressly the defendant waived his impact our are not unaware plea in appeal disposition the written and on the caseload could have decision agreement prosecution. he made with the However, Legisla if the courts. district present No such waiver is here. There- to limit wishes ture fore, may Ball for a trial de novo. decisions of judgments and court to to the district metropolitan court 3. Conclusion so thereby, it must do aggrieved persons amendment. through a constitutional We reverse the orders all the cases Cf. (provid Constitution, article denying defendants have an aggrieved party” shall “an ing that de novo district and remand for appeal from district right to one proceedings. further absolute language we court). qualifying Absent IT IS SO ORDERED. 34-8A-6(C) and Metro. hold that abridge or dimin 71(a) impermissibly Rule ALARID, NEAL JJ., concur. guaran right of unqualified ish the To the ex 27. WALTERS, article teed Justice (dissenting). permitting a read as tent Sanchez be word,” “When I use a Humpty Dumpty change said, in tone, a rather scornful “it means Like it is overruled. article just I what choose it to mean—neither that a Bazan requires wise, to the extent more nor less.” in order to party be an (from Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonder- it too is overruled. land.) separate Does the issue in State v. The majority has chosen in this case to Ball require a different say result? really “all cases” “only means some cases.” Defendant Ball entered into an oral disposition agreement whereby Having he authored the Bazan case re- agreed plead guilty to driving with a ferred majority t« both the and the suspended or revoked license. prose- Appeals, Court of I am convinced that the agreed cutor to recommend that his sen- “aggrieved discussion there on party” was tence not include incarceration. unnecessary These to that decision and that the were agreement. terms of the opinion, instead, rested primarily on Ba- The metropolitan court refused to accept express zan’s agreement to waive the recommendation and sentenced Ball to all objections defenses and raised or that days seven jail imposed a future, fine of could be raised in the in return for fifteen dollars. The district charges dis- dismissal of against two him. permitted again upon lacking the wisdom 1982 reflect opportunity to

theWith portion of the Bazan opinion the second pro- between a constitutional a clash direct It no more correct then written. language of limiting more vision and today. majority is the than rule, I am dis- a court-created statute suggested I would have mayed that even against con- could be resolution

there language.

stitutional majority dissent from the respectfully

I culpa profess public mea

opinion and

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Ball

Court Name: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date Published: Apr 24, 1986

Citation: 718 P.2d 686

Docket Number: 15755

Court Abbreviation: N.M.