STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. BENHART BAKKA, A/K/A ROBERT BAKKA AND BENHARD BAKKA, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Supreme Court of New Jersey
Argued February 19, 2003-Decided July 1, 2003.
826 A.2d 604 | 176 N.J. 533
mandated under our existing jurisprudence for the reasons already expressed. We decline to presume that McClure, working under the supervision of either the Attorney General or the new prosecutor, cannot justly and fairly respond to defendant‘s claims.
IV.
The PCR court‘s disqualification order shall be vacated. The matter is remanded to the Law Division for that purpose and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
For vacation and remandment-Chief Justice, PORITZ, and Justices COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and ALBIN-7.
Opposed-None.
Alyssa A. Aiello, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
ZAZZALI, J.
The primary issue in this appeal is whether a defendant‘s operation of a vehicle with a revoked license, absent any indication of the reasons for that revocation, is probative of recklessness within the meaning of the aggravated manslaughter,
This matter arose after defendant Benhart Bakka was involved in a vehicular accident on the Garden State Parkway that killed his friend Wayne Teague. A jury convicted defendant of first-degree aggravated manslaughter,
We agree with the Appellate Division that evidence that defendant‘s license has been revoked by itself cannot be probative of recklessness. We conclude, however, that evidence concerning defendant‘s revocation was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result in respect of defendant‘s aggravated manslaughter, vehicular homicide, and unlawful taking by a means of conveyance convictions. We therefore reverse.
I
On January 2, 1997, at approximately 4:00 p.m., Eileen McCray, defendant‘s estranged girlfriend, was driving to meet defendant following his release from jail. McCray stopped her car when she saw defendant flagging her down at an intersection in Toms River. After a short discussion, McCray asked defendant to enter her vehicle, a black 1989 Acura Integra. Once in the car, defendant told McCray that he wanted to drive, but McCray refused. McCray testified that defendant appeared intoxicated.
Defendant then forcibly took control of the car and drove to the Lakehurst Motel where the couple discussed their relationship. After an argument with defendant, McCray left the motel, returning about an hour later to find defendant with an almost-empty pint of vodka. Defendant took McCray‘s car keys, leaving the motel at about 10:45 p.m. Shortly thereafter,
Edwin Leugo, one of defendant‘s roommates, testified that defendant arrived home around midnight. According to Leugo, defendant was visibly intoxicated, agitated, and argumentative. Another roommate, Wayne Teague, awoke after an argument ensued between Leugo and defendant. Thereafter, defendant and Teague began drinking vodka heavily. Leugo went back to bed around 5:00 a.m. and when he awoke around 7:30 a.m. defendant and Teague were gone.
Around 11:00 a.m., motorist Jane Gross was traveling approximately 55 m.p.h. northbound in the center local lane of the Garden State Parkway when a black Acura “zoomed” past her at a high rate of speed. She witnessed that vehicle drift into the left lane, striking the left guardrail. Subsequent to the Acura‘s collision with the left guardrail, the vehicle moved abruptly across the two local lanes and hit the right guardrail. The State‘s accident reconstruction expert, Reginald Grant, indicated that the abrupt movement to the right was an “over corrective” measure consistent with the actions of a driver under the influence of alcohol. The car then spun around and crossed over the grassy median of the Parkway into the inner express lanes of traffic. There, the car collided at a low rate of speed with the rear passenger-side of a GMC Yukon SUV. The driver of the Acura did not apply the brakes during the entire collision sequence. Moreover, the occupants of the vehicle were not wearing seatbelts. The force of the second impact caused Teague to be partially ejected through the open window of the vehicle‘s passenger side. Teague‘s head and arm struck an “I” beam that supported the guardrail.
Immediately after the collision, the driver of the Yukon, Eric Haberstroh, exited his vehicle and walked back to the Acura, which was located approximately fifty feet away. Haberstroh testified that as he approached the vehicle he observed the top half of Teague‘s body hanging out of passenger‘s side of the vehicle. Teague‘s head was bleeding profusely and Haberstroh “knew there was no help for him.” Haberstroh then walked around to the driver‘s side of the car and saw a man, later identified as defendant, in a semi-prone position in the driver‘s seat. Defendant‘s feet were beneath the brake and accelerator pedals. After determining that defendant did not need immediate assistance, Haberstroh stepped away from the vehicle and waited for the police to arrive.
New Jersey State Troopers James Miani and Richard Laverty arrived at the scene at approximately 11:15 a.m. Trooper Miani approached the Acura and, like Haberstroh, saw that Teague was “hanging out of the passenger‘s side window from the waist up” and “had catastrophic head trauma.” He stated that defendant appeared conscious and had his back leaning against the legs and buttocks of Teague. Defendant‘s left foot was partially across the seat and his right foot was “hanging down where the normal driver foot would be.” The accelerator and brake pedals were located approximately ten inches away from defendant‘s right foot.
On entering the vehicle, Miani “detected the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming directly from [defendant‘s] breath.” Defendant informed Miani that he had hurt his neck and back. Miani then asked defendant to identify the driver of the vehicle, and defendant replied: “I know it wasn‘t me. I‘m not a bad guy. I
Trooper Richard Laverty testified that when he approached defendant he “immediately detected a strong odor of alcoholic beverage emitting from his breath.” Laverty stated that defendant “began to speak in a rambling and slurred manner,” “claimed to have no identification on his person,” and “continued to ramble on about using pain medication and drinking alcohol prior to the accident.” Medical personnel at Riverview Medical Center later turned over defendant‘s personal belongings to Trooper Laverty, which included two pill bottles. One bottle contained Meprobamate, an anti-anxiety prescription drug, and the other contained Paxil, an anti-depressant prescription drug. Labels were affixed to both bottles, indicating that the prescriptions were defendant‘s and that the drugs “may cause drowsiness.”
The paramedics arrived, immobilized defendant on a stretcher, and placed him in an ambulance for transportation to Riverview Medical Center. Paramedic John Shook conducted a trauma assessment of defendant in the ambulance. Although defendant‘s speech was slurred, Shook observed him to be “alert” and “oriented,” and answering “all questions appropriately and promptly.” Shook also detected a strong odor of alcohol about defendant.
Trooper Patrick O‘Dwyer followed the ambulance to the Medical Center to obtain information regarding the accident and to obtain a blood sample from defendant. When O‘Dwyer arrived at the hospital he located defendant who was supine on a stretcher outside of a patient holding area. O‘Dwyer informed defendant that he was under arrest for DWI, and administered Miranda warnings. Defendant signed the Miranda warning card, which Shook initialed as a witness. O‘Dwyer then asked defendant to describe the cause of the accident. Defendant responded: “I picked up my friend Wayne. We went to go home. I hit the guardrail. I blacked out.” Defendant also informed O‘Dwyer that McCray owned the Acura, and that he had taken medication for depression on the morning of the accident. Defendant consented to the officer‘s request for a blood sample. The toxicology report indicated that defendant‘s blood alcohol content at the time of the accident was 0.271%.
Three days after the accident, New Jersey State Police Detective Anthony Sempkowski met with defendant to obtain a formal statement. After being advised of and waiving his Miranda rights, defendant gave Sempkowski a five-page statement detailing the events that led up to the accident and the accident itself. Defendant indicated that he had consumed three mixed drinks at a bar before meeting McCray, and then seven to nine beers while with McCray at the motel. He then drove McCray‘s Acura to his apartment and went to bed around midnight. Defendant awoke around 6:00 a.m., took his medications, Paxil and Meprobamate, consumed two “stiff” drinks mixed by Teague, and then left the apartment to travel “up north” with Teague. While on the road, defendant admitted that he consumed a few more vodka and Sprite drinks, which were mixed by Teague. Although defendant remembered that he was driving at around 10:30 a.m., when he and Teague stopped for food at a service area, defendant only “guessed” that he was driving at the time of the accident and it “bothered” him that he could not remember.
The State‘s accident reconstruction expert concluded that defendant was the driver of the Acura. In support of that
At trial, the State presented assistant medical examiner Karabi Sinha who expressed the view that a driver with a blood alcohol content of 0.271% is sixty times more likely to be in an accident than a sober driver. Moreover, Sinha indicated that a person with a blood alcohol content of 0.271% who simultaneously takes anti-depressant and anti-anxiety medications “would be greater and farther impaired” than one who is just drinking alcohol.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. Consistent with his formal statement, defendant admitted to consuming three mixed drinks prior to meeting McCray and seven to nine bottles of beer while at the motel. He stated that he then drove McCray‘s Acura to his apartment, consumed two to three vodka and Sprite drinks, which Teague had prepared, and went to bed around midnight. Defendant woke up around 6:00 a.m., took a shower, had “a couple more drinks” with Teague, and took both his medications before leaving the apartment. Defendant and Teague left their apartment at 9:00 a.m. because Teague needed a ride “up north.” While driving the Acura northbound on the Garden State Parkway, Teague, who was in the passenger‘s seat, mixed more vodka and Sprite drinks, which the two consumed before stopping at a rest area. According to defendant‘s testimony, at the rest stop “Wayne went inside and got food. I remember him walking in, and that‘s the last I remember.” Following that incident, defen-dant could only recall waking up in a hospital “strapped to a board almost in [an] upside-down position.” Although defendant could not remember the accident, he denied driving the vehicle at the time it occurred.
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to allow it to introduce evidence at trial that defendant was driving with a revoked license at the time of the accident. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court agreed to admit the evidence, concluding that the jury could consider defendant‘s conscious decision to violate the law by driving with a revoked license when determining whether he was reckless within the meaning of
As noted, the jury convicted defendant of first-degree aggravated manslaughter,
At sentencing, the court granted the State‘s motion to impose an extended term based on defendant‘s persistent offender status pursuant to
On appeal, defendant challenged the State‘s introduction of evidence that he was driving with a revoked license at the time of the accident. The Appellate Division found that the trial court improperly admitted that evidence and vacated defendant‘s convictions. Bakka, supra, 350 N.J. Super. at 55-56. The panel concluded that the evidence was not connected logically to a determination of recklessness within the meaning of the aggravated manslaughter and vehicular homicide statutes. Id. at 54-55. Further, it determined that “despite the strength of the State‘s case,” the introduction of defendant‘s revocation had the capacity to influence the jury‘s verdict and therefore constituted harmful error. Id. at 58-59. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded for a new trial on all counts.
We subsequently granted the State‘s petition for certification. 174 N.J. 193, 803 A.2d 1164 (2002).
II
A person is guilty of aggravated manslaughter when he or she “recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.”
Evidence is probative if it tends “to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action.”
III
Defendant argues that because driving with a revoked license does not tend to show conscious disregard for a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, the trial court improperly allowed the jury to consider that fact when determining whether defendant was reckless within the meaning of
As the Appellate Division noted below, “[m]any offenders are engaged in one form of illegal conduct while committing another, but we are unable to find any precedent for the proposition that disregard of the law is itself a factor to be evaluated in determining a defendant‘s level of mental culpability.” Bakka, supra, 350 N.J. Super. at 55. Unlike driving while intoxicated, speeding, or some other conduct from which a reckless state of mind may be inferred circumstantially, the mere fact that a defendant is an unlicensed driver does not by itself suggest an awareness of risk. We therefore find that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that driving with a revoked license at the time of the accident, without specific reasons for that revocation, is probative of recklessness.
The Appellate Division also stated that “[t]o be probative on the issue of defendant‘s recklessness, the lack of a valid driver‘s license had to be causally related to defendant‘s driving conduct that resulted in the fatal accident.” Bakka, supra, 350 N.J. Super. at 54 (emphasis added). See State v. Peterson, 116 Utah 362, 210 P.2d 229, 231 (1949) (stating that “[w]ith or without a license, the manner of driving is not affected“); Madison v. State, 40 Ala. App. 62, 109 So.2d 749, 753 (1958), cert. denied, 268 Ala. 699, 109 So.2d 755 (1959). However, although recklessness generally may be inferred from the manner in which a vehicle is operated, relevant evidence of a defendant‘s “driving conduct” is not limited to the manner in which that defendant exercises actual physical control over a vehicle. In State v. Vowell, 276 Ark. 258, 634 S.W.2d 118, 119 (1982), for example, the court held that evidence of the defendant‘s three prior convictions for DWI and the fact that defendant was driving with a revoked license was admissible, but only for certain purposes. Specifically, it was admissible “to prove the warning quality of the other convictions and to infer that the [defendant] must have arrived at a mental state inconsistent with mistake and consistent with the culpable mental state of causing serious physical injury ‘under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.‘” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in United States v. O‘Brien, 238 F.3d 822, 827, 827 n. 2 (7th Cir.2001), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that driving with a revoked license could be considered together with the defendant‘s “checkered driving history” as evidence that the defendant “was well acquainted with the consequences of unsafe driving,” and therefore reckless.
We agree with the Vowell and O‘Brien courts that revocation introduced along with the reasons for that revocation may be probative of recklessness when the defendant again engages in unsafe conduct
In the future, if the State seeks to introduce evidence of a defendant‘s revocation along with the reasons for that revocation, then the trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing and apply the four-part test established in State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338, 605 A.2d 230 (1992). Ultimately, the trial court must determine in a vehicular homicide case whether the probative value of a defendant‘s revocation or suspension and the reasons for that revocation or suspension will outweigh the potential for undue prejudice. See State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 483, 691 A.2d 293 (1997); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 266, 524 A.2d 188 (1987).
IV
Having determined that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of defendant‘s revocation, we now decide whether that error was harmless.
We disagree with the panel below that the trial court‘s introduction of defendant‘s revocation was clearly capable of producing an unjust result in respect of defendant‘s convictions on aggravated manslaughter, vehicular homicide and unlawful taking by a means of conveyance.
We address first the jury‘s finding on vehicular homicide and aggravated manslaughter. The trial court instructed the jury that a person is guilty of aggravated manslaughter if that person “recklessly causes the death of another person under circum-stances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.”
The phrase under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life does not focus on the defendant‘s state of mind but rather on the circumstances under which you find he acted. If, in light of all of the evidence, you find that defendant‘s conduct resulted in a probability as opposed to a mere possibility of death, then you may find that he acted under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to human life. On the other hand, if you find his conduct resulted in only a possibility of death, then you must acquit him of aggravated manslaughter.
The court also instructed the jury that vehicular homicide requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant caused Teague‘s death by driving a vehicle recklessly,
That “a jury may infer that an individual who drives while intoxicated is consciously disregarding the risk of an accident” is well settled. State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J. Super. 557, 563, 563 A.2d 856 (App.Div.1989) (citing State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 204, 553 A.2d 335 (1989)), aff‘d, 121 N.J. 527, 582 A.2d 1003 (1990); State v. Bogus, 223 N.J. Super. 409, 419, 538 A.2d 1278 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 567, 546 A.2d 497 (1988). Thus, “while intoxication is not necessarily an element of the crime of committing death by auto, a defendant‘s driving while intoxicated may [by itself] support a determination of recklessness.” LaBrutto, supra, 114 N.J. at 204 (quoting State v. Casele, 198 N.J. Super. 462, 472, 487 A.2d 765 (App.Div.1985) (internal quotations omitted)). A defendant‘s sobriety or insobriety, however, “is merely one of the circumstances to be considered by the jury.” Ibid. The jury also may consider other circumstances, such as speeding, lack of control over a motor vehicle, traffic violations, and lack of sleep, to establish that a defendant recklessly operated a vehicle. See, e.g., State v. DeLuca, 108 N.J. 98, 109-11, 527 A.2d 1355 (1987).
Although the crimes of both aggravated manslaughter and vehicular homicide require the element of recklessness, aggravated manslaughter demands a more stringent standard of reckless conduct, namely that the defendant acted “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.”
Here, the State presented evidence that defendant‘s blood alcohol content at the time of the accident was 0.271%, nearly three times the legal limit of 0.10%. Defendant admitted to consuming several “vodka and Sprite” drinks while driving to a rest area on the Parkway shortly before the accident. He also admitted to consuming a significant amount of alcohol during the eighteen-hour period preceding the accident. Several people who came into contact with defendant immediately following the accident detected a strong odor of alcohol. Further, defendant admitted to taking anti-anxiety and anti-depression prescription drugs with alcohol a few hours prior to the accident. Moreover, motorist
Because the Appellate Division below concluded that the evidence of defendant‘s revocation “could have prejudiced the defendant on the unlawful taking charge,” Bakka, supra, 350 N.J. Super. at 58, we now address that issue. A person is guilty of third-degree unlawful taking of means of conveyance if “with purpose to withhold temporarily from the owner,” that person “takes, operates or exercises control over a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner or other person authorized to give consent and operates the motor vehicle in a manner that creates a risk of injury to any person or a risk of damage to property.”
Because the Appellate Division reversed defendant‘s convictions, it did not address defendant‘s claims regarding his sentence. Accordingly, we remand solely for a determination of whether the trial court improperly imposed an extended term under
V
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed. We reinstate defendant‘s convictions and remand solely for a review of his sentence.
LONG, J., dissenting.
I would affirm the decision of the Appellate Division, substantially for the reasons expressed in the thorough and thoughtful opinion of Judge Weissbard. My colleagues in the majority agree with Judge Weissbard that the fact of revocation, standing alone, is inadmissible. Yet they hold that error in this case to be harmless. It is here that I part company from them.
Because it was disembodied from any admissible fact, the only effect of the revocation evidence was to show defendant to be a bad person with an inclination toward
I am troubled as well by the majority‘s statement that “revocation introduced along with the reasons for that revocation may be probative of recklessness when the defendant again engages in unsafe conduct identical or similar to that which resulted in the revocation.” Ante at 547, 826 A.2d at 611-12. The overarching problem with that notion is that once the facts underlying a revocation are admitted, in general, the revocation can add nothing of relevance. Although the majority cites several out-of-state cases as support for a contrary conclusion, State v. Vowell, 276 Ark. 258, 634 S.W.2d 118 (1982); United States v. O‘Brien, 238 F.3d 822 (7th Cir.2001), I note, as did the Appellate Division, that those opinions contain no analysis that will withstand scrutiny. State v. Bakka, 350 N.J. Super. 43, 54, 794 A.2d 260 (2002). Yet the majority has subscribed to their conclusions and declared that when prior conduct that is the subject of a revocation is repeated, the revocation may serve as an “additional warning” to the defen-dant of the risks his conduct poses to others. Ante at 547, 826 A.2d at 612. That is a breathtakingly broad notion.
Indeed, I can conceive of only one limited situation in which a revocation, along with the facts underlying it, would be relevant as a warning. That is the case in which a revocation bears on notice of incapacity to drive. Thus, for example, if a driver has had his license revoked for visual impairment, the revocation bears on the issue of whether he knew he was not competent to drive and chose to do so in the face of that risk. That scenario is substantially different from the run of the mill case involving a revocation for a motor vehicle violation that is nothing more than a punishment for a momentary lapse, and not a commentary on the defendant‘s capacity to operate a motor vehicle. The majority‘s broad counter-statement that declares the potential relevance of a class of evidence that should be excluded is insupportable. Except in the limited class of cases to which I have adverted, I would bar any evidence of revocation and require the state to prove the relevance of the underlying facts in every case.
For all those reasons I dissent.
Justice ALBIN joins in this dissent.
For reversing-Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices COLEMAN, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI-5.
For affirming-Justices LONG and ALBIN-2.