Opinion
Thе defendant, James Baker, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. On apрeal, he claims that the sentencing court improperly denied his motion because it failed to provide him with an opportunity to aJlоcute prior to the sentence being imposed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are rеlevant to our resolution of this appeal. On October 13, 1999, the defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to the Alford doctrine
The defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence on Seрtember 19, 2011, arguing that he had been denied an opportunity to allocute to mitigate the sentence. The court heard oral argument оn September 21, 2011, and issued an oral decision. The court stated that “[i]t does not appear, under the facts of this case, where there’s an agreement to a voluntarily entered plea that the court needs to invite a statement by the defendant” and, accordingly, denied the motion. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant claims that his right to allo-cute should have been offered to him and that the failure to do so was harmful. He maintains that although our Supreme Court has held that the trial court has no affirmative duty to inquire whether a defendant wishes to make a personal statement in the dispositional phase of a probation revocation hearing, that holding has not been applied to sentencing hearings and should not be so applied. We are not persuaded.
We begin with our standard of reviеw. “[A] claim that the trial court improperly denied a defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence is reviewed pursuant to thе abuse of discretion standard. ... In reviewing claims that the trial court abused its discretion, great
Practice Book § 43-10 provides in relevant part: “Before imposing a sentence or mаking any other disposition after the acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or upon a verdict оr finding of guilty, the judicial authority shall . . . conduct a sentencing hearing as follows ... (3) The judicial authority shall allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to make a personal statement in his or her own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence. . . .” In State v. Strickland,
Although the court in Valedon interpreted Practice Book § 43-10 (3) in the context of the dispositional phase of a probation revocation hearing, nothing in that decision limited the court’s legal anаlysis to that particular factual scenario. Because Practice Book § 43-10 (3) applies to both original sentencing hearings and the dispositional phase of probation revocation hearings, the interpretation of that section by our Supreme Court apрlies to both kinds of hearings as well. On the basis of the reasoning in Valedon, we conclude that the sentencing court did not have an affirmative duty to inquire of thе defendant whether he wanted to make a personal statement at the sentencing hearing. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that in this сase the defendant was sentenced pursuant to a plea bargain agreement that included an agreed upon disposition.
Morеover, even though the court did not have an affirmative duty to give the defendant an opportunity to ailocute, the defendant was, in faсt, given a reasonable opportunity to do so. After it entered the defendant’s guilty plea and before sentencing, the court asked if defense counsel wanted to be heard. He responded, “No, your honor.”
“Absent some indication to the contrary, a court is entitled to rеly on counsel’s representations on behalf of his or her client.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hall,
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
North Carolina v. Alford,
At the time of the incident, the defendant was incarcerated at the Garner Correctional Institution for a murder conviction. His maximum release date was 2044, and his estimated release date was October, 2031.