State v. BakerState v. Baker
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Traylor
TRAYLOR, Justice.
The issue presented is whether a sentence imposed for possession of a firearm by a felon, a violation of
FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The defendant, Monolo Anton Baker (“Baker” or “defendant“), has the following relevant criminal history:
(1) December 16, 1996 felony conviction for aggravated battery, a violation of
(2) September 13, 1999 felony conviction for illegal possession of stolen things, a violation of
Thereafter, Baker was arrested and charged with a violation of
On January 27, 2005, Baker, entered a plea of guilty as charged to being a felon in possession of a firearm. On March 16, 2005, the district judge sentenced Baker to eleven and a half (11½) years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.
Thereafter, the state filed an habitual offender bill of information, seeking to enhance Baker‘s firearm sentence under the provisions of
Thus, the state relied upon Baker‘s prior conviction for a violation of
After a hearing, the district judge adjudicated Baker a second felony offender, vacated his prior sentence of eleven and a half years (11½) imprisonment at hard labor, and sentenced Baker to fifteen (15) years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The district judge denied Baker‘s motion to reconsider the sentence.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed Baker‘s adjudication and sentence as an habitual offender. The appellate court rejected Baker‘s sole argument that his adjudication and sentencing as an habitual offender following his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm constituted “double enhancement” prohibited by this court‘s decisions in State v. Sanders, 337 So.2d 1131 (La.1976) and State v. Firmin, 354 So.2d 1355 (La.1978).1 We granted the defendant‘s writ application to review the correctness of that decision.2
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Prior Precedent from this Court
Baker urges that his habitual offender adjudication and sentence must be vacated under the holdings of Sanders and Firmin. In Sanders, this court was presented with the res nova question “whether the state may multiple-bill a person, who was convicted under
The defendant in that criminal matter, Clarence Sanders, had three prior felony convictions for the following crimes: an armed robbery in 1955, another armed robbery in 1961 and attempted simple burglary in 1970. He was subsequently charged with violating
On review, this court discussed two concepts. First, the court found that the state‘s attempt to further enlarge Sanders’ firearms penalty was an improper attempt to use the defendant‘s prior convictions twice: “first, to establish his status as a convicted felon so as to convict him of the crime, and, second to increase the penalty through a multiple bill.” Id., 337 So.2d at 1134. In finding such a “double enhancement” improper, the court noted that “[t]he act of possessing or concealing [a weapon under
The second concept which Sanders discussed was a determination that no further enhancement, other than the penalties already described in
The court‘s ultimate holding in Sanders was the following statement:
Consequently, we find that the penalty provisions enacted in
R.S. 14:95.1 were intended by the legislature to delimit the permissible punishment for that offense because the statute itself takes into account the fact of defendant‘s previous felony conviction and the legislature gave no indication that it wanted the multiple-billing procedure to remain available as a vehicle for further enlargement of the penalty.
Despite the second, more far-reaching holding of Sanders, the decision was bound to its facts, that is, the state had attempted to use the habitual offender law to enhance a sentence for a conviction under
Two years later, the court subsequently removed any doubt as to the reach of the
Although Firmin has not been cited as authority in any subsequent opinions, Sanders has continued to be cited as authority, both in situations involving
Court of Appeal Analysis
On appeal, Baker argued that his adjudication as a multiple offender was improper under Sanders and Firmin as an impermissible double enhancement of his firearms conviction. The state countered that no double enhancement occurred because Baker‘s 1996 aggravated battery conviction supported Baker‘s firearm violation under
Although the Second Circuit acknowledged the reasoning of this court‘s opinions in Sanders and Firmin, the appellate court continued its analysis by citing to, and ultimately relying upon, appellate court cases which address a totally different issue than the one presented here. Instead of trying to determine whether a sentence under
The appellate court cited to the Fourth Circuit‘s opinion in State v. Hymes, 513 So.2d 371 (La.App. 4 Cir.1987), wherein that appellate court held that a felon in possession of a firearm conviction may be used to enhance the penalty for a subsequent conviction only if the underlying felony used as an element in the firearms
From these appellate court opinions, the Second Circuit drew the conclusion that “no impermissible double enhancement occurred in Baker‘s case” because the conviction used to prove an essential element of the firearm possession offense was not the prior conviction then used to enhance the offender status and sentence of the firearm conviction under the habitual offender proceedings. Baker, 40,997 p. 6, 935 So.2d at 369.
Analysis
Although the court of appeal ignored clear precedent from this court, a practice which we cannot condone, its doing so resulted in our granting a writ of review. Consequently, the court has been provided with an opportunity to re-evaluate our previous opinions on this issue.
Our interpretation of a Louisiana criminal statute is governed by the following rule:
. . . in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.
As originally enacted, and as the form of the statute at issue in Sanders,
§ 95.1 Possession of firearm or carrying concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies
A. it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of first or second degree murder, manslaughter, aggravated battery, aggravated or simple rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated arson, aggravated or simple burglary, armed or simple robbery, or any violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law which is a felony or any crime defined as an attempt to commit one of the above enumerated offenses under the laws of this state, or who has been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States or of any foreign government or country of a crime which if committed in this state, would be one of the above enumerated crimes, to possess a firearm or carry a concealed weapon.
B. Whoever is found guilty of violating the provisions of this Section shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less
than three nor more than ten years. If such conviction is for the crime of carrying a concealed weapon, such sentence shall be without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence and be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars. C. Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Section shall not apply to the following cases:
(1) The provisions of this Section prohibiting the possession of firearms and carrying concealed weapons by persons who have been convicted of certain felonies shall not apply to any person who has not been convicted of any felony for a period of ten years from the date of completion of sentence, probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
(2) Upon completion of sentence, probation, parole, or suspension of sentence the convicted felon shall have the right to apply to the sheriff of the parish in which he resides, or in the case of Orleans Parish the superintendent of police, for a permit to possess firearms. The felon shall be entitled to possess the firearm upon the issuing of the permit.
(3) The sheriff or superintendent of police, as the case may be, shall immediately notify the Department of Public Safety, in writing, of the issuance of each permit granted under this Act. Acts 1975, No. 492, § 2.
In Sanders, the court pretermitted discussion of constitutional issues of double jeopardy and due process by deciding the issue presented on the basis of legislative intent.6See Sanders, 337 So.2d at 1134. Similarly, our current analysis will focus on the clear language of the statute, its context and its purpose.
Statutory Language
In Sanders, this court noted that the terms of the statute did not “indicate that a greater penalty could be superimposed by multiple-billing” and from that determined that the intent of the legislature was to prevent habitual offender enhancement of a sentence under
After reviewing the language of
We find our previous reasoning in Sanders to be faulty in this respect. Although the legislature did include specific language regarding enhancement in
Statutory Purpose
We find there is nothing in the statute‘s purpose which would prevent enhancement of a penalty imposed under its provisions. This court has previously determined the purpose of
It is beyond doubt that the statute challenged in the instant case [
La. R.S. 14:95.1 ] was passed in the interest of the public and as an exercise of the police power vested in the legislature. Its purpose is to limit the possession of firearms by persons who, by their past commission of certain specified serious felonies, have demonstrated a dangerous disregard for the law and present a potential threat of further or future criminal activity.
State v. Amos, 343 So.2d 166, 168 (La. 1977).
Similarly, there is nothing in the purpose of the habitual offender law which would prohibit enhancement of a sentence under
Further, we do not find that the combination of these two statutes would lead to a result unintended by their purposes. We do not find that a sentence imposed under
Statutory Context
Turning now to the context of the statute, we see that our determination in Sanders was perhaps unduly influenced by the manner of the statute‘s enactment.
A review of the reasoning in Sanders makes clear that the court previously considered
Nevertheless, in Sanders, we characterized the enactment of
[w]e assume that the legislature was prompted to make this change because a person multiple-billed after conviction under the original statute,
R.S. 14:95 , could usually be given only a very short sentence.13 Since the legislature in passingR.S. 14:95.1 has in that very statute provided enhanced penalties for the act of concealing a weapon when the concealor is a felon, we therefore presume that it must not have intended the multiple enhancement incident to the state‘s usingR.S. 15:529.1 to further enhance the penalty. (Emphasis added)
However, our assumption, that the purpose behind the legislature‘s enactment of
Nor was further analysis added by the court‘s pronouncement in Firmin. Indeed, Firmin, a three-paragraph per curiam opinion, states without additional reasoning that the “rule of State v. Sanders, supra, is still applicable and the defendant should not have been sentenced as a multiple offender.” Id., 354 So.2d at 1355.
We hold today that our determination in both Sanders and Firmin, that a sentence imposed under
Statutory Intent
Upon our re-evaluation of the interpretation and statutory intent of
Applicability to Baker
During oral argument, the question was raised as to what effect there should be for the defendant herein should we rule that our holding in Sanders was in error. Our
CONCLUSION
We find that a sentence imposed under
AFFIRMED.
CALOGERO, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.
JOHNSON, J., dissents.
CALOGERO, Chief Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. In this court‘s seminal opinion in State v. Sanders, 337 So.2d 1131 (La.1976), we held that the state may not multiple-bill a person who has been convicted under
In State v. Firmin, 354 So.2d 1355 (La. 1978), this court then specifically applied the Sanders rationale to facts identical to the instant case and held that the state may not adjudicate and sentence a defendant as a habitual offender under
ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING
Rehearing denied.
CALOGERO, Chief Justice, granting rehearing and assigning reasons.
I would grant rehearing in this matter on two bases.
First, for the reasons assigned in my dissent on original hearing, I believe there was no rational or legal basis for overruling State v. Firmin, 354 So.2d 1355 (La. 1978), and State v. Sanders, 337 So.2d 1131 (La.1976). State v. Baker, 06-2175 (La.10/16/07), 970 So.2d 948, 2007 WL 2994601, Calogero, C.J., dissenting. This court in those cases identified and enforced the legislative intent regarding sentencing enhancement for violations of
Second, I believe the defendant makes a credible argument that the majority‘s wholly new and substantive interpretation of
In Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001), the United States Supreme Court noted that a judicial change in the law could deprive a defendant of his due process rights—in particular, notice, foreseeability, and the right to fair warning—if the change were unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue, citing Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). In the instant case, surely the majority‘s substantive reinterpretation of the statutes was unexpected, as this court had specifically identified and enforced the legislative intent behind the statutes, and the legislature had left that interpretation in place for decades. Moreover, the majority‘s new interpretation,
Notes
The statute currently provides:
§ 95.1. Possession of firearm or carrying concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies
A. It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime of violence as defined in R.S. 14:2(B) which is a felony or simple burglary, burglary of a pharmacy, burglary of an inhabited dwelling, unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, felony illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities, manufacture or possession of a delayed action incendiary device, manufacture or possession of a bomb, or any violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law which is a felony, or any crime which is defined as a sex offense in R.S. 15:541(14.1), or any crime defined as an attempt to commit one of the above-enumerated offenses under the laws of this state, or who has been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States or of any foreign government or country of a crime which, if committed in this state, would be one of the above-enumerated crimes, to possess a firearm or carry a concealed weapon.
B. Whoever is found guilty of violating the provisions of this Section shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifteen years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence and be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars.
C. Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Section shall not apply to the following cases:
(1) The provisions of this Section prohibiting the possession of firearms and carrying concealed weapons by persons who have been convicted of certain felonies shall not apply to any person who has not been convicted of any felony for a period of ten years from the date of completion of sentence, probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
(2) Upon completion of sentence, probation, parole, or suspension of sentence the convicted felon shall have the right to apply to the sheriff of the parish in which he resides, or in the case of Orleans Parish the superintendent of police, for a permit to possess firearms. The felon shall be entitled to possess the firearm upon the issuing of the permit.
(3) The sheriff or superintendent of police, as the case may be, shall immediately notify the Department of Public Safety, in writing, of the issuance of each permit granted under this Section.