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State v. Baker
405 A.2d 368
N.J.
1979
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*1 ant under these the validity circumstances attack of his wife’s prior Mexican repudiate obligations divorce and to which he end, marrying plaintiff. estopped assumed in To that he particular assert these plaintiff’s defenses to marital claims. is re- Accordingly, judgment Appellate of the Division plain- versed and the matter remanded for the reinstatement of complaint proceedings may appro- tiff’s and such further priate. and Jus-

For Justice HUGHES reversal remand—Chief CLIFFORD, PASHMAN, MOUNTAIN, SULLIVAN, tices and HANDLER—7. SCHREIBER

For affirmance —None. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, JERSEY, v. DENNIS STATE OF NEW BAKER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 3, 1979 Argued April July Decided 1979. *4 argued appellant the cause for Rothberg

Mr. David H. Sachar, Bernstein, (Messrs. Rothberg, Mongello, & attor- Sikora neys). argued respondent. B. Blacker the cause for

Mr. Michael Director, Bisgaier, Mr. Division of Public Interest Carl S. curiae Advocacy, argued the cause for amicus Public Advocate Ness, (Mr. Advocate, Jersey Stanley of New C. Van Public Hurd, attorney; Bisgaier Depu- Mr. and Ms. Linda R. Assistant Advocate, brief). ty Public on the Borough

A brief was submitted on behalf of amicus curiae Dilts, (Mr. attorney). Thomas H. Somerville of the court was delivered opinion PASHMAN, J. presented by appeal

The issue this is whether a munici upon biological legal criteria based relation pality may utilize types groups may to limit the that live within ships in order Specifically, validity its borders. we must determine the 17:3-l(a)(17) Zoning which of the Plainfield Ordinance seeks § preserve “family” municipality’s neigh character of the by prohibiting borhoods more than four unrelated individuals housing from unit. For the reasons to be sharing single given below, we although goal sought conclude that to be fur entirely legitimate, the means provision thered chosen relationship not bear a substantial to the effectuation of that do I, Hence, (1947) goal. regulation violates N.J.Const. Art. IV, par. and cannot par. and Art. stand. § Defendant Dennis Baker is the owner of a house located at Avenue, dwelling Plainfield. This is situated in a Sheridan separate single family zone restricted to use. On three occasions charged allowing with during the fall of 1976 defendant in violation of section family more than one to reside in his home Zoning “Family” 17:11-2 of the Plainfield is defined Ordinance. in the ordinance as: *5 dwelling single (1) occupying unit as a a non-profit or more One persons * * * (4)

housekeeping blood, not related by than four unit. More persons a marriage, not be considered constitute family. [City shall adoption 17:3-l(a)(17)] Zoning § Plainfield Ordinance Municipal Plainfield charges was held as to all three A trial the home was indicated that presented The evidence Court. Baker, their Mr. and Mrs. by nine individuals: generally shared her three children. Mrs. Conata and Several daughters, three within the household for apparently resided other also of time. periods indeterminate together lived in what defendant The Bakers and Conatas groups two view each other family.” an “extended The termed family and have no desire to reside part large of one Defendant, an ordained minister of the Pres- separate homes. Church, living arrangement that the arose out byterian testified go desire to religious beliefs and resultant of the individuals’ life as “brothers and sisters.” The Bakers and Conatas through communal prayer shared common areas and held together, ate per amount week occupant sessions. Each contributed fixed expenses. defray household guilty charges was found of all three and fines Defendant County in the imposed. were After a trial de novo Union upon Municipal transcript, Court see R. 3:23- Court—based 8(a)—defendant again found in violation of the ordinance. County judge religious concluded that defendant’s Court were and that the house- regarding lifestyle his sincere beliefs family, constituting thus hold resembled a traditional extended non-profit housekeeping meaning unit” within the “single Nevertheless, he found both that zoning ordinance. violated the living arrangement of the Bakers and Conatas 17:3-l(a)(17) provision and that the numerical restriction of § municipality’s police powers. of the Ac- was a valid exercise imposed penalties Municipal the same as had the cordingly, he ordered, however, He that the fines for the first Court. suspended. third violations *6 Division. appeal Appellate a of to the Defendant filed notice Baker, (App.Div.1978). appel- The N.J.Super. v. 158 536 State * * * ordinance judges that “the Plainfield late concluded may single who a occupy the narrowly ‘so delimits potential who occupants numerous family dwelling prohibit as to family living to be style sought to of pose no threat the ” State, Berger v. 71 N.J. (quoting Id. from preserved[.]’ at 541 206, held the ordinance invalid Consequently, they 224 (1976)). according occupants’ uses to permissible insofar as it classified however, ruled, relationships. judges also legal The biological or housekeeping criterion used unit” “single non-profit that the County the concluding was After the ordinance valid. a Baker such unit finding that the household constituted Court’s evi- on credible reasonably have been reached sufficient “could record, considering proofs the as a whole present dence the ** 540, con- they at reversed defendant’s N.J.Super. 158 fines. victions vacated the and 77 N.J. 508 petition for certification. granted

We State’s amicus appear to (1978). permitted Public Advocate now affirm. curiae. We

I broad, is not although municipality’s zoning power, A valid, zoning regulation a must In to be without limits. order and police power of the represent a reasonable exercise both municipal legitimate to a substantial relation bear real and Moreover, public “not need regulation may exceed goal. not of the offen partake uses which do substantially affect sought problem of which cause sive character those 59 Manasquan, v. of Holding Borough ameliorated.” Kirsch Co. Ass’n, 241, See, Mayor Ltd. & (1971). g., e. v. 251 Pascack N.J. 470, (1977); Berger 74 v. Washington Tp., N.J. 483 Coun. of State, 206, (1976); Corp. v. J.D. Construction 71 N.J. 223-224 (Law 140, N.J.Super. Adj. Tp., Board of Freehold Div.1972). Under this test the numerical limitations of 17:3- § l(a)(17) must fall. quarrel legitimacy with the of Plainfield’s

We have no designate certain areas as goal. governments Local are free preserve family style exclusively may residential and act 223; State, supra, 71 N.J. at v. living. Berger See Collins (1949); Adj. Margate City, Village 3 N.J. Board of Boraas, Belle Terre v. 94 S.Ct. 39 L.Ed.2d 797 U.S. (1974). municipality validly maintaining concerned with A generally single associated with stability permanence family occupancy preventing resembling boarding uses living arrangements. Berger v. houses or other institutional See *7 Moreover, State, supra, municipality 71 N.J. at 225. a has a strong regulating intensity interest in of land use so as to overcrowding. Berger, As we stated in congestion minimize may every legitimate way endeavor in to “secure municipality a blessings quiet and maintain ‘the of seclusion’ and to make repose available to inhabitants the refreshment of and the its tranquillity 71 N.J. at 223. of solitude.”

Nevertheless, power goals to attain these is not not, municipality may example, A for zone without limits. so poor to exclude from its borders the or other unwanted minori See, Madison, g., Township ties. e. at Inc. v. of Oakwood Madison, (1977); Burlington Cty. Tp. 72 N.J. 481 NAACP v. So. 151, dism., Laurel, app. of Mt. 67 N.J. cert. den. and 423 U.S. 18, 808, (1975). may zoning 96 46 L.Ed.2d 28 Nor be used S.Ct. regulate composition housekeeping as a tool to the internal of Taxpayer’s Weymouth Tp. Weymouth Tp., units. Ass’n of v. 80 6, dism., 977, (1976), app. N.J. cert. den. and 430 U.S. 97 S.Ct. See, (1977). g., Holding e. Kirsch v. L.Ed.2d 373 Co. Ferraioli, of White v. Borough Manasquan, supra; City Plains (Ct.App.1974). 34 N.Y.2d 313 N.E.2d 756 N.Y.S.2d municipality preserving A a balance between must draw careful family prohibiting diversity. life and social resi maintain a stable attempting to fatal flaw in upon of criteria based through the use neighborhood dential oper is that such classifications legal relationships biological or to the pose of uses which no threat plethora a prohibit ate to Moreover, sought to be achieved. of the end accomplishment which legitimizes many uses defeat system a classification such ordinance, example, prohibit a for would goal. Plainfield’s that widowers, “widows, spinsters older or five unrelated group of single residing in a unit judges” from even of bachelors—or Borough Holding Kirsch Co. municipality. within the hand, group other a at 248. Manasquan, N.J. On supra, violating reside without cousins could so of 10 distant consisting distinguishes between ac Thus the ordinance ordinance.1 may, many which grounds uses on prohibited ceptable sought to relationship problem be cases, to the no rational have ameliorated. biological legal relationships

Regulations based traits generalized stability about the assumptions reflect necessarily comprised of unrelated desirability of households and social cases do not reflect the individuals—assumptions many which Schaefer, Court Supreme for the writing real world. Justice Illinois, that has noted operate only by together common desire to group their a bound unit, thought quality might

single housekeeping to have transient *8 not, contend, colleagues examples dissenting 1These are as our intended to suggest by country possibility of “invasions swarms of cousins.” See Rather, post they merely at 124. are set forth to demonstrate that closely municipali distinctions utilized ordinance are not related to the ty’s may Although line-drawing valid some concerns. arbitrariness be necessary aclpeve goal, legitimate to countenanced when it is not where, here, precise reaching tolerated as more methods of the desired end See, Ltd., 483; g., Berger supra, are available. e. Ass’n 74 N.J. v. Pascack at State, Co., supra, 223-224; supra, Holding 71 N.J. at Kirsch N.J. at 251. 59 * ** might neighborhood, And it of the would affect adversely stability generate group more of unrelated would be likely be considered that a parking than would an number of related traffic and equal persons. problems groups universal truth. are of these observations reflects a Family But none all units are stable well-disciplined. mobile and not internally today, family groups Plaines v. cars are not unfamiliar. Des with two or more [City Family (Sup.Ct.1966) (emphasis N.E.2d sup 34 Ill.2d 432, 437, Trottner, plied)] municipality power without that court held Accordingly, * * “penetrate deeply so zoning ordinance which would adopt a housekeeping unit.”2 composition single of a into the internal Id. at 120.

Nevertheless, the inexactitude and overinclusiveness despite them in we would be reluctant to condemn regulations, of such do, options less restrictive alternatives. Such the absence of however, exist.

The courts of this and other states have often noted that concept underlying the core single family living is not biological but, rather, or legal relationship single its character as a house State, keeping Berger unit. supra, 71 N.J. at 227. See Kirsch Holding Borough 250; Co. v. Manasquan, supra, 59 N.J. at City Trottner, of Des supra; Plaines v. Boston-Edison Protective Fathers, Ass’n v. Paulist 306 Mich. (Sup.Ct. N.W.2d 847 1943); Ferraioli, City 300, 305-307, of White Plains v. 34 N.Y.2d 449, 452-454, N.Y.S.2d 313 N.E.2d 758-759 (Ct.App. 1974). As long group “generic as a bears the character of a family household,” unit as a relatively permanent it should be equally occupy as entitled to a single family dwelling its that Des Plaines has in fact been statute. 2The dissent notes superseded reasoning for here, however, which, It is cited not for its result but rather its view, in our remains as valid as when it was written. See Kirsch today Holding (citing approval). with Co., 59 N.J. at 249-250 Des Plaines supra,

109 Plains, City supra, White 34 neighbors. related of biologically 758; 453, see, 306, g., N.E.2d at e. N.Y.2d 357 N.Y.S.2d at 313 at Ct., 69, Superior Cal.Rptr. 242 Brady Cal.App.2d v. 200 19 Chester, v. of 31 (Dist.Ct.App.1962); Zoning Oliver Comm’n 197, (C.P. A.2d 841 Middlesex Conn.Sup. Cty.1974); 326 Carroll Beach, (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1967); 643 City v. of Miami 198 So.2d 45 Washington, Zoning, Inc. v. Board of Group House of Port 377, 266, (Ct.App.1978); 380 N.E.2d 207 N.Y.2d N.Y.S.2d Org. for Chil Working Ass’n v. Retarded Little Neck Comm. dren, (App.Div.1976); Missionar 52 A.D.2d 383 N.Y.S.2d Bay, v. of Whitefish Lady Village of of La Salette ies Our (Sup.Ct.1954). Wis. 66 N.W.2d 627 a preserving in legitimate a interest

Plainfield has neighborhoods. “family” style living of in certain residential achieved, sensibly, by the perhaps more may a be goal Such well the exclusion as as single-housekeeping requirement, unit residences, uses such as commercial incompatible residential uses, homes and other such boarding institutional non-familial unnecessarily upon freedom occupancies infringing without State, Berger v. privacy of unrelated individuals.3 See Margate City, v. City Inc. supra; Realty, Collins Gabe N.J.Super. (App.Div.1970). “family” living, preserving style to

In addition necessary prevent also defends its ordinance municipality multi-family occupan- opinion suggests today’s will allow 3The dissent ignores family post cy single the fact that at 115-116. This homes. See actually groups municipalities empowered which are to restrict residences single single-housekeeping fide units—the true criterion constitute bona State, supra, Municipal dwellings. Berger 227. 71 N.J. at residence such manner what constitutes remain free to define a reasonable officials limitations, infra, may Moreover, space-related occupancy discussed unit. groups possibility preclude of “unrestricted” size. of household used today’s Thus, only groups compatible area will benefit with a residential opinion. *10 overcrowding congestion. regulation, however, The instant tenuously is too related goals to these to justify impingement its upon makeup the internal of housekeeping entity. The Plainfield Ordinance is both and overinclusive. underinclusive It is prohibits jingle overinclusive because it housekeeping units not, may fact, which be overcrowded or cause congestion; it is underinclusive because it prohibit fails to housekeep- certain ing units—composed of related present individuals—which do . Thus, problems. such example, for five unrelated gen- retired tlemen not large eight could share a bedroom estate situated upon land, five acres of whereas a large extended family includ- aunts, ing cousins, uncles and could share' a small two bedroom apartment without violating this ordinance.

An appropriate prevent method to overcrowding conges- tion suggested by this Court Holding Kirsch Co. v. Borough Manasquan, supra. of We there stated that overcrowding dwelling of /. [w]hen use, e., of intensity units and facilities, might given zoning consideration [presents problem] quite properly housing general code which limiting would have to be provisions, application, the number of sleeping in reasonable occupants relation to available and bath- requiring

room facilities or a minimum amount of habitable floor area per (emphasis supplied)] N.J. at 254 occupant. [59 See v. Mayor Clifton, Sente and Mun. Coun. of 66 N.J. 204 (1974). facility-related Area or only ordinances not bear a greater much problem relation to the of overcrowding than do legal or biologically classifications, based they impact also do not upon the composition of the household. They thus constitute a more reasoned manner of protecting public health.5 4We have, in fact, reaffirmed the today of such appropriateness restrictions as a League solution to density-related Home problems. Builders of So. (1979). Inc. v. Jersey, Berlin, 81 N.J. 127 Tp. 5We note that Plainfield does in fact have a minimum space per occupant although zoning requirement, officer who testified at trial did not if know the Baker household was in violation thereof.

Ill with similar- legitimate municipal concerns can be dealt Other congestion appropriately Traffic can be remedied reason- ly. able, number of cars which evenhanded limitations Moreover, may given be maintained at a residence. area-related will, by decreasing density, restrictions tend them- occupancy behavior—which, problems. Disruptive selves to reduce traffic course, households—may properly is not limited to unrelated through general police power. be controlled the use of the As Borough Manasquan, supra: we stated in Kirsch v. *11 with obnoxious behavior can best be dealt by personal Ordinarily officially general

vigorous and enforcement of ordinances and police power persistent * * Zoning and cannot be criminal statutes *. ordinances are not intended dwelling cure most anti-social conduct in situations. [59 expected prevent N.J. at 253-254] upon legal relationships Restrictions or biological based such as impact Plainfield’s only remotely upon problems such and hence judicial cannot scrutiny. withstand

Plainfield, attempting justify regulation, upon its relies Boraas, 1, Village 1536, of Belle Terre v. 416 U.S. 94 39 S.Ct. (1974). L.Ed.2d 797 In that case Supreme the United States upheld Court an ordinance which limited to two the number of single-family unrelated individuals who could reside in a dwell ing. widely by Belle Terre has been criticized the commenta 6 tors appears part and its rationale to have been undermined in Cleveland, by City the more recent case of v. E. Moore 431 g., Doughty, Legal e. Williams and 6See, “Studies Realism: Mount Rutgers (1975); 29 L.Rev. Berman,” 76-82 Belle Terre and Laurel, Hart- “Village man, of Belle Terre v. Boraas: Belle Terre is a Nice Place to (1974); There,” Note, Visit—But ‘Families’ Live 8 Urb.L.Ann. 193 Only May “Village ‘A of Belle Terre v. Boraas: for 9 U.S.F.L.Rev. Sanctuary People,”’ (1974). U.S. (1977).7 event, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 531 any In Belle Terre is at dispositive most of any federal constitutional question We, course, here involved. remain interpret free to our constitution and See, statutes more stringently. e. g., Madison, Madison, Oakwood at Inc. v. Tp. of supra, 72 N.J. at n.3; Burlington Cty. Laurel, So. Tp. NAACP v. of Mt. supra, 67 N.J. at generally Brennan, 174-175. See “State Constitutions and the Rights,” Protection of Individual 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1977).8 We find the reasoning of Belle Terre to be both unpersuasive and inconsistent with the results reached by this Court in Holding Kirsch Borough Co. v. Manasquan, supra, State, Berger supra. Hence we do not choose to follow it. Co.,

The dissent Holding supra, contends that Kirsch was undermined Belle Terre. regard Its conclusion in this First, upon unsound. the dissent rests the premise that holding Kirsch was in fact based federal constitutional grounds. however, opinion, merely That held that substantive process issue; due regulation was offended at it did not specify whether the federal or state constitution being invoked. Inasmuch as our own requires zoning constitution ordinances comport process, Laurel, with due supra, see Mt. there is no reason to predicated believe that Kirsch was not *12 7See, g., Law-Zoning,” “Developments e. in the 91 Harv.L.Rev. 1568- (1978); City Cleveland, Emergence 1574 “Moore v. of East Ohio: The of the Right Family Zoning,” Pepperdine (1978). of Choice in L.Rev. 547 remarked, aptly they 8As Justice Brennan “state courts cannot rest when protections have afforded their citizens the full of the federal Constitution. Constitutions, too, liberties, protections State a are font of individual their extending beyond required by Supreme often those the [United States] interpretation Court’s of federal law.” Id. at 491. Constitutional decisions courts, declared, only “guideposts” federal he should be considered as in interpreting provisions they logically state constitutional “if are found to be persuasive well-reasoned, paying regard precedent policies due and the * * underlying specific guarantees constitutional Id. at 502. Further, grounds. upon both state and federal constitutional State, incompatible supra,9 clearly which is with Belle Berger v. Terre, decided Belle Terre was handed down. More was after over, reasoning, thereby endorsed Kirsch Berger specifically only aspect that it its which was under indicating was federal Terre; holding state mined Belle its constitutional remains event, unimpaired. any analysis logically In the Kirsch remains Terre, regardless today sound of Belle and we reaffirm our position. adherence to that complies its ordinance

Finally, Plainfield asserts that State, that Berger supra. In case opinion with in v. this Court’s dictum, validly could “restrict stated, municipality that a we number who to a reasonable single family dwellings unit.” 71 N.J. at 225. single housekeeping constitute a bona fide dealing an use in a However, there were with institutional we “persons” rather than unrelated spoke setting familial discussion, we conclude light today’s In individuals. imply space-relat intended

use of word “reasonable” Thus, legitimizes space-related Berger merely ed limitations. such, and, wholly as consist general application restrictions of Washington v. Township of opinion today. See ent with our Inc., Center, N.J.Super. Health Bergen Central Comm. Div.1978); Hospital Montroy, N.J. (Law Holy Name Div.1977). (Law Super. 181 zoning regulations which we hold that

Accordingly, unrelated the number of attempt residency limit based housekeeping unit single non-profit present individuals recognize that Although we constitutional muster. pass cannot municipal powers duty to construe we are under constitutional 11, municipali IV, par. (1947), Art. N.J.Const. liberally, § see Berger opinion aspect this 9The chooses to characterize dissent developed holding. Actually, fully alternative dictum. it was a *13 zoning ties cannot enact ordinances which violate process. due See, Washington Ass’n Ltd. v. & Council g., Mayor e. Pascack (1977); State, v. Tp., Berger N.J. 71 N.J. I, 1; IV, (1976); (1947), par. 223-224 N.J.Const. Art. Art. § par. 2.10

II require that Plainfield’s numerical Having concluded house invalid, whether the Baker we must determine ment is “single criterion of remaining municipal a hold fulfilled the housekeeping that the Baker-Co non-profit unit.” We conclude permanence of sufficient so as to resemble nata alliance was Thus, Court family. County extended the more traditional “single the Baker constituted a that household judge’s finding unit” the intendment of 17:3- non-profit housekeeping within § on record. l(a)(17) adequately is based the

Conclusion municipalities may that not condition residence Today we hold upon persons present the of unrelated within the house- number alternatives, such availability hold. of less restrictive Given the perceived to the ills regulations insufficiently are related social I, par. 10Article our Constitution ensures the natural and unalienable right pursue safety happiness. Encompassed of individuals to and obtain requirement process within upon today’s its is the strictures of due which analysis addition, is based. In we would be remiss if we did not that the note right privacy protection provi is also included within the offered that See, Saunders, g., (1977). Although right sion. e. State v. 75 N.J. 200 this absolute, may only necessary not promote compel it be restricted when ling government IV, 6, par. expressly provides interest. § Article that the power police power to zone shall be deemed to be within the of the State. have, .however, interpreted provision We mandating zoning that that regulations reasonably promote public welfare of as a See whole. So. Burlington Cty. Tp. Laurel, supra. provisions, NAACP of Mt. These when together, require zoning read accomplished restrictions in manner impacts right which they least of individuals to order their lives as herein, see fit. regulation For the reasons contained the Plainfield this fails Thus, right privacy test. process. it violates and due *14 we not they Although to ameliorate. do which were intended faith, it chose to further its good the means doubt Plainfield’s overreaching in their scope were hence legitimate goals permitted be to stand. cannot reasons, Appellate of judgment the the foregoing

For the Division is affirmed.

MOUNTAIN, J., dissenting. my disagree- grounds the to state write in dissent both

I the my colleagues and with reached with the decision ment to indicate as holding, but also support in of that reasons offered this case to great significance of able the clearly I am throughout the and indeed owners State and home property Although there are a generally. the citizens of State majori- view in the points of and declared number statements aspects of the decision exception, I two ty to which take opinion especially empha- be importance deserve to especial are of sized. will this case have is the result that

One these take to an this The second is What I be zoning fabric of State. as a basis of Jersey New Constitution unfortunate resort decision, of this certain people from the State taking thus enjoyed may hitherto but now they which have important rights no longer exercise. points. The most of these initially the first

Let me address deprives this is that it result of decision immediately significant “one-family in resi are located properties whose homeowners areas of the residential other restricted dence zones” possibility enjoyed against the hitherto protection they have for multi the same zone would used dwellings in that other of unrelated individ occupancy by groups family purposes or for writing, except as noted As of this as to size. uals unrestricted say Jersey in New who can with below,1 is no homeowner there enjoy the 1Homeowners whose benefits restrictive covenants properties limiting single-family are use of lands to still occupancy protected, by any house, assurance that neighbor’s his next door or that of his street, may friend down the any not at time and without warning, occupied either be by two or families or by more group of unrelated indefinite number. All of this may happen although properties Triple-A are located in a Furthermore, one-family moment, Residential zone. at this such occupancies perfectly are legal and it is not at all any clear that *15 effective clear, relief can be had at the municipal level. What is below, as will be discussed is that no effective relief at all is available at the State level—from Legislature. our More of this anon. This condition of things results from majority deci- sion handed today. down significant aspects

The of these two of this case has to second majority opinion interprets do with the manner in which the and Constitution, adopted deals with our That State Constitution. 1947, following provision: in contains the concerning of this and of law Constitution any municipal provisions government, concerning for shall be counties, formed local or corporations construed in their favor. The of counties and such municipal liberally powers granted include not those terms also those shall but corporations only express conferred, or fair or incident to the necessary implication, powers expressly essential and not inconsistent with or this Constitution or thereto, prohibited by law. Art 4, § 7, [N.J.Const., II11] law, Hitherto, provision this has in the course of our decisional terms, with its again again, and in accordance applied, been provisions interpretation a liberal of all constitutional and afford municipalities. applies It with full pertaining of all statutes zoning force to ordinances. Zoning ordinances are to receive a reasonable construction and application, under the Constitution of Art. 1947, § are to be IV, VII, par. they liberally Adjust. construed in favor of the v. Bd. of municipality. [Place River, Saddle (1964)]

42 N.J. coming covenants, virtue of these of all respect within the properties neighborhood scheme—the area to which the covenants apply. however, to dwell especially important, It is not relationship provision zoning of this constitutional to the ordi- us, opinion really nance before because the Court’s focuses—al- Zoning Enabling our though specific mention—upon without Act, any discussion of Through by-passing N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62. Constitution, majori- turning directly this statute and to the legislative in effect cure. Thus ty possibility eliminates all deprive Legisla- the direct result of is to our this decision State power municipalities ture of the to restrict home to authorize know, occupancy to families. As far as I this restriction single upon legislative exists in no other state. power is the voice of that our Constitution forget

We never should rests. ultimately sovereignty in whom all people, Constitution derives its not from the force, Convention which framed [T]he it, [Gangemi (1957)] but from who ratified it. 25 N.J. people Berry, that our people It is the of this who have declared State are to concerning municipalities our statutes Constitution and I leave it to the reader to decide receive a liberal construction. give due today whether this Court’s decision can be said *16 proper weight people the admonition of the set forth above. to germane point out making In this assessment it is fair and that, above, appears as I have no other court in the land said have furthermore lawgivers so shackled the hands of its and years ago was some today that the rule of law laid down Village land. of Belle repudiated by highest the court in the Boraas, (1974). 39 L.Ed.2d 797 Terre v. 416 U.S. S.Ct. majority zoning The the Plainfield ordinance concludes sharing from a prohibiting more than four unrelated individuals I, Jersey of New single housing par. unit violates Art. the The clause reads as follows: Constitution. All free and have certain natural and are nature and independent, by defending rights, among enjoying and life and

unalienable which are those of pursuing and acquiring, possessing, protecting of and and property,

liberty, Art. I, obtaining 1] [N.J.Const., par. safety happiness. affects provision how this may immediately apparent It not be is silent majority opinion the issue before us and the this law that case we know from earlier unenlightening. But process” a “due to include both provision interpreted has been in the found to those clause similar “equal protection” and an or both upon one presumably Federal Constitution. It relies. majority clauses that the implied these our discussion. point in highly significant a brings This us to achieving a foreordained majority, obviously The intent finding that result, goal sought-for could have reached the not, a us, as did before the section of the Plainfield ordinance requirements the fulfill statutory interpretation, matter of have held it could words Zoning Enabling the Act. In other in the forth manner set power “family” that the in the to define municipalities delegated to powers beyond ordinance went Enabling of the pertinent portion Legislature. The most Act says, zoning ordi- a or amend governing may adopt body [of municipality] buildings and and of relating of land nance nature and extent of the uses to the

structures thereon. [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62] adverted applicable Given canons of liberal construction above, comprehensive this might thought it difficult to read itBut grant of Plainfield has done. power forbidding what language certainly would to discover in this be no more difficult ordinance, extract a prohibition against than to the Plainfield vague proscription from the against municipal legislation such difficulty phrases I, course the par. quoted Art. above. Of quite clearly arises from the fact that neither Constitution prohibi- Enabling sensibly impose nor the Act can be read to *17 care the tion. But with some let us move forward to examine majority to which follows from the choice made the result than the statute. upon its decision the Constitution rather place Normally, the has chosen to do is most unusual. What Court arises, where an a court will rest its decision issue of this sort upon a It has statutory ground. rather than a constitutional Had suggested unyielding.2 been that this rule is absolute and here, very differ this course been followed the result would be ent than the decision been reached the end now achieved. Had Legislature, as a then the statutory interpretation, matter of so, the statute to had it seen have amended fit to do could have municipalities should thenceforth provide expressly that previously found not to have been power the Court had this be doing foreclosed from granted. completely Now it is violation. cause the has found there to be a constitutional Court Legislature cannot amend the Constitution. parallel experience A in Illinois is instructive. In 1966 the Supreme state, City Court of that in the case of of Des Plaines Trottner, (1966) required v. to Ill.2d 216 N.E.2d 116 rule to validity municipal very of a ordinance similar the one before us here. The in the Illinois case ordinance defined a each “family” consisting of one or more blood, to adoption marriage together related the other with respective “Family” might their also include spouses. domestic N.E.2d at 117. gratuitous guest. servants and one The court statutory determined that as a matter of construction zoning enabling act in ordinance was invalid because make delegated municipalities power Illinois had not such a classification. questions sound, principle oft-expressed constitutional is the 2[TJhere absolutely imperative in the unless

should not be reached and resolved adjudicative process disposition litigation. admits of few While the of the absolute, rules, any being unyielding an as close as this maxim comes J., Saunders, (Clifford (1977); [citing 75 N.J. authorities] [State dissenting)] *18 adopted Legislature the Illinois following year, the In as follows: reads 11-13-1(9), which Ill.Rev.Stat.19Q7, c. § following have the authorities in each powers: [T]he corporate municipality ‡‡‡‡**** (9) regulate on the basis of to and restrict the use of property classify, as one or more which be defined family relationship may

family relationship, maintaining marriage or each related to the other blood, adoption a common household. problem way which the common The difference between been handled way in which it has and the was handled Illinois Illinois, the court decision In since Jersey striking. in New is statutory interpretation, an issue of upon made to rest was readily were able to Legislature, their through people, acting enacting simply by they disagreed, which with alter a decision hand, this other Jersey, In New on the legislation. corrective not In the opportunity. of this people deprived has Court with be dissatisfaction there should unlikely event accomplished by either only correction can majority opinion, amending the Consti- byor to reverse itself inducing this Court I is what have simple certain. This Neither course is tution. Jersey resort to the New as “an unfortunate referred to above not have the Court should something It I think Constitution.” done. very in another to this presented Court problem same I refer years ago. decided some few

important zoning case Laurel, (1975) 67 N.J. Cty., Tp. Burl. of Mt. So. N.A.A.C.P. to rest the was made (Mt. Laurel). There a conscious choice grounds. statutory upon than upon decision constitutional rather holding in the Court’s Although 67 N.J. at 174-75. I concurred of the Court case, other members disagreed in that I with the upon the decision single point. this I have rested upon would wrote a grounds and statutory than constitutional rather I still at 193. stating. 67 N.J. opinion so concurring brief is correct.3 that that view believe Laurel, had very Mt. able commentator

In a discussion of say my concurring opinion: about this On this to rest constitutional or point [whether opinion upon statutory *19 grounds] (Mountain) ground one Justice concurred on the that the specially, general zoning enabling decision should be based welfare act under the . and a therefore that constitutional decision was This unnecessary. would have been an invitation to the dominant suburban forces in the open Legislature, figure enabling get to out a to amend the act in order to try way majority rejected decision; around this and so the Williams, it. [3 wisely Planning American § Land 1978 Law, 6.13f, 33-34, p. Cum.Supp.] But point legislators people the whole is that the the whom they represent should have the the This is right to final word. what democracy is all about. are, foregoing points

While the in their the impact upon State, important citizens of this the most that emanate from decision, aspects majority opinion this there are other of the perhaps go which should not unnoticed. Village treatment of rather cavalier

One of these is its Boraas, by a case decided the United States supra, v. Belle Terre upon to was called in 1974. There the Court Supreme Court one-family land use to examine an ordinance that restricted being one or more was defined as dwellings. “family” The word any blood, well as adoption, as persons marriage or related as cooking together living “. . . persons two unrelated at .” 416 at S.Ct. single housekeeping unit . . . U.S. 3 I both in the would concede that there is a nobility purpose readily goes justify decision and in far to resort Mt. Laurel that opinion suggested in Mt. I have much before. “The rule down [laid Constitution. Inc. Madison, at idealistic, has an even Oakwood Laurel] quality.” Utopian (1977). that no Madison, 72 N.J. It is all too obvious Township such is to be found in the case before us. quality

1537-38, at L.Ed.2d 800. It will be that seen this ordinance is practically us, identical with the one that except before Plain- permits field twice as many persons—four unrelated rather than two—to occupy dwelling. Speaking for seven members of the Court, Douglas Justice an opinion sustaining wrote the constitu tionality of the ordinance all respects. argument The was made, here, as it has been made that unrelated were improperly deprived of associational and other constitutional rights. out, It pointed here, as has been done whereas only two persons might residence, unrelated occupy a one-family any persons, blood, number of adoption, if allied marriage or were free to associate together single housekeeping as a unit. It was urged that this constituted impermissible discrimination and violated the rights associational persons. of unrelated opinion Court’s rejected completely argument. It formed basis, however, of Justice Marshall’s dissent.4 It Why rejects Belle is not clear. is said majority Terre its persuasive, why not but we are not or wherein told addressed inadequacies lies. All other state courts that have *20 this issue follow it. since Belle Terre was decided have chosen to Denver, 250, (1974); Rademan v. of 186 526 P.2d 1325 City Colo. Norwalk, Prospect Home, City Gardens Convalescent Inc. 214, 32 for Educ. Conn.Supp. (1975); 347 637 Association A.2d Hayward, (Mo.1976). may properly Dev. v. 533 S. W.2d 579 We note Village following . the Terre v. Bo- state of Belle courts, tendency reject (1974) 416 to raas, U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d ... the 1, 39 [94 1536, 797] groups

claims of of friends have needs but or other associates who no special together. [Developments-Zoning, wish to live 91 1578 merely 1427, Harv.L.Rev. (1978)] 77n. But not in Jersey. New 4Justice taking Brennan wrote a dissent separate position that under the

facts presented to the Court the case was moot and therefore there was no pending “case or ground He controversy.” recommended dismissal on this and hence did not reach the meritorious issue in the case. The majority argues that Plainfield’s definition of “family,” embracing as only four unrelated while including nucle- size, ar families of any is both overinclusive and underinclusive. points It possibility of ten distant assembling relatives under one jurists roof while five or more groups or other similar are forbidden to together. cohabit The argument proceeds upon oft-rejected have, premise legislation that that could but did not, person exclude or include every might properly who have been so classified therefore invalid. Much the argument same Supreme was advanced before the Court in Belle Terre: It is said, that if two however, unmarried can constitute a people “family,” there is no reason three or four not. why But line may drawn every by legislature might leaves some out that well have been included. That exercise of legislative, judicial, is a discretion, however, not a function. U.S. at [416 8, S.Ct. at 39 L.Ed.2d at 1540, 803—4] Douglas quote Justice went on to Justice Holmes’ famous re- sponse to argument: this kind of legal When a distinction is as no one doubts that it determined, be, may night between childhood and or day, other maturity, extremes, any point has gradually to be fixed or a line has to be drawn, out successive picked by change

decisions, mark where the takes Looked at itself without place. by regard might to the behind it the line or seems It necessity point arbitrary. well or as well bo a little more to one side or the nearly other. But when it is seen that a line or there must be, that there is no mathematical or point logical fixing legislature it the decision of the way precisely, must be accepted unless we can it is wide of say reasonable mark. Louisville Gas very any (dissenting Co. v. Coleman, 32, U.S. 41, 423, S.Ct. 72 L.Ed. 770 opinion). at 8 n. U.S. S.Ct. at 1540 n. [416 39 L.Ed.2d at 804 n. 5] Limiting occupancy single families and to not more than individuals, four unrelated City as has been done Plainfield, is in every sense fair and reasonable and should be sustained. The majority would be employed protecting better rights of homeowners—grievously threatened this deci- *21 sion—rather than in conjuring up hobgoblins in the imaginary form of nonexistent country invasions swarms of cousins. why

Let more I Plain- affirmatively me indicate believe the posi- Appellant field ordinance be sustained. takes the should above, tion, composed family, stated that if a of an indefinite occupy a resi- persons, may legally “single-family” number of dence, persons then an indefinite number of unrelated should agreed majority doing have the The has and in so right. same greatest has of our deplorably denigrated one of the and finest family family. The should be entitled—as institutions—the distinctly until now it been—to stand on its own in a has preferred position. support There is in our mores there no law, group should our the justify any be none in elevation of position parity family. of unrelated to a of with a Cleveland, Brennan, concurring, Justice in v. East Moore 1932, (1977), quoting U.S. from S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 531 case, Village the brief the Terre in filed of Belle that earlier stated, expressed point perhaps has as well as it can age Whether it be the extended of a more or the nuclear family leisurely family raising training of generations the role of successive today family legal it more we than makes dare other social species important, say, any If freedom not Bill institution. any mentioned in the ... specifically Rights enjoys a in the law it is most position ‘preferred certainly family. U.S. at 97 S.Ct. at 545; at [431 L.Ed.2d Justice that of emphasis Brennan)] Similarly plurality opinion Powell in Justice the same case sharp judicial drew a line between family solicitude for the as an n institution and its attitude groups. toward unrelated It should be stated that the ordinance in East “family” Cleveland defined way such a a grandmother could not maintain a common household grandchildren with two cousins, although who were she could have done so they City had brothers. been East Cleveland relied on Belle Terre to sustain position. its Justice Powell disagreed:

125 . overriding . . factor [0]ne sets this case from apart Belle Terre. The ordinance there affected unrelated only individuals. It allowed all expressly who were related marriage” “blood, together, by or adoption to live and in sustaining the ordinance we were careful to note that it promoted “family needs” and values.” 416 “family U.S. at 9 S.Ct. 39 [94 1536, L.Ed.2d East 797], regulate Cleveland, contrast, has chosen to housing of its occupancy by slicing into the deeply itself. family U.S. at 97 [431 498, at S.Ct. 52 1935, L.Ed.2d at 537] Prior decisional law in this is not especially helpful. State Holding Kirsch Borough Co. v. Manasquan, (1971) 241 N.J. dealt only rentals, with summer perhaps which should be thought of as a special problem. present Furthermore its status is ambivalent. Taxpayers In Weymouth Tp. Association of Weymouth Tp., (1976), Pashman, 80 N.J. 6 Justice speaking for a court, said, unanimous Kirsch was grounds decided on constitutional and to that have extent, may, been undermined by decision in Belle Terre v. subsequent Boraas, supra, U.S. 941, S.Ct. upholding L.Ed.2d similar ordinance. N.J. at [80

33] This clearly so, although the majority opinion seems uncertain. State, Berger v. recently,

Most this Court decided home, group by owned N.J. 206. There the maintenance of a State, at- pre-school children was multi-handicapped for in the certain restrictive covenants being tacked as violative of located, was as well chain which the school of title of the land on zoning as in the local ordinance. being provisions in violation of that, as a We held were not violated and that the covenants provisions immune from the agency, group state home was by way on to zoning say, the local ordinance. We went dictum, setting apart one-family zoning that a ordinance zone, defining “family” being only those residential blood, marriage adoption unduly related persons restrictive; fairly legitimate that it did not take account of the suggested We also persons. needs of unrelated

rights those number limiting to a reasonable be met might this need together as a bona choose to live might who unrelated suggestion same at 225. The unit. 71 N.J. housekeeping fide *23 in Gate Collins by Judge made Conford indeed been earlier had 341, 350 City, N.J.Super. City Margate Realty, Inc. v. has City of Plainfield 1970). to me that the It seems (App.Div. suggestion. this done its best to follow ordinance the Plainfield finds that majority opinion also The the reader IV, §6, 2,¶ it does not inform although violates Art. support forth elaboration set any reasoned what this is nor fol- reads as in fact provision holding. This constitutional lows: Legislature general other laws under which enact municipalities, may restricting zoning limiting and specified ordinances

than counties, may adopt according buildings to their regulating structures, and therein, districts and and extent and the nature use, and the nature and extent of their construction, to be deemed such shall be uses of and the exercise of land, authority of the subject to repeal laws shall within the of the State. Such police power Legislature. § Art. Const., alteration 2]17 [N.J. to how majority—as does speculate—as I leave the reader confirmation this broad us offends before ordinance even reached. the issue is or in fact how zoning power legislative above, dissent respectfully forth I For all of the reasons set Appellate Division judgment of the and would reverse ordinance in question. declare valid the joins opinion. this Justice Chief HUGHES PASHMAN, CLIFFORD, For affirmance—Justices Judge HALPERN—5. and HANDLER SCHREIBER and Justice MOUN- For reversal—-Chief Justice HUGHES TAIN—2.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Baker
Court Name: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Date Published: Jul 30, 1979
Citation: 405 A.2d 368
Court Abbreviation: N.J.
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